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ČLANCI I STUDIJE



IDEOLOGY AND TRUTH: THE RETURN OF THE OLD COUPLE IN THE POST-TRUTH ERA

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SUMMARY

The author argues that any discourse analysis, as well as other approaches in social sciences and humanities, cannot ultimately avoid the truth and ideology distinction. The first part of the article provides several glimpses at the Western philosophical tradition that preserves the value of truth. In the second part, an idea for political science, grounded in such a history of ideas, is sketched. After a brief discussion of what is ideology as opposed to truth, the author proposes a thesis about ideology, identity and power, and several heuristic ideas how to develop it. In the third part, he briefly provides examples from political and policy analysis that correspond to such a project. In the final part, he explains the importance of preserving the distinction between ideology and truth in the discursively postulated “post-truth” era. This combination of epistemology, science, analysis and teleology is reflected together in one political area of utmost importance for political science operating in the public sphere: the politics of naming.

KEY WORDS: ideology, truth, post-truth, discourse, power, identity, political science, politics of naming

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INTRODUCTION

ἐγὼ διδαχθεὶς ἐν κακοῖς...
Ὀρέστης

“I have suffered into truth...” (Aeschylus 1979, 243).¹ Thus speaks Orestes, recounting his experience from which he has learned when to speak and when to remain silent. The poetic English translation of the ancient Greek verse captures an epistemological tension which is not present in its literal rendition (“I have been thought through bad things...”).² A true insight is something associated with experience. The truth is learned through experience. It is revealed through it. Perhaps more often than not, the access to truth on a personal level involves suffering instead of a victorious bliss. It comes out of an “ordeal”, a word Orestes employs – at least in English translation.³

This experience, both ethical (“I am a new subject”) and epistemological (“I know something new”), may be timeless in the sense that human beings learn about themselves, others and the ways of the world, through personal tragedies and collective tribulations. Both philosophers and laymen still seek the truth on less ethereal or abysmal levels and express it in language: they speak and/or write to communicate it the others, more or less versed to assess it. Those scholars who are by definition focused on less noble levels of truth seeking, thinkers of society, sociologists and political scientists, often employ or have employed the words “discourse” and “ideology” in conveying their messages about the social and political world. The first word usually has something to do with conveying ideology or truth (“a discourse is true or infused with an ideology”), while the second is opposed to truth (“an ideology per definition is not the truth or the whole truth about things: it is a political position”).

This essay – acknowledging the discourse as a useful concept and its valuable usages and analysis – returns to the old couple of ideology and truth, as something more fundamental. It tries to clarify both concepts, and it tries to show how this distinction still makes sense and can still be applied analytically in politics, especially in the present times that are sometimes, in various media outlets, dramatically called a “post-truth

1 Verse 276 from *The Eumenides* (“The Kindly Ones”).

2 One version abbreviates this as “Schooled in misery...” (Scott n.d.). A bit funny but precise Croatian as well as Serbian translation of the English version which renders the epistemological tension might go: “Upatio sam u istinu...”

3 In the original it is not a Socratic βᾶσανος, a touchstone used to check the purity of an allegedly precious metal and an enduring metaphor for philosophical, judicial and religious ordeals, but simply πράγματα, i.e. things or the real stuff which is as consistent with the line of thought I develop in the essay.

era". Since I want to go beyond discourse, I have to be careful here. By "discourse" I mean a system of linguistic mechanisms that in the social sciences and humanities appears as a focus of analysis and an important operational concept. Even discourse analysis, driven by political or epistemological motivation, looks for an ideology in the texts. It says something about their political intent. It, so to say, identifies the political software behind or coded in the linguistic hardware of the text.⁴ It is the analysis that clarifies what is an ideology that serves power and implicitly what truth and possibilities lay behind the words serving power. In other words, after six years of academic teaching on the tenure track not to speak of many more years of research and assistantship leading to that – teaching about Foucault in the field of political ethics and about interpretive policy analysis and its tools, dealing with various discourses, stories and constructions in the realm of public policy – I gradually came to the position that after all is said and done on the formal level of a discourse analysis, there remains one fundamental question. The answer to that question is often eluded in a cruel, manipulative or obtuse way. The question is simple.

"Is this true or not?"

And then perhaps some qualificatory issues emerge such as "On which level?" and so on but the quest for the truth remains. To ironically paraphrase the introduction, I have suffered into this question from my academic experience. This leads me to the purpose of this mental exercise. I want to revive an old ethical tradition. The following section will associate it with Plato, while the conclusion will associate it with Aristotle, viz Alasdair MacIntyre as one of his prominent modern ("neo-Thomist") followers, interested in epistemological crises and the possibilities for political ethics in modernity (MacIntyre 1977; 2007; 2016). But I should here point out that the tradition is at least a bit older, more widespread and associated with civilizations beyond the Western one. For example, it is clearly articulated in the teachings of Confucius who was interested in the problem of true names present in *Cratylus* which I discuss below.

In the 13th book of the *Analects*, Master Kong claims, warning his disciples that civilized gentlemen should speak carefully: "If names are not rectified, then words are not appropriate. If words are not appropriate, then deeds are not accomplished. If deeds are not accomplished, then the rites and music do not flourish. If the rites and music do not flourish, then punishments do not hit the mark" (Confucius 2000, 49). There are right names and "aberrations". From the right names, the right words, the right deeds, the right mores and customs, and the just punishments follow. I.e. (music aside) a whole structure of authority in a polity, obvi-

4 This is roughly the metaphor van Dijk offers in his works, e.g. in his systematic treatise on ideology (van Dijk 1998).

ously associated with the distinction between truth and, in modern words, ideology. What the Analects want to say is that, conversely, if we turn all the names upside down and, consequently, live in a lie, a confusion ensues, political and moral, and a degradation of a polity. Names can conserve a tradition to a point and perhaps names can foster a new reality which makes them tools of politics. But if things or, obviously much more importantly, persons, living beings and their environment, history and future, are named wrongly, or oppressively, a public space may become a place of tyranny. This is the central issue of this essay. The politics of change or preservation of an order than becomes a political ethic of the truth.

The structure of the essay revolving around those motivations and issues is the following.

First, I provide several glimpses at the old tradition that affirms the notion of truth. The reader can think of it as a series of flashes that reveals it in some expected and some less expected places. Is it a big and implicitly political *ad hominem*? Do I want to say that these grand old men thought so and thus a little one can feel at ease when claiming the similar thing? Perhaps. However, beyond their authors being old and venerable, the reader will hopefully see that there is some content to it. There is an argumentation beyond mere proclamation.

Second, I turn to the notion of ideology. If something is not truth, but not exactly a lie, at least not a simple one, what it is and why? How does it work? After a short definitional game, delineating the concept, to explain its “why” I will offer a thesis. Here I will borrow from Pierre Bourdieu – whose work highlights the language games of power pervading the social field, associated with official and unofficial struggle for symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2001) but one must also remember Bourdieu was an experienced field sociologist who affirmed sociology in a non-relativistic way, i.e. he implicitly excluded science from the struggle.⁵ I will also offer heuristic guidelines to apply this thesis with some often misused notions such as “identity”, hinting to the “dialectics” of its change, associated with the interregnum, a state of the shaken or crumbling political orders in the divided societies permeated with ideological and identitarian struggles. Let’s say, somewhat pretentiously, that it’s the case of a special theory. The essence is quite simple: ideology – conveyed through discourse with its

5 There is an old paradox at work here, of a guy from Crete claiming that all Cretans lie. When we listen to him, he seems to exclude himself from the lot. Bourdieu is a bit similar. The struggle of naming is pervasive and political but of course, Bourdieu claims, as we should turn to engineers when we build or fix bridges, when we claim something about social life we should turn to sociologists who have *le savoir sur le monde social*. He employs yet another analogy claiming it’s a sociologist’s duty to intervene as a meteorologist should predict weather. If a meteorologist who can presage an avalanche, in Bourdieu’s metaphor, does nothing, he is no good (cf. Bourdieu 2000, 43–44).

nooks and crannies of language that speaks the truth but also deceives – is a function in the struggle for power of various identities. It serves those who speak. It has a purpose for them involved in the struggle. Groups, be it good or bad, sound or unsound, in the field of political naming claim that which fosters their power and expands their liberty or freedom, or what they think is a good life for them and others. This may be associated with truth beyond or in the realm of appearances but more often is not. (“A good economy, socialist or capitalist, may not produce results projected, political imposition of duties or system of rights might not lead to good life but to the destruction of the social.”)

Third, since I am a political scientist by formation and vocation, I provide a few crude examples in politics and public policy just to suggest how analysis on this basis could work in practice. These are but short elliptic illustrations of what one could do with the thesis and its corollaries analytically. That is: after some evocations in the history of ideas and a thesis in political science, an illustration of its application or perhaps a corroboration in politics and public policy is offered and I intentionally do it in a bit “undone” way, throwing ideas and hints how to do it (“The reader can apply the theses to explain one or more cases and autonomously reach epistemological and normative conclusions”). There is still science, and political science is not necessarily political in the narrow sense of a partisan bias if it tries to reach the truth and expose ideology.

Fourth and final, this leads me to the question of purpose. In an attempt to provide an answer, I bring together the concern for the true names and the question of truth in analysis with some familiar republican motives that are skeptical to the project of liberalism focused exclusively on the negative concept of liberty as a right to say no or extract a particular benefit from the state. In the end, I cannot suggest that there is reason for optimism – the question of optimism or pessimism of truth preservation is an empirical one – but this teleological framework appealing to practical wisdom is decent enough to preserve the truth as a presupposition for any workable teleology. It provides for a fair game of a common public vocabulary and values against particular interests and the tiresome language games of manipulative discourses. It is an ethical call for the value of the truth in the so-called post-truth era where the true speech is often replaced with a bonfire of ideological manipulation.

A HISTORY OF TRUTH? SOME GLIMPSES AT THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUTH IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

Cratylus, Plato’s famous dialogue about language and naming, is one of the initial intriguing places where the story about truth can be found, some-

where near the very beginnings of Western philosophy as we know it. It is of less importance if the particular ancient Greek etymologies offered in the dialogue, implying that the names convey some original or essential truth about things not readily present, are true or a joke: one might accept the positions of Cratylus, a naturalist, or Hermogenes, almost a de Saussurean conventionalist, or, most probably, on a practical level reach a nuanced position between the two extremes as good enough to go on with life in language. This is not of central importance here. However, there is a place in dialogue where Socrates does not seem to jest, even if he speaks hypothetically (which probably, as usual, makes the underlying power of logic more convincing). It's his critique of the sophists, economically or politically motivated relativist manipulators of the day. If everyone has his own truth, it is not possible to divide folly from wisdom. Consequently, wisdom becomes impossible: "And if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another" (Plato n.d., 386c).

This *partage de la folie*, as Foucault had it in his inaugural Nietzschean Collège de France lecture (pointing to the division between reason and madness as one of the procedures governing discourse in the West), here serves as the basis of ethics. Ethics is grounded in the knowledge of the truth. And rightly so. If there is no truth about things on some level, there is no basis for ethics and, one might build further in the normative sphere of collective life, good politics. We might call "true" those statements about things that are not such, or accept madness, but this relativism or manipulation might not be the best political course even if it can in exceptional cases serve as a gate to the higher truth. N.B. that practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*) in the same dialogue is associated with the right perception of motion and flux and temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) with the preservation of wisdom in such circumstances (Plato n.d., 411d-412c), but even these and many more etymological insights into the (diano)ethical virtues do not carry the point important for us here. As the finishing skeptical bit of the dialogue has it, pitting the doctrine of ideas against the Heraclitean flux of things eliminating the possibility of any permanent knowledge (and perhaps language itself as the place of truth): "This may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue" (Plato n.d., 440d). It is the very possibility of a true discourse that is affirmed prior to this, which is to be reached via process of reflection and not by an un-critical assent to the externally offered onomata and their accompanying language games and practices: "no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers

of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality” (Plato n.d., 440c).

Perhaps there are no shortcuts in the process of thinking leading to the truth, but I hope some shortcuts are allowed in the presentation of the history of thought. For the purposes of this essay, we may skip the stoical contemplations and theological orientation of philosophy in medieval times. At the dawn of the modern age, renaissance and classicism, philosophy may still speak in a theological idiom but its epistemological discussions turn secular. There are many interesting contextual problems here – whether the metaphysics of the day shapes politics or it’s the other way around (Sunajko 2015) – but it’s beyond the scope of this essay. In any case, it’s not the higher transcendental truth of God or his immanence in the world we are dealing with but the truth of things or ideas. If it’s not of things and existence, or of quantity or number, as Hume formulated his fork dividing theoretical and empirical knowledge, the discourse should go to the flames “for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Hume 1999, 211). We thus formally enter the epistemological modernity and shake off the religious and metaphysical excesses from above.

Although one might speak about the critique of idols by Bacon, and dig into more pragmatic down-to-earth British tradition of philosophy, Descartes is an obvious reference if we rewind history a bit from Hume and seek an exemplary topos of the epistemological modernity even if it’s still clad in the language of God. To simplify a bit, Descartes’ thought is directed against the swamp of theology and *disputatio* as a traditional Jesuit method of arrival to the truth. Throwing different opinions on the subject is interesting but one is soon fed up and not feeling any smarter. The path is needed. A method. Descartes’ specific claim of our interest here is simple and seems logical as Plato’s “either or” from above. If there are two persons with different judgment on the same thing, claims Descartes, at least one is wrong, as he elaborates within his second rule of method.⁶ “At least one” (*l’un des deux au moins*) is witty and insightful, of course, as is the aphoristic procedural continuation from the actually published *Discourse on method*: experienced lawyers (*longtemps bons avocats*) are not, for that reason, better judges (*meilleurs juges*) (Descartes 2000, 104–105). The argument again slides into ethics – from logics to the good practice of production of the truth – and it might seem that, contra Hume, many philosophers interested in the good life thought that there are ways to derive ought from is.

The final example corroborates this position. I have chosen it because at the same time it’s contemporary enough and offers an interpretation of

6 Or, *toutes les fois que deux hommes portent sur la même chose un jugement contraire, il est certain que l’un des deux se trompe* (Descartes 1826).

one of the alleged fountainheads of relativism, Nietzsche, specifically his essay on truth and lie in an extra-moral sense (Nietzsche n.d.). Bernard Williams is interested in the concept of truthfulness.⁷ His final book *Truth and Truthfulness* claims: “The concept of truth itself – that is to say, the quite basic role that truth plays in relation to language, meaning, and belief – is not culturally various, but always and everywhere the same” (Williams 2002, 61). The statement is detonated in the middle of nowhere of the book like a bomb, coming from a sort of a once closeted Nietzschean who offered a Hobbesian interpretation of Nietzsche. Truth has no history, claims Williams. But what does he mean?

First, let’s take care of Nietzsche. It’s a harder nut to crack from the position of truth. In the said essay, he claims each and every thing is different. World is a set of different things. However miniscule these differences are, there are no two completely similar things. Language erases such differences. Using that same vehicle, as all nominalists do in their discussions, Nietzsche claims we forget the differences in the formation of concepts. There are no two same snowflakes, even no two same leaves (the latter is Nietzsche’s example) but we still use the same word to refer to them. Nietzsche’s poetry enters the story. Our nervous stimuli become encoded in words. We produce concepts as the spiders spin their webs. We engulf the world in metaphors and his picture of truth emerges as a mobile army of metaphors and other figures of language through which we refer to the world. Columbarium of concepts, graveyard of perceptions are some of the figures which emerge in Nietzsche’s poetic and aphoristic style.

So far so good. As Platonic agents in a Heracliteian flux of things, we use the words of language as approximation to depict, according to convention, this set of human relations we metaphorically represent. Truth is a map, not the territory itself. We’re fine with it and we might add a tidiness of method, following the precepts of the so-called French idealism as formulated by Descartes. However, an ethical dilemma then arises for Nietzsche, the question of will, will to truth as Nietzsche calls this in paragraph 344 of the *Gay Science* (Nietzsche, 1887a). It’s an ethical choice. Science as a truth producing activity appears there as a sort of prudence or utility to protect ourselves. Why (such) morality? – Nietzsche asks further, being a philosopher, when nature and history are immoral (he lives in the century of Hegel and Darwin). Why keep the faith in truth which he equates with both Christianity and Plato, and which corresponds to our short history

7 The concept renders itself more or less easily into French as *véracité* or in German as *Wahrhaftigkeit*. There are some dilemmas if one wants to translate it to Croatian and Serbian: *iskrenost* corresponds to *sincerity*, *autentičnost* to *authenticity*, and *istinost* to the truth-value of a statement. Perhaps *istinoljubivost*, equivalent to German *Wahrheitsliebe*, could go, but I leave it to the linguists, being lucky to write this in English.

here, affirming truthfulness? (A Humean would perhaps ask: Why derive an ought at all?) We after all live in a world of overpowering, dominating, reinterpretation, and generally nasty politics. In the world of genealogy, as Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morality* argues (Nietzsche 1887b).

Williams' answer is simple, albeit all the labels from the history of the political theory I will throw at the reader. Hobbesian interpretation of Nietzsche means that one can affirm both Descartes and Nietzsche and be sort of a Cartesian Machiavelli.⁸ Truth is the correspondence of words and things and we may chose it or discard it. If we choose it, we are truthful. We choose truthfulness. This has a history. Williams tries to show a normative logic of this with a thought experiment, with a just-so evolutionary story. This is the style of analytic philosophy such as Nozick's. There is a state of nature and the statements that are sincere and accurate pay off in a social setting if we want to avoid perdition alike to a Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes* scenario. We may save ourselves from a bear attack if we shout "bear" when we see one and we may learn from the past when we read a truthful history. Thucydides is for Williams the father of history, since he introduces these values in the activity of writing history: accuracy, sincerity and non-mythical time. History becomes rational, emancipated from mythical consciousness. Is that bad?

Perhaps, as Nietzsche notes in one of his innumerable jottings, there are no facts as such but interpretations.⁹ The old meanings and purposes are obliterated as he claims in the *Genealogy of Morality*. Any political subject can see that (and that is also one of the reasons why Foucault is an unorthodox historian). But there is, together with that statement, a truth about changing nature of certain facts. Many facts moreover, especially in human affairs. That is the point of genealogy. It is politics, one of a willful power or of a reflected choice. Nietzsche offers us a true discourse, a poetic hypothesis, and his metaphysical self even speculates in a revelation about the eternal return since to all these permutations (of facts) there might be an end and thus a repetition of the same.¹⁰ Truth is preserved both in Nietzsche and his interpreter Williams.

8 I owe the phrases "Cartesian Machiavelli" and "closeted Nietzschean" to James Miller. He taught about Williams in a seminar *Truth, Deception, & Self-Deception in Politics, Philosophy, & the Media* at the New School in the Fall semester 2017. As the usual disclaimer goes, the acknowledged influence does not imply any responsibility whatsoever for the content or the style of the essay.

9 Nietzsche frames the statement as a critique of positivism: *gerade Tatsachen gibt es nicht, nur Interpretationen* (Nietzsche 1887c). We create hypotheses about the world.

10 This thought is present already in Blanqui's writings, as Benjamin noticed, "ten years before Zarathustra – in a manner scarcely less moving than that of Nietzsche, and with an extreme hallucinatory power" (Benjamin 2002, 25). Be it said also that the central thought of Nietzsche's genealogy also precedes him: it is present in the 38th chapter or Cervantes'

The claim seems to be, in this tradition I glimpsed at, however elliptically, that there are truth claims (“Plato”), that multiple contradictory “truths” about same things on the same level are not possible (“Descartes”), that relativism undermines itself and is unethical on some level (“Plato”, “Descartes”, “Williams”), and very likely politically harmful (I leave a tiny bit of Aristotle, conveyed through MacIntyre, for the end section). Folly may lead to a higher insight, persisting in the falsity may reveal the truth, and an unethical conduct may lead to a higher good (as providence works in Victor Hugo’s novels). There are, in other words, many more thinkers in the tradition of Western philosophy, epistemology and political thought: Foucault underneath one of his masks, epistemologists and historians of science such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, and various political thinkers be it Adam Smith for economy or Charles Lindblom for politics. They would offer a more nuanced picture. My idea in this section is not to offer a strict and simplified Popperian morality play (“Always strive to falsify, be a stern puritan in science and a careful piecemeal engineer in politics”). But nuances wouldn’t change the core of the story. The fundamental stakes are important: there is truth. Every time we speak, we acknowledge it. And we should care for it. If we ignore it as such, this may arguably lead to discord, peril and decay or at least such are hypotheses offered by the prophets and religious teachers above, in their basic form of the empirical truth-claims.

Perhaps there is a big Platonic theme to be elaborated on here, associated with the claim that there is no justice without the access to the truth. The importance of the truth may also work for various ethical and practical systems such as the one of conquest or mercy beyond the political ethics of liberalism of individual rights but such themes would demand several volumes beyond these cryptic remarks. I’ll thus content myself with a more modest claim. Discourse can (and should) convey the truth. This is one of its functions. If something, conveyed in a discourse, is not truth and also not a simple lie, falsity, poetry or meaningless gibberish, and refers to political life, then it’s very probably ideology. And ideologies differ. People offer different political stories bringing them into conflict. The next sections offers a thesis about how to deal with that. It does so from the vantage point of political science which is in reality often closer to a partisan advocate than to reasonable judge, even less to a methodical scientist, but should ideally aspire to the latter roles. If there is truth, why do people speak ideologically and what to do with it? This is not the terrain of philosophy but of political science.

Don Quixote where science speaks there would be no weapons without it but the weapons respond that without guarding of the peace with weapons there would be no science. It’s both a Hobbesian thesis and a Foucauldian insight.

IDEOLOGY, IDENTITY AND POWER: AN “EXTENSION OF THE DOMAIN OF STRUGGLE”

What is ideology?

The interesting narratives tracing the history of the concept from de Tracy and Napoleon via Marx and Engels to this day are not important here. Nor shall I enter into an analysis of the specific ideological positions as various readers and textbooks do, with a focus on ideologies in plural and the “*content* of political thought” (Heywood 2017, 4). There is the usual spatial metaphor of left and right, with a history of more or less changing content under those labels; there are anvils and spectra with multiple dimensions, and other conceptual tools that present and typify ideologies making them easier to grasp (cf. Heywood 2017, 16–17). These are also beyond the scope here. All that aside, beneath the discursive fuzz and massive literature on the topic, ranging from ideology critique to a more relativistic sociology of knowledge, it is a concept that is not that hard to grasp even if usual works on the topic often start with about dozen of different definitions, which is similar to Geertz’s line-up of the definitions of culture at the beginning of his probably most famous book (Geertz 1973). I shall give it a try and then typify it along few lines to get some additional contours.

Let’s take a look at few definitions. For Kent Tedin, ideology refers to a set of attitudes which means ideology has cognitive, affective and motivational components (Tedin 1987). It may have elements of truth which can, in Popperian sense, be falsified, but it is both moral and political: it moves the subjects and gives them sense of political right and wrong. Ravlić’s definition accentuates this. For him, ideology is “a set of political ideas and values which are made for human orientation and action in an infinitely complicated political world” (Ravlić 2012, 355–356).¹¹ This set of ideas that explains, evaluates and orients an actor, programming his or her action, can also be associated with a simple scheme, a tripartite model of “freedom (or liberty)” which consists of agent, obstacle and goal: the point is that each ideology inscribes them with their own political content (Ball et al. 2017, 2–3). That means that different practices of naming and ideological signification in the history of political polarizations call to action (it’s an interpellation, in Althusser’s terms) different actors that fit into various more or less sound, convincing, comprehensive and coherent stories about goals and obstacles between them and freedom or liberty or some other kind of politically defined good. For Heywood, who claims that “[a]ll people are political thinkers”, the concept refers to the world-views professed by that

¹¹ ... skup političkih ideja i vrijednosti koje su upravljene za ljudsko orijentiranje i djelovanje u beskrajno složenom političkom svijetu.

political people, with their visions of good society and some implicit or explicit theory of change to reach that preferred end; ideology is, in its relation to power, a “[m]ore or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power” (Heywood 2017, 1, 10).

Several further observations may be added to this framework. It is for example not hard to agree with Eagleton that ideology is “most effective when invisible” (Eagleton 2007, xvii), since some are blind to what is obvious to others, although ideology can and does become visible when named as such by others, Eagleton included, often in ideological struggles. I obviously agree with Eagleton that concept is not to be abandoned (Eagleton 2007, xxi). Eagleton also (beyond being unhappy with Mannheim’s approach as unilluminating), adds some other useful and more or less witty remarks such as: “Ideology, like halitosis, is in this sense what the other person has”, or “Ideology is a function of the relation of an utterance to its social context”; furthermore, when associating ideology with power, he rightly claims that all conflicts between persons are not ideological, he sees it as a more useful concept than myth, and points out that ideologies have “effects *within* discourses” (cf. Eagleton 2007, 2, 5, 8, 9, 109–110, 188, 194). This is all of course helpful and to it one might add that ideologies of endism are themselves ideological (Heywood 2017, 325) and that, if that is a parallel with religious figures of thinking (ideological endisms reflecting religious eschatologies), it is certainly not the only structural similarity. Ideologies can easily be seen as secular versions of religious doctrines with their prophets, anointed collective, judgment days, heavens and hells. As Bertrand Russell long ago noticed in his *History of Western Philosophy*, Marxism has a similar structure to Judeo-Christian religious narrative: dialectical materialism equals Yahweh, Marx equals messiah etc. (cf. Gray 2018, 31). But my point is not, at least not here, to explore their temporality or psychological appeal. More important for the discussion is the fact that specific ideologies often fit different contents into the basis-superstructure theorizing usually associated with some currents of Marxism: e.g. class, race, nation, sex, gender serve as the bases of cultural production in different (often ideological) ideology critiques. However, as Carl Schmitt leaves the basis of political relation empty in terms of identifying a specific distinction that can serve as the basis for political contest, we must abstract here as well.

Consequently, various definitions of ideology – in the familiar trope of introductory scare-lists, Heywood offers only 9 definitions in comparison to Eagleton’s 16 – should be discarded or understood as very specific theories insofar as they point to the specific bases of ideology such as economical structure of society. As Geertz put aside the various definitions of

culture in order to define ethnography as an interpretive science searching for meaning, so the theorizing about specific bases of ideology should be replaced with a more general theory pointing to power. This means, in the end of this short review of literature about ideology, that the most succinct definition that I have found is at the same time the best one: ideology is meaning in the service of power (Thompson 1984).¹² The question is then: for whom does it work? The question may sound simplistic, archaic, not-at-all-structuralist but it is still the right question since “structures” in a given setting also work for the concrete people which yield power over other people however their identities and conceptions might have been formed. In the end of this short review of literature about ideology, we can thus hear the echo of the above question about the truth:

“Whom does this serve?”

It is not truth but ideology and it works for someone. But how does the process usually look? Before finally laying down the thesis that suggests where and how to search for the answer to this simple question, I only need to link this view of ideology with the motif of politics of naming. Ideology produces political names. Bourdieu is a theorist both of power and the struggle for names and normative categories. His political sociology is well known and is not to be expounded here. Social fields, forms of capital, habitus of an actor in a social field, search for distinction and so on: in that dynamic setting, names are not fixed. Bourdieu is right when he asserts that battle for names is pretty pervasive in society. His thinking is a continuation of the old French tradition of thought that warns about politics of naming. In the realm of ideology, Sartre was right: To speak is to act, and things which we name have lost their innocence.¹³ And it is not only French tradition, associated with the political Left. Sensibility for the politics of language is widespread: “In politics, words and their usage are more important than any other weapon”, warns Koselleck, a German historian of concepts (Koselleck 1968, 57) who, in his *Begriffsgeschichte*, traced historical changes of language as well as semantics of revolutions and crises (cf. Kursar and Tomičić 2014).

However, Bourdieu goes a step further which is important here. To reiterate, he is quite explicit about pervasiveness of this struggle. We need names to work for us. Everyone. Every civil society activist as every lawyer in a court of law and every social human being in a struggle for the definition of the situation, knows this. This is a process that appears both in

12 Veyne uses the following metaphor that can make such a broad concept more vivid: ideology refers to “the relationship between the paper money of words and the gold depository of power” (Veyne 1988, 80).

13 *Parler c'est agir : toute chose qu'on nomme n'est déjà plus tout à fait la même, elle a perdu son innocence* (Sartre 1948, 27).

public and private settings, it's formal and informal: there is no social agent who does not try to attempt to do this – to create a world that is more convenient for him or her by naming (ideologically).¹⁴ This is the meaning of the above claim that all people are political thinkers even if they do not reflect too much. And, to remind the reader, Bourdieu's position is that at least in the social world, words can make things.¹⁵ They can change things and perhaps even the world. Even truth needs power or force to back it up, as Bourdieu often claimed,¹⁶ which adds another paradoxical layer—not only on his sociology, but also on Williams' philosophy and this text defending the truth using both of them.¹⁷

The things in the world are framed as something by ideology: this enables some actors and restricts others. To refer to economy, evolutionary biology or some other paradigm in search for an explanation why and how people produce such names would be very interesting but I feel it's a task for another scientist who would search for specifics. To answer the question of who does it and why, and how does this work, I'll stick with the generality of power that is so dear to political science. With the title of the section, in any case I want to suggest that this process – ideology production associated with identity and power – goes broadly and that ideologi-

14 *Il n'est pas d'agent social qui ne prétende, dans la mesure de pouvoir de nommer et de faire le monde en le nommant: ragots, calomnies, médisances, insultes, éloges, accusations, critiques, polémiques, louanges, ne sont que la petite monnaie quotidienne des actes solennels et collectifs de nomination, célébrations ou condamnations, qui incombent aux autorités universellement reconnues* (Bourdieu 2001, 155).

15 *Quand il s'agit du monde social, les mots peuvent faire les choses* (Bourdieu 2001, 328). From Schmitt's perspective (that political concepts are secularized religious concepts), this is but a secular variant of God creating the world with words (Gen 1 & John 1,1 but also many other less conspicuous places than the very beginnings such as Ps 33,6). From a religious perspective, both in Christianity and Islam where Adam gives names to the things in the world this is an ability taught by God. Although there are differences in Christian and Muslim tradition (where Adem informs the angels or the *malaikah* about the names) as well as between Hobbes' view on language and Hegel's *Majestätsrecht* or the authority to name given to the first man, it seems that self-naming (*sebe-imenovanje*) is a sin in the religious tradition in contrast to Hobbes and Hegel (cf. Pavić 2007, 95–96, 102). This also opens normative questions about the diversity and dissent of names problematized in the creation myths: is it a good thing, a projected station in providential eschatology of suffering and salvation, contributing to the richness of the world, or a punishment for vanity of falling from God's proto-language bestowed upon Adam?

16 He correctly associated this with Spinoza: *Je ne cesse de répéter la formule de Spinoza, 'il n'y a pas de force intrinsèque de l'idée vraie'* (Bourdieu 2000, 68). This, of course, opens the big question of interchangeability of true and right in various languages and various etymologies of the word "truth" which I cannot explore here but I should say that I don't think the results would alter the argument significantly.

17 I should remind of the simple solution for this paradox: "truth is out there", but truthfulness – our attitude – is in the realm of ethics and politics. This also explains the "post-truth" era as an ethical and political problem, not an epistemological novelty.

cal struggle is pervasive.¹⁸ So, finally, the thesis (1) and its accompanying heuristics (2–6):

- 1) *Ideology is a function in the struggle for power of different collective identities.* There are different bases that can serve to constitute a political collective. The political collectives produce meaning based on their current identity. Individuals and groups prefer names that better their positions and ensure hegemony. Naming is in that sense a function of power. If symbolic power is power to constitute something, a “quasi-magic”, according to Bourdieu,¹⁹ it needs mobilization of force, propaganda or democratic power in the Arendtian sense.
- 2) *Identities are composite.* Economic, social, ethnic, national, sexual and so on. Some or all of this makes someone’s complex political identity, especially when associated with one’s personal trauma and hardship. It is not only economy or a nation or one’s sexuality in a concrete case. It is the composition of this and the corresponding life experiences that make individuals and then groups different in comparison to others which opens the potential for the political conflict and serves as the basis for ideological production.²⁰
- 3) *Identities are not fixed.* At least in the long run. There is a dialectic of particular and universal at work in politics and history. Formation of identity is associated with collectives, sometimes with particular and exclusive ones but often with universal projects and their legitimation. Languages, wars, revolutions, crises and the bases above: they all have a say. People accept political ideas, enter into the struggle, win or lose. Nothing is fixed, be it good or bad. In the realm of natural history, organisms that were, now are extinct. In the realm of human history, religions, empires, nations, federations, states even more so. They have a shorter time span. Not to speak of political identities of today.
- 4) *Ideology and eschatology are a function of biopolitics.* I want to claim that the function of ideology is to promote or stop certain forms of

18 The reference is to the title of the first Houellebecq’s novel, *Extension du domaine de la lutte*, which could not be translated into English literally, at least by the publisher’s criteria applicable to the translation of the titles of the novels of the new and then relatively obscure French writers (the novel’s title was translated as: *Whatever*). The novel has an essayistic insert on sexual competition independent of the economic one, with its sexually mostly unsuccessful protagonist ending up in nihilism and madness, which is reflected in the writing that becomes chaotic.

19 *Le pouvoir symbolique comme pouvoir de constituer le donné par l’énonciation, de faire croire... pouvoir quasi magique* (Bourdieu 2001, 210).

20 Family and upbringing tend to be important. George Lakoff, a cognitive linguist and a political liberal in American sense, accentuates this (Lakoff 2002).

life. Power is another name for that: forms of life that impose themselves on each other or on nature. I shall abstain from discussing power in any detail, even if it is a key concept in the long history of political science. It has convincingly been done elsewhere, be it Hobbes or Rousseau, Schmitt, Habermas or Foucault, Neumann or Arendt in political philosophy and theory, Lasswell in his policy sciences, Weber, Parsons or Lukes in (political) sociology. Every political science and public policy primer has to say something on it and I have written about elsewhere (Petković 2017, 233–297), and there is no reason to repeat that here. Let me only say that, traditionally and historically, individuals or groups of humans constituted on various not at all fixed criteria tend to like power and want to expand it, even if it's destructive for them and others (and it often is). To impose one's will against others, wherever this ability may stem from, is one of the old and still valid traits of power, as Weber had it. It is the analytically delineated "power over" of Marx and Weber against the political and social "power to" of Rousseau and Parsons (of non-problematic collectivities). By referring to Foucauldian and later Agambenian biopower or sometimes biopolitics²¹ – throwing it like a bomb here, seemingly *ex nihilo* – I want to associate power with human life: collectives renew life or fail to do so. Eschatology, an old religious and theological term, referring to the doctrine about the end of times has its secular variants: ideologies often speak about their ideal final state. It is often a vision of ideal life at the end of history.

- 5) *Intensity of the struggle for names is a measure of the weakness of power.* Decadence of power reflects itself in the chaos of naming. When a power struggle is open, a contest for names emerges. If political order is unstable, this is marked by the battle of naming. It rages up to the constitution of parallel languages in a society. A singular symbolic power is shaken. There is no centrality but factions. The conflict becomes horizontal. Various factions often try to employ state apparatus to enforce their names. Penal symbols and practices are especially important in this struggle: we do not

21 Foucault conducts the analyses of liberalism in his lectures *The Birth of Biopolitics* with the help of concepts such as *régime de vérité qui partage le vrai et le faux* and *dispositif de savoir-pouvoir*, i.e. the very mechanism that is introduced in political economy is the criterion of truth (e.g. the free market). He does not make use of the concept of ideology. He rejects it. It's another language game – a play with words from the perspective taken here. In any case, contrary to some simplifications, Foucault does not refuse the concept of ideology as such, even in his earlier *The Archeology of Knowledge* and makes use of it in his analysis of biopower in the sense employed here, in his earlier lectures *Society Must Be Defended* (e.g. racism as ideology).

only want to fight those who wield the wrong and dangerous names, we want to punish them from the position of authority. Struggle for the limits of public language that channels itself in private venues and interaction of society is part of the struggle for power (revolutionary discourse may, on the contrary, start in private spaces and turn public).

- 6) *Ideology may not be important for life.* This may come as an anti-climax but it is a good way to think about the politics of naming and human life. Like in Jurassic Park which is, of course, not about dinosaurs but about American culture and families as well as any given Spielberg Movie (except perhaps Schindler's List): Life finds a way. Ideology must serve an emergent force helping power but it may also be a symptom of waning power. Life may supersede it. This is one of the lessons of the new (natural) history. (Alternatively, one can think about this "thesis six" not from the perspective of Hollywood films but from literature: the endings of Coetzee's *Waiting for the Barbarians* and *Disgrace* may offer a clue.)

The next step is to show what to do with this set of ideas. Certainly, in further analytical work one should draw the precise coordinates of existing ideological divides to accompany this position. The existing systems and schemata and their application often demonstrate a bias in naming (e.g. "liberal" not only today and not without some historical ironies, often means an intervention in society and imposition of tax, punishment and language, not the freedom from the tyranny of the state). Various dimensions are often lumped together, usually of economic issues and the so called morality policies, often in an unilluminating and manipulative way. But this would mean to enter into specific content which I cannot do here. The next section will instead discuss the possibility of application of these theses in the analysis on few illustrative examples.

POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: SOME EXCESSES IN PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGICAL VOCABULARIES

Let's take a look at the first case. It's a piece of engaged text entitled "Letter from a trans man to the old sexual regime" which addresses the readers as "Ladies and Gentlemen, and everybody else". It claims the following:

Since the sexual and anti-colonial revolution of the past century shook their world, the hetero-white-patriarchs have embarked on a counter-reformation project—now joined by "female" voices wishing to go on being "importuned and bothered". This will be a 1000-year war—the longest of all wars, given that it will affect the politics of reproduction and processes through which a human body is socially constituted as a sovereign subject.

It will actually be the most important of all wars, because what is at stake is neither territory nor city, but the body, pleasure, and life (Preciado 2018).

The author, a New School alumni Paul Preciado, explains that he is “not talking here as a man belonging to the ruling class, the class of those who are assigned the male gender at birth” and he describes himself in the following terms: “I was a Lesbian for most of my life, then trans for the past five years. I am as far removed from your aesthetics of heterosexuality as a Buddhist monk levitating in Lhasa is from a Carrefour supermarket”.

Beyond the playful juxtaposition of consumerism and Buddhism, three things should probably be noted. First, obviously, it is a piece of ideology, not a truth statement. Second, by its tone, its echoes Engels’ Elberfeld speeches which call capitalism a brutal war of all against all and call for a revolution which will be bloodiest of all wars (and then peace will ensue). However, it would probably be completely non-intelligible to Engels, not because it appears almost 175 years later, but because it places the struggle in another domain and seeks a political solution. It shows that sexuality and reproduction are ideological by the very fact that some can politicize them as such. Third, it thus illustrates the extension of the domain of struggle. I have chosen it because it may fit easily into all the six theses above if a reader gives it a thought.

If this dimension of the political phenomenon is called politics as a struggle for power by the means of ideology in contrast to truth (ideology among other means of politics), the two other dimensions, polity and policy are as political even if they do not include calls for revolution or war as extreme forms of political struggle “continued by other means”. They are politics in this perspective – constitutions with their language and values are domain of struggle as are strategies, programs, measures, their implementation and evaluation. Contemporary public policies (as are constitutions and laws) are politics in the sense of irrational maneuvering space, opposed to *Schimmel*, “mildew”, a metonymy Mannheim uses in *Ideology and Utopia* to denote other part of the distinction – mere technical administration and its suffocating bureaucratic documents. This leads me to the second set of examples that shows how public policy is ideological.

The perspective on public policies as an area of the political struggle for definitions of the problem is classically explored in Deborah Stone’s *Policy Paradox* (Stone 2011). It provides both entertaining and meticulous analysis of goals, numbers and stories about causes of problems in public policy as an area of ideological contestation. The possible illustrations are almost innumerable. There is now a long tradition in public policy research that discusses the social construction of target populations claiming – *quelle surprise* – that beneficial policies target “powerful, positively viewed groups” while “punishment policies” are applied to the

“negatively constructed” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 337). To evoke that tradition here is not to criticize its ideological operations and the insertion of ideology where the truth and value judgments can be reached (“To say constructed as something is similar to the claim ‘Discourse is such and such’: it puts the truth-question in the brackets”). My interest is in its focus on these issues in the situation of a strong “partisan polarization” where “mixed, divided social constructions” appear, especially in the case of refugees “with some viewing them as courageous people escaping from horrendous conditions to make a better life for their families, and others viewing them as fraudulent criminals who will sneak into the country and commit crimes” (Schneider and Ingram 2018, 16).

The “moralistic” policy designs appear which “enable the majority party to open public debate on moral issues in terms favorable their image, place restrictions on the rights of groups aligned with the other side of the issue, and promote a social construction of ‘shame, unworthiness, immoral’ on such groups” (Schneider and Ingram 2018, 26). In other words, in public policy, we can observe politics – an old process of who gets what, when and how, with conflicts which become worse since the battle of names (“the propensity to rely on oversimplified stereotypes, labels, and emotional appeals is clearly visible”) has intensified leading Schneider and Ingram to diagnose a “degenerative democracy” which is “characterized by over-subscription of benefits to the ‘advantaged,’ oversubscription of punishment to ‘deviants,’ neglect of the weak, and extensive deception as the parties work to make themselves look good (Ibid., 27). To be sure, this does not work only for Arizona, or some other American state but obviously has more general connotations for the policy processes in the West. Degenerative democracy is another name for a polity of a post-truth era.

To illustrate this further, one can take any contentious policy issue in divided societies with possible patterns of degenerative democracy. Abortion is usually taken as a crown-example. Take for example the operation of naming in a narrative offered in MacIntyre’s *After Virtue*:

Murder is wrong. Murder is the taking of innocent life. An embryo is an identifiable individual, differing from a newborn infant only in being at an earlier stage on the long road to adult capacities and, if any life is innocent, that of an embryo is. If infanticide is murder, as it is, abortion is murder. So abortion is not only morally wrong, but ought to be legally prohibited (MacIntyre 2007, 7).

It’s easy to contrast this “pro-life” position with a “pro-choice” one: any feminist legislation proposal will frame the issue as the question of reproductive rights and medical issue, demand the cost coverage of the procedure from the public health system if there is such, and probably add a bit on the voluntary sterilization at public expense. The reader can rest: I will not enter into the content in this controversial case. The truth is there for

the reader to reach. The point of these examples is not to show the obvious – that there is at least a little Fouquier-Tinville in most of us, the “political thinkers” ready to call a nun a criminal assassin (and maybe vice-versa). Various groups involved in the policy process, as the above letter and virtually any political commentary on an internet site and various communique issued by the opposed ideological factions of civil society, could probably be analyzed with good results with the above 1–6 schema.

The point is rather normative, to prepare us for the last section. Since true statements can be issued clearly on this and other cases given the state of knowledge, it should be done so, as should various valuations then be given clearly. It is exactly the truth that makes a choice hard and thus responsible, not the manipulation of frames that leads to pointless struggles. Each reader can do the exercise in the cases and thus see what is at stake. In the conclusion I will underline how my motivation is normative, not a “positivist” affirmation, as in some straw-man versions, of a frog-eye reflection of the easily observable facts that could be associated with “the truth”. But the readers will easily notice that, even if I have convinced them and they have accepted the old call for truth and perhaps some suggested theses for an ideology analysis, they do not have to subscribe to the political specifics.

CONCLUSION

*... a failure perceived most clearly by Nietzsche.
MacIntyre, After Virtue*

“Of course, you can speak in *oratio obliqua*, and thus avoid the commitments of speaking straight out.” Searle was right in his Speech Acts. We can all easily switch to an indirect speech. Instead of “He made a promise”, we may say: “He made what they, the people of this Anglo-Saxon tribe, call a promise”. You can do that “with any word you like” (Searle 2001, 196). This is often done with the help of the word “discourse”. In the meanwhile, the questions on the truth and the good remain unanswered, while the discourses roam around (there were even quite idiotic suggestions to erect a chamber of discourses, published in prestigious political science journals). To recapitulate, however, before I get to the ultimate point of this critique.

In this essay, I have first elaborated on some claims from the history of ideas that affirm the truth-falsity distinction. There is truth and there are good reasons why we use it or why we, as good philosophers, use a noble lie knowing exactly it is not true. Turning from Plato to the world of Aristotle, we will want to be ethical and politically reasonable. I thus tried to offer an epistemological backing for the distinction between truth and ideology,

a statements of correspondence between words and things and the political projects of naming. This, secondly, enabled me to associate ideology as a partisan meaning with power. Political discourse is often ideological, it affirms volatile relations of power. I offered one main thesis and five more supporting ones about this: collective identities fight each other with ideologies, identities are composite, identities are not fixed, end projections are biopolitical, battle for names reflect the weakness of power, ideologies may misfire. Third, this set of propositions can be applied to any given theme in politics and public policy in an ongoing *Kulturkampf* between conservatives and liberals across the globe and to other ideological struggles.

Is this too naïve and after all pretty strange – to implicitly return to the transparency of classicism, to the semantic world without any opacity or intermediary elements between words and things?²² Not exactly, because I do not claim that there are not intermediary elements. Discourse analysis is important because language and its uses are not that simple. I only claim that there is truth distinct from ideology underneath it all. Fourth, this brings me to the last question: Why explain this at all? It's Bernard Williams' question of the value of truthfulness, more easily answered in a context: "Look a bear" makes sense when we are really confronted with a bear in the woods. I say the truth (shout "bear" for a bear instead "squirrel" etc.) not to be eaten or to save my fellow human beings (from such a notoriously ravenous beast). Searle, the guy from the prior paragraph and arguably the biggest living analytic philosopher, has a useful epistemological anecdote that will lead us to a similar bottom line:

Suppose I believe my car keys are on the dining room table. Now, how do I find out if this belief is true or false? Do I hold the belief in my left hand and hold reality in my right hand and look to see if they correspond? That is not my picture at all. Rather, my picture is that I look for my car keys. If they are on the table, then my belief is true, otherwise not. In accord with disquotation, the way to find that it is true that p, is to find that p. The correspondence theory in action is applied disquotation. (Searle in: Prado 2006, 113)

Either the keys are on the table or not, and that can be checked. The purpose of all this (i.e. the history of truthfulness in Williams)? Well, I need the keys to drive my car, and I need to drive my car to go from "A" to "B", or more generally to be mobile, move efficiently and so on (add some ecological concerns if needed, it does not change the teleological schema requiring the truth as a basis). The question in our context is then: why an analysis of ideology in contrast to truth in a discourse as a paradigmatic task for the social sciences?

22 *C'est qu'entre le signe et son contenu, il n'y a aucun élément intermédiaire, et aucune opacité* (Foucault 1966, 80).

To affirm the true speech against manipulations means to answer to the long-going critique of social sciences and liberal democracies which have a niche for such an activity (in contrast to, let's say, theology or state propaganda). "Social science positivism fosters not so much nihilism, as conformism and philistinism" (Strauss 1959, quoted in: Deutsch and Murley 1999, 93). Leo Strauss was right. But my effort here, as I have suggested, does not fall under the polysemic label "positivism" in the sense that I would claim it is value-neutral. This would be the farthest possible thing from the truth to suggest. My effort comes out of the pervading sense of crisis which sometimes conjures up the term post-truth or even the post-truth era. It comes from what I believe, along with MacIntyre and many others, is the political crisis of liberalism: "On the dominant liberal view, government is to be neutral as between rival conceptions of the human good, yet in fact what liberalism promotes is a kind of institutional order that is inimical to the construction and sustaining of the types of communal relationship required for the best kind of human life" (MacIntyre 2007, xv).²³ I find that statement true, as is the following one: "Perhaps above all, liberalism has drawn down on a preliberal inheritance and resources that at once sustained liberalism but which it cannot replenish" (Deneen 2018, 29–30). In Germany, this is known, at least from the mid-1960s, as Böckenförde's paradox (the *Böckenförde-Diktum*), i.e. the idea that the secular liberal states cannot replenish (or that they even destroy) the social capital they presuppose. To be sure, a similar diagnosis also comes from quite different political voices. Bourdieu, for example, speaks of a waning social state in the West, as a sort of a fine civilization (almost as a fine ecosystem inhabited by the big blue catlike humans in Cameron's *Avatar*), only to be destroyed by "neoliberal" barbarians: *Destruction d'un ordre social qui a été très difficile à construire...* (Bourdieu 2000, 46). The bases of identity are multiple, identities composite, as I have claimed, and I will here leave the discussion of the economy of the social state aside, but the point is that the feeling of crisis is widespread across the ideological spectrum.

What should one do in the crisis of liberal democracy that produces the above intimated scenarios associated even with the terms such as "degenerative democracy"? Habermas was perhaps naively optimistic, still ready to write hundreds of pages of political theory instead of a Hellenistic diary, as for now is this author (writing such a long essay) and probably most readers of this journal as its very name suggests. Is some form of ethical stoicism an alternative? Since the public sphere is contaminated by the warring camps and sense of decadence is strong, it may be an indi-

23 For MacIntyre, the neo-Aristotelian, "contemporary philosophy theorizing about morality is flawed" (MacIntyre 2016, 77), and operates with fictions.

vidual solution. The pessimism professed by the mentioned French writer whose title I used for one of the essay chapters, who sees the entropy of the Western society as irreparable, suggests such an approach. For the religious, some Benedictine model comes handy as ever. To pray and work in silence and wait for something old but completely different is a story much older than the contemporary bestsellers: “We are waiting not for a Godot, but for another – doubtless very different – St. Benedict” (MacIntyre 2007, 263). However, all the options – a retreat of pessimism or hope, isolated stoical endurance or the erection of new small patient communities with bits of messianic fatalism, the usual party politics or a revolution – demand one thing. They demand true knowledge. Those who waged a war or revolution on wrong premises perished as did those who were stoical when there was an opportunity of action: to suffer a life of a lost opportunity is one of the highest curses in the parables offered by religion – one of the bad servant from the Gospel of Matthew who hides the sole talent he has instead of using it. However, even outside of such an apocalyptic mood, the questions about what is just and good are not answerable without the access to truth and understanding of ideology.

After all is said and done, it seems that a meagre call for simple decency remains beyond the set of theses which will prove themselves or not against political reality. It is the call to be truthful. Relativism hides or lies. It postpones and manipulates, conducting politics that may not or dare not to present itself clearly. Beyond short-term tactical shots this is most certainly an imprudent road to political decay. Discourse is important, but it's only the first step in an analysis that tries to identify ideology and understand it. The battle of naming is going on in the broad realm of biopolitics. The truth serves as a basis for justice for different forms of life which is arguably a republican virtue. I am not sure if the telos of this call for truth is republican (as opposed to liberal). I have listed several options above that are certainly not such, and various historical republican calls have failed after all. A republic of true names may seem as a museum, a farce, an irony, or it may have a touch of eternity. Plato seemed to think so. However, if naming is republican, it would certainly include what Isaiah Berlin, interpreting Rousseau and others, called a positive liberty, not only a negative one. It would include duties that recreate life, not only the rights that stop power. The above catastrophists of liberalism were right in that claim, implicit or explicit. But who knows: who laughs last, laughs the sweetest, and the game of truth, ideology and the politics of naming goes on, with lives at stake. Here I at least tried to offer a glimpse at an epistemic basis for a sound teleology and prudent politics instead of folly.

POSTSCRIPT:
A REPLY TO THE SEVEN CRITICS

For this sprightly essay I received no less than six engaged anonymous reviews, editorial suggestions, and one set of detailed comments from a prominent academic colleague and a friend. Some were beautifully written, some relentlessly and patiently critical, some were virtually inexhaustible and leading to rabbit holes. They were all very valuable, even the one that was acridly dismissive. Beyond various minor corrections of clarification and major cutting of some three thousand words – the additional literary allusions ra(n)ging from Herman Hesse to John Kennedy Toole, and the whole section about the discourse of truth in religion, usually associated with the prophetic anticipations of demise or godly invocations of hell – I felt it would be impossible to address all of the constructive critical comments by refashioning the essay itself. It would become something else, and I did not want that. I liked it just as it was perceived by the most of the early readers: interesting and intriguing, with its verbose meandering and a repetitive play of interlocked discourses, quite sententious, perhaps a bit too rich on the side of imagination – “dazzling but also dizzying”, as one of the readers effectively put it. But the critics do merit a response, and the only way to preserve the imaginative force of a purportedly unorthodox essay, with its less than sound but hopefully mentally stimulating parts; its digestibility for the reader and the better academic customs, was to briefly as possible address the critical points of the reviewers and the readers in a postscript. So here it is – an extra rabbit hole – and, as already noted in a note somewhere above, the faults are all mine.

I will first address numerous associations that were thrown at me from the rich realm of the history of ideas and more contemporary political theory that demand of the author to take a stand on various positions on the questions of the subject and the good associated with language and truth. I will then switch to the more substantial issues on the nature of politics, truth, opinion, and identity that together form the axis around which the essay revolves. The interventions will have to be brief since longer ones would inflate the postscript into yet another essay. Unfortunately I have to set aside some actual treatises that were brought up: the recent one dealing with the relationship of truth and democracy (Rosenfeld 2018) and a history of truth that tackles “the quest for language that can match reality” (Fernández-Armesto 2013) – the first one, because it belongs to a specific political analysis that adds to a political genealogy of the “post-truth” era, which is great but beyond the scope here; the second, because it is simply too big to handle here. Since I evicted religion, I feel that adding some comparative historical anthropology on truth finding techniques would be too much. It’s a Foucauldian question of different procedures or

alethurgies to arrive at the truth and their mutual relationship. I started with a hint of it (truth as ordeal), I have written about it extensively elsewhere (Petković 2018), so I can remain silent on it here. Let me just say that it seems to me that all the historical and contemporary techniques for conjuring up the truth – be it “primordial philosophy” or “great poetry”, as Heidegger has it (Heidegger 2002, 47), or good old Popperian science that produces falsifiable hypotheses, and so on – have something in common in its effect, as do all varieties of lying and forgeries.

First and foremost, Heidegger and Kant in retrospective of Heidegger (as the Eleatic forerunners of Kafka, according to Borges, become Kafkaian in retrospect). I agree that you have to have an identity – you are a subject, not a whole, but a part of a moving whole – for the world to be intelligible. Be it a Copernican turn, a worn out phrase used to speak of Kant’s critical enterprise with man in its center, or a project of philosophy understood as an universal phenomenological ontology, i.e. the existential analysis of the *Dasein* (pardon the jargon), this rings true to me. But it is also a truism at my level of analysis. Some sketchy hints on the identity forming processes I add below.

On the other hand, the absence of Hobbes, beyond a little nod in a footnote about religious archetypal parables on naming, is obvious. Very probably due to civil wars of religious factions, he has the strongest sensibility to the problem of the politics of naming. Let’s put aside the specific enmity to the Catholic Church, in the retrospective an overzealous crusade against the Aristotelian scholastics (he shares this with Descartes), and intriguing proclaimed sternness towards metaphors: his line of thought in the chapter four of the *Leviathan* parallels the one of the Confucius I have offered in the introduction. Hobbes could have been used instead, together with some further useful motives appearing in the *Leviathan*: his thoughts on prudence and sapience from the fifth chapter are relevant for the last part of my essay, as well as the hermeneutical maxim to focus not on “the bare words but the scope of the author” from the Chapter 43. His naïve sounding and stalwart constructions (one is almost compelled to feel a mysticism in it) starting from the most basic elements are again, which is symptomatic, actual in these times. I can only conclude with the incomparable charming lines from the fourth chapter of Hobbes’ *grand oeuvre*: “a man that seeketh precise *truth*, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed”.²⁴ Furthermore, if the view that there is one semantics instead of many (e.g. one associated with the links between

24 They would say in these parts of the world: *Zapleo se k'o pile u kućine...*

words and things, and the other with the rules of public discourse) can be associated with Hobbes, I think he is right. (To remind the reader, Hobbes is unyielding: when discussing Job and the existential stuff of non-political suffering, he refuses to use the word punishment for the bad developments of destiny from the point of view of the subject. He is strict in advocating one universal politics of naming.)

As for Marx, my discussion of ideology is indeed not framed by his and Engels' treatise and Marx's philosophical remarks on alienation. I see the talk of false consciousness as an ideological project itself. The world is to be changed, according to the 11th thesis on Feuerbach, obviously based on some interpretation of it, if not philosophical then perhaps politico-economical as is the case in Marxism. This position then plunges into a revolutionary program which, even if it is not intrinsically malevolent, had quite bad historical results in all its geographical and temporal variations. To say, on the other hand, that ideology is meaning in the service of power is to broaden the field of political economy into biopolitics, and to include a more complex picture of identity beyond the politically framed binary or so economic class struggle.

Aquinas and Adorno were also amicably thrown at me in the reviews. As for the scholastic definition of truth as the adequacy of thing and mind (*adaequatio rei et intellectus*), it is an understandable association since I use MacIntyre but is too big a bite, one that I cannot chew here: it is not a modern correspondence theory but much more complex position involving a combination of theology and an Aristotelian metaphysical paradigm, distinction between human and divine intellect, and so on. I cannot do any justice to it here. It requires both time for further thought and space which I have exhausted. It is something worth contemplating as well as, let's say, Eliot's take on Dante's Divine Comedy and the idea of Godly love preceding the earthly ones, but as such it seems to be quite out of scope here. As for the Adornian *right* to non-identity (one German professor, in a parrhesiastic-dyonisiac moment of truth, said this is the most important concept for him), I see the negative dialectics as a political claim. Adorno makes politics out of Nietzsche's remark from above of not two entities being really identical. If truth is somehow associated with the development of the whole – *Das Wahre ist das Ganze*, as Hegel puts it in his foreword to *The Phenomenology of Spirit* – this is only a part of the whole, i.e. a maxim of ideology for particular identities against the posited whole (in Adorno's words: *die Unwahrheit von Identität*/the “untruth of identity”). I'll reflect on this a bit more in the following part dealing with substantial claims. Finally, one of the reviewers was skeptical about liberalism's value neutrality both on theoretical and practical level. He is right in a way and that is a part of the problem which invokes analyses ranging from Schmitt's

insights into politics of “depoliticization” to Gray’s critique of what he calls “evangelical liberalism”. On the other hand, I cannot really enter how much this does justice to the concrete authors mentioned – Rawls, Dworkin, Raz and others – since I am not an expert for them. Perhaps it does not. However, a critique of liberalism – in the sense of the claim that a sole focus on negative liberty, its politics of rights and claims, accompanied with the discourses of entitlement and victimhood – forgets a viable program of positive liberty to create or preserve something (perhaps associated with some forms of social capital), since it constantly and obsessively looks to the gutter, stands as far as I can see. To seek a *modus vivendi* and regulate a public reason is to retreat from the problem. It is the situation described in the thesis no. 5 above. This finally brings me to the substantial part of the response.

Perhaps most important question raised by the reviewers was: Is the whole realm of politics, by its very definition, ideological? There lies the crux of the problem with no easy answers in a moving world of collective and changing identities, i.e. in political history. One position that can be derived from Bourdieu as portrayed above states that words can make things in the political realm. This suggests a politics of change or even revolution. Things can be otherwise. Changing of the vocabulary is part of the ushering of the new world. The other position is a conservative one. Readers may be surprised but it is the one held by authors so different as Arendt and Foucault, that is, Arendt under political attack, writing her essay on *Truth and Politics*, and Foucault discussing the great rage of facts (*La grande colère des faits*) that speak back to political oppression. In the essay (originally published in *The New Yorker* on February 25, 1967), Arendt memorably claimed that “it may be in the nature of the political realm to be at war with truth in all its forms, and hence to the question of why a commitment even to factual truth is felt to be an anti-political attitude”. She also stated there that “to look upon politics from the perspective of truth, as I have done here, means to take one’s stand outside the political” and she (“conceptually”) equated the truth with that “what we cannot change”. Her point was there are limits to the political will, as was Foucault’s in his critique of the use of the political (*le politique*) instead of politics (*la politique*) in French appropriations of Morgenthau and Schmitt. Politics as a technique of governing, normatively understood, is a fine art. Both of preservation and change.

In other words, to revolutionaries the realm of politics may seem extremely wide, but it is in fact quite narrow. If the names accompanying the programs deviate from life, from what works and what is sustainable and possible, they will most likely cause trouble – the angry facts returning to the political programmer – and, most importantly, unnecessary human

suffering. Realm of politics as the realm of the possible is in fact quite restrained, at least historically (who knows, with the development of technology...). Limits to the extreme leaps of ideology and often destruction are offered by the truth of life. That's also the point of the sixth thesis I offered above. Words often cannot create an alternate reality. They create an illusion and an oppression instead. Ideology has its limits.²⁵

But how do things change in this worldview? This brings me to the words "dialectics" and "identity" I have quite often used above. One of the readers was right to mention Kwame Antony Appiah, whose own complex ethnic, cultural and sexual identity made him sensible for the issues of identity politics as the new generations in his wider family filled him with hope. His view of identities, historical and social scripts, that expand horizons and can play positive role, but are not fixed (he affirms "appropriations", borrowing and "stealing" from other cultures), seem fine to me. The wider points are that identities change in the course of things and to be stubborn in fixing them is an ideology as strange as forcing them to change. There are subjectivities emerging, mixing, and so on: the "we" and "I" change on the basis of personal experience or trauma, history and politics. I mentioned dialectics to vaguely refer to this process of change. It is a much misused word coming from the simple conversations and exchanges that evolve dynamically and change those involved. I used the term dialectics in an arguably non-ambitious, very rudimentary and under-theorized sense, to denote a gradual shift in the rhythm of political things, i.e. not as an overarching logic of history but an observation of change in identities. Dialectics is not linear, in opposition to eschatology, secular or sacral, and it is not static, in opposition to metaphysics (ironically even Stalin remarks this in his Questions of Leninism, along with the less sublime lines on the destructions of the kulak opposition). Dialectics need not to refer to a violent political revolution denotes but to an open evolving game. But, after all, I don't want to go much further than to state an empirical observation that identities and political frameworks do change and a normative one that I am not in principle inimical to it.

Adornian negations, to be outside or against, appear in this process. As one of the reviewers warned, implicitly opening some sociological questions about the presuppositions of the "post-truth" politics, opinions

25 There is a fine moment in Karlo Štajner's account of his "7000 days in Siberia", i.e. an instructive story of almost 20 years he had spent in Soviet prisons and camps. In the repetitive torturous interrogations he is submitted to, his simple account of truth is called tactics by his interrogators. There is it then: a direct juxtaposition of truth and tactics. The point is that his oppressors in power feel he is not politically loyal or he might not be. They cannot truly prove that he is a spy or counterrevolutionary agent (since he is not), but for them, as a social democrat, he is an existential, Schmittian enemy of their ideological cause. The irony is that he has survived the ideological regime that has tortured him.

also appear, “neither true nor false, neither poetic nor meaningless“, thus seemingly placing themselves nowhere, or in a heterotopia between truth and ideology. There is a useful saying here, uttered by Harry Callahan, a police officer from the famous film franchise: “Opinions are like assholes, everybody has one.” The idea here is not to eschew arguments with vulgar remarks or to advocate police brutality, but to point to a problem of indifference and a grain of truth contained in the remark of a fictional tough cop armed with a magnum. If opinion is, by definition, not necessarily based in fact or knowledge – it is a mere “preference” reframed by Lindblom as “volition”, to sound more politically serious – it remains in the purgatory of politics. It may be true, or it may be ideology serving particular power. We don’t know yet. If it is neither true nor ideology, nor relevant to power in any case, well, that’s fine, but it’s no concern of political science. One has to make a choice or choice will be made by someone else.

Is then the political space – as a whole, as such – colonized by the ideological? And can, for example, something be true outside of power, but then become ideological when it comes into power and serves the regime? By my definitions no, on both accounts. There might, after all, be a fine space for truth in politics, although I admit there are some vertiginous possibilities of interpretation here. Arendt’s essay is the best proof of it.

Finally, the truth. It indeed seems to be a sort of correspondence against constructivism and nominalism. If it’s not such it is not useful except tactically as a manipulation, i.e. a lie. Correspondence is not enemy of pragmatism and does not lead to a scholastic ontology and the intellectual penetrations into the somewhat mystical *Ding an sich*. The whole section of the history of philosophy was necessary exactly to find such fine moments where the ultimate defense of truth is given. They only point to it because truth, of course, cannot be proven by discourse itself. It lies beyond it. It resides in things. This is the point of simpler examples of bears and car keys but which transpose as well to the examples from identity politics and morality policies.²⁶ There are things, and more importantly persons, outside

26 Unfortunately, I also cannot enter the vast jungle of American scholarship on Nietzsche which was, with considerable furor, thrown at me which does not come as a surprise since Nietzsche, the restless aphorist and not a serene system builder, is one of the prominent mirrors where various authors like to look at themselves and see everything differently than it is. As a scholar dealing with Foucault, I am fine with Leiter’s assessments of differences between Nietzsche and Foucault (*Genealogy of Morality* is after all something quite different than the genealogy of penal policy attempting to explain the Western soul in *To Discipline and Punish*), and Miller’s view of Nietzsche’s prophetic utterances as quite different from Foucault’s parrhesia, the true speech directed at others not at destiny. As for Nietzsche’s pragmatism, postmodernism and so on concerning truth, I find Nehamas’ sober-minded observation in the recent text convincing. He asks the reader to imagine “foraging in the proverbial savannah of the Pleistocene”, i.e. to take the role of one of the “monkeys” in the Clarke’s/Kubrick’s 2001 Space Odyssey prologue situation: without the monolith you run or you die

of texts and since our situation is plural and agonistic with different interests, it is a good idea not to lie or project ideology on things and persons but to speak precisely about the same things. Translate projected eschatological wars as “I want it to be so”, and personal choices as those who involve terminations of life if they do. There is a price for choice that is not eliminated by incessant melodies of Orwellian ideological jargons of politics, which, following Arendt, stumble at something they cannot change. We may sometimes need to admit our own selfishness and cruelty. If by taking notice of all of this I only engage in *enfoncer des portes ouvertes*, as one of the reviewers noticed, in response I can only quote the old lyrics: “The door is locked now but it’s open if you’re true. If you can understand me, then I can understand you.”

The only thing left at the very end is a small question of style that puzzled at least one of my reviewers: what does a sentence here and there, within quotation marks but without a Harvard-style bracketed reference, mean? Well, it means: this could be a typical restatement of the claim I have just made, its possible coagulation in an indicatory parody of common parlance. It is thus not, as it was once said, a strange assault on one’s own words, but a slight touch of irony within a narrative that could help a reader get a richer understanding of author’s claims.

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when you see “a sleek, yellowish, spotted animal”. If you want to make sure it is a leopard or cheetah, you count the spots (or the hairs on a bear’s fur or something similar, in Williams), you die. Nehamas concludes: “None of this suggests that it is in principle impossible to get things right: Nietzsche never denies that one might count the animal’s spots correctly. His point is simply that, in these particular circumstances, the effort would take long enough for the animal to make a meal of you” (Nehamas 2017, 327).

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SAŽETAK

IDEOLOGIJA I ISTINA: POVRAK STAROG PARA U DOBA POST-ISTINE

Autor tvrdi da svaka analiza diskursa, kao i drugi pristupi u društvenim i humanističkim znanostima, ne mogu u konačnici izbjeći razlikovanje istine i ideologije. Prvi dio članka daje nekoliko pogleda na zapadnu filozofijsku tradiciju koja čuva vrijednost istine. U drugom dijelu, skicirana je ideja političke znanosti, utemeljena na takvoj povijesti ideja. Nakon kratke rasprave o tome što je ideologija nasuprot istini, autor predlaže tezu o ideologiji, identitetu i moći, te nekoliko heurističkih ideja kako je razviti. U trećem dijelu ukratko se navode primjeri iz političke analize i analize javnih politika koji odgovaraju takvom projektu. U posljednjem se dijelu objašnjava važnost očuvanja razlike između ideologije i istine u diskurzivno postavljenoj eri „post-istine“. Ova kombinacija epistemologije, znanosti, analize i teleologije ogleda se zajedno u političkom području od najveće važnosti za političku znanost koja djeluje u javnoj sferi: politici imenovanja.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: ideologija, istina, post-istina, diskurs, moć, identitet, politička znanost, politika imenovanja.

TRUMPOVA DOKTRINA I REALISTIČKA TRADICIJA

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Sveučilište u Zagrebu

SAŽETAK

Polazište ovog rada nedavno je prijepor suvremenih realista oko aktualne dvojbe je li vanjskopolitička doktrina američkog predsjednika Donalda Trumpa realistička. Autor ukazuje da je navedena polemika posljedicom zastarjelog, tautološkog, ali još uvijek i neprevladanog dualističkog diskursa u teorijama međunarodnih odnosa, koji dijeli teoriju i vanjskopolitičku praksu na dva dominantna pravca: realizam i liberalizam. Na temelju dosadašnje teorijske kritike novog realizma, ili neorealizma, članak potvrđuje da ovaj suvremeni realistički pravac epistemološki ne pripada tradiciji realizma na koju se poziva, nego se svojim predodžbama o moći, državi i međunarodnom sustavu utemeljuje u političkom idealizmu: pravcu mišljenja koji se redovno pripisuje liberalima i kojemu je tradicionalni, ili „klasični“ realizam bitno suprotstavljen. Analizirajući glavne podudarnosti između pretpostavki neorealizma i načela Trumpove doktrine, ovaj rad navodi na zaključak da Trump nije realist nego protuliberalni idealist. Pojam „protuliberalni idealizam“ prikladniji je za razmatranje aktualne američke vanjske politike u kontekstu njene hegemonijske pozicije u liberalnom međunarodnom poretku.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Trump, realizam, neorealizam, liberalizam, idealizam

1. UVOD

Tijekom 2016, dok se Donald Trump natjecao za republikansku nominaciju na nadolazećim američkim predsjedničkim izborima, politolog Daniel Drezner objavio je članak u *Washington Postu*, u kojem otvoreno poziva realiste u američkoj akademskoj zajednici da prigrlje Trumpa kao svog kandidata. Trumpov „hladni realizam“, tvrdio je, omogućiti će realistima da nakon skoro trideset godina izađu iz sjene i na tržištu se ideja nametnu

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kao relevantni savjetodavni čimbenik (Drezner 2016). Trump je pobijedio na izborima i u svom inauguracijskom govoru u siječnju 2017. iznio bitno određenje svoje vanjskopolitičke doktrine *America First*: „Pravo je svake nacije da svoje interese stavi na prvo mjesto. Mi ne želimo nikome name-tati naš način života, nego naprotiv, želimo zasjati kao svijetao primjer drugima da nas slijede“ (The Inaugural Address 2017). Bila je to ohrabrujuća poruka i zaista se činilo da će realizam, koji je dominirao kako akademskom zajednicom tako i koridorima vanjskopolitičkog odlučivanja dobrim dijelom dvadesetog stoljeća, dobiti drugu priliku. Američki su realisti prigrlili Trumpa ali veoma oprezno, jer je od početka njegova agresivna retorika i nepredvidivost u donošenju odluka izazivala sumnje. Povelu se nekoliko nepovezanih rasprava, u kojima se baratalo uobičajenim realističkim načelima i pojmovima u kontekstu prirode Trumpovih ideoloških stavova, predizbornih obećanja i realnih mogućnosti njihova ispunjenja.¹ Kao i većina kvaziteorijskih rasprava o recentnim vanjskopolitičkim pitanjima, ova je bila još jedna akademska bura u čaši vode. Međutim, pod površinom ove naoko beznačajne polemike uočavaju se dublje dimenzije krize realističke teorije.

Svrha ovog članka je da kroz analizu kritike realizma razriješi dvojbu i teorijski odredi Trumpovu doktrinu. Valja na početku istaći da realizam nije jedinstvena teorijska tradicija, kao što je još sredinom osamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća ukazao Richard Ashley (Ashley 1984). U stvari, striktno govoreći, Kenneth Waltz je u pravu kada kaže da je s njim, odnosno s njegovom studijom *Teorija međunarodne politike* iz 1979, utemeljena realistička teorija: „novi“ realizam ili neorealizam (Waltz 1990). Sve prije neorealizma je „klasična“ realistička misao, koja seže do Tuki-dida u antici, te se razvija preko Machiavellija i Hobbesa, Clausewitza i Webera, do modernih realista sredine dvadesetog stoljeća Edwarda H. Carra, Hansa J. Morgenthaua, Reinholda Niebuha, Henryja A. Kissingera i drugih. Waltzov je iskorak radikalniji. Izuzev preuzimanja nekih temeljnih realističkih pojmova kao što su moć, nacionalni interes ili ravnoteža snaga kojima održava intelektualni kontinuitet s tradicijom, on svoju znanstvenu teoriju, rasterećenu od političke misli, utemeljuje u strukturalizmu. U kratkim crtama, neorealizam polazi od pretpostavke da anarhična struktura međunarodnog sustava predstavlja skup organizirajućih principa koji uvjetuju ponašanje država.² Posebne karakteristike određene

1 U prvom poglavlju ovog rada iznijeti će se samo neki od tih komentara u raspravi. Diskusija se uglavnom vodila putem časopisa. Jednu od značajnijih objavio je *The International Security Studies Forum*, a vodila se između dvojice neorealista Roberta Jervis i Randalla Schwellera, a koja je naknadno objavljena kao knjiga (Jervis i Gavin 2018).

2 Struktura predstavlja treću predodžbu ili razinu analize. Prve dvije, koje Waltz odbacuje, su „čovjek“ i „država“.

države kao „jedinice“ (*unit*) su beznačajne (primjerice, povijesno iskustvo ili državni oblik vlasti). Pitanje rata i mira isključivo je pitanje djelovanja strukture, stoga u središtu je pozornosti neorealističke analize razmatranje sistematske „raspodjele moći“ među jedinicama i njihovih „materijalnih sposobnosti“.

Kriza neorealizma počinje devedesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća, ali ne samo zato što neorealizam nije mogao predvidjeti i objasniti raspad Sovjetskog Saveza; ne ni zato što će u narednom desetljeću dominirati suparnička teorija liberalizma, opijena endističkim idejama o „kraju povijesti“, koja završava „demokratskim mirom“ i „trgovinskom međuovisnošću“, ne ni zato što se u akademskoj zajednici pojavila jaka opozicija poststrukturalnih i konstruktivističkih teorija. Ponajprije, kriza je to realističkog identiteta koja proizlazi iz radikalnog raskida s „klasičnom“ tradicijom, a čija rehabilitacija u posljednja dva desetljeća ne predstavlja samo renesansu u povijesti političkih ideja, nego se nameće kao relevantni misaoni pravac u suvremenoj političkoj misli o međunarodnim odnosima.³

Fenomen Trumpa samo je posljednji u nizu potresa koji podriva autoritet neorealizma. Ovaj članak će pokazati da Trump nije realist, nego „protuliberalni idealist“ – pojam koji se u ovom radu izvodi kao sinteza kategorije koja je u „klasičnom“ realizmu poznata kao „utopizam“ ili „revolucionarna“ tradicija (Carr 2001; Kissinger 1976; Wight 1991), te recentnih određenja Trumpove političke doktrine kao „protuliberalne“ (npr. Posen 2018; Stokes 2018). Kako bi se ova pretpostavka dokazala, potrebno je izaći izvan ustaljenih teorijskih okvira antitetičke podjele na realizam i liberalizam i vratiti se prvobitnoj epistemološkoj podjeli „klasičnih“ realista na realizam i idealizam. Po tom kriteriju, neorealizam nije realistička nego idealistička teorija jer je utemeljen u racionalizmu. Središnji će dio rada izložiti bitne podudarnosti između osnovnih načela Trumpove doktrine i teorijskih pretpostavki neorealizma, kako bi se pokazalo da *America First* u konačnici jest politički idealizam, sadržajno određen kao nacionalistička ideologija. Riječ je o jednoj revolucionarnoj protuliberalnoj doktrini koja se svojim unilateralnim djelovanjem i nacionalističkom retorikom javlja kao izazov današnjem liberalnom međunarodnom poretku, a samim time i liberalnoj hegemoniji SAD.

3 Rehabilitacija „klasičnog“ realizma u prvom je redu rehabilitacija političke teorije međunarodnih odnosa, počevši s *Tragičnom vizijom politike* R. N. Lebowa (Lebow 2003), koji potvrđuje trajnu relevantnost načela realizma od Tukidida do Morgenthaua. O recentnosti „klasičnog“ realizma pisali su među ostalima: Craig (2003); Molloy (2006); Williams (2005, 2007); Tjalve (2008); Bell (2009); Barkin (2010); Scheuerman (2011); Navari (2017), itd.

2. DVOJBENI REALIZAM „PRINCIPIJELNOG REALIZMA“

Kategorijalna podjela na realizam i liberalizam okvirno se javlja pedesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća u SAD (Guilhot 2011). Iako se intelektualna ishodišta ove binarne konstrukcije nalaze u bogatoj tradiciji europske političke misli, ona je odraz posebno američkog političkog iskustva. Danas je ta podjela tautološka, te se epiteti „realist“ ili „liberal“ uglavnom pridaju američkim državicima. Robert Kagan kaže kako je za razliku od europskih imperijalnih sila SAD od svog nastanka bio liberalan; svojevrsni „savjesni behemot“ kojemu je liberalno uređenje odredilo povijesnu ulogu u svijetu i uvjetovalo ponašanje kao kombinaciju realističke obrane i idealističkog promicanja liberalnih vrijednosti (Kagan 2002). Kissinger ove dvije vanjskopolitičke perspektive jedinstvenog interesa američkog liberalnog uređenja simbolički utjelovljuje u dvojici predsjednika: republikancu Theodoru Rooseveltu (1901–1909) i demokratu Woodrowu Wilsonu (1913–1921). Obojica dijele nepokolebljivu vjeru u univerzalno poslanje liberalnog SAD, ali se razlikuju u vanjskopolitičkom pristupu. Roosevelt se oslanja na realističke principe politike moći (*Realpolitik*) i na jasno definiranom nacionalnom interesu; Wilson se oslanja na ideal „kolektivne snage“ demokratskih nacija, utemeljen na zajedničkoj moralnoj svijesti i vrlinama liberalnog društva (Kissinger 2000, 2. poglavlje; usporedi s Kissinger 2015, poglavlje 7).

Početak dvadesetog stoljeća, te su dvije vanjskopolitičke pozicije poznate kao „izolacionizam“ i „intervencionizam“. Na kraju stoljeća, s učvršćivanjem američke globalne hegemonije i intervencionizmom kao normom, perspektive su se izmijenile, ali neka supstancijalna načela realizma i liberalizma ostaju netaknuta.⁴ Za liberale, pitanje hegemonije u stvari je pitanje legitimiteta međunarodnog poretka, kojega SAD kao dominantna sila gradi na svoju sliku i priliku (Latham 1997; Ikenberry et al. 2008; Ikenberry 2012).⁵ Legitimitet proizlazi iz iskrene predanosti SAD da promovira vlastiti interes kao kolektivni interes (na primjer: slobodno

4 Iako je američki izolacionizam kao politika s Drugim svjetskim ratom definitivno prevladan, svijest o državi kao nacionalno koherentnoj cjelini, suverenoj na ograničenom tlu, ostao je i dalje prisutni politički sentiment. Postepeno stvaranje američke hegemonije redefiniralo je nacionalni interes isključivo po sadržaju, ali ne i svrsi koja se poziva na „nacionalni interes“ kao odraz jedinstvenih nacionalnih težnji. Taj sentiment izolacionizma, koji stavlja naglasak na nacionalni interes i vojnu moć države, snažno je naglašen u Trumpovoj doktrini. To je navelo mnoge Trumpove kritičare da ga označe izolacionistom, iako on niti je izolacionist niti je takva politika više moguća (Carpenter 2018). Ova primjedba samo pokušava ukazati koliko je izolacionizam idejno srodan realističkoj misli.

5 Konceptcija liberalne hegemonije razvija se na pretpostavkama „teorije hegemonijske stabilnosti“, koju je na polju ekonomske povijesti razvio početkom sedamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća Charles Kindelberger (Kindelberger 2013).

tržište, demokraciju, ljudska prava). On nastupa benevolentno u vidu ponude ekonomskih i sigurnosnih „usluga“ partnerima, čime dokida regionalne ekonomske sukobe i sigurnosne prijetnje, stvarajući pretpostavke za kolektivnu suradnju i institucionalizaciju međunarodnih pravila i normi. Nasuprot liberalnoj perspektivi, realizam gradi predodžbu o hegemoniji prinude (Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 2001). Legitimnost poretka počiva na pragmatičnom promicanju liberalnih vrijednosti, dok je u stvarnom nacionalnom interesu stvaranje slobodnotrgovinskih zona u kojima američka ekonomija ima znatnu prednost, prinudno naplaćivanje „usluga“ partnerima, te podržavanje, odnosno rušenje diktatorskih režima po kriteriju lojalnosti. Dakle, američka vanjska politika u trajnoj je tenziji predodžbe „prvog među jednakima“ u liberalnom međunarodnom poretku, s jedne, i nacionalne ekskluzivnosti, s druge strane. Tenzija je ta koja će obilježiti američku vanjskopolitičku povijest od ranog Hladnog rata do pojave Trumpa.

U praksi, doktrina *America First* počiva na programu vanjskopolitičke strategije pod nazivom *principled realism*, odnosno „principijelni realizam“. Budući da je Trumpova administracija desna republikanska, pozivanje na tradiciju koja zastupa nacionalni interes i *Realpolitik* ne čini se spornim. Ipak, izraz „principijelni realizam“, kojega je Trump sveukupno četiri puta upotrijebio tijekom posljednjih dvije godine svog mandata, pokazuje se prijepornim kako zbog svojih konceptijskih nedorečenosti tako i zbog navodnog odmaka od tradicionalnih načela realizma. Nedostatak jasnog određenja naveo je jednog od Trumpovih kritičara da primijeti kako nije jasno „predstavlja li strategija ideju po kojoj se trebaju slijediti principi realizma, ili treba realistički slijediti principe“?⁶ U govoru pred Općom skupštinom UN-a, u rujnu 2018, Trump je dao tek negativno određenje strategije, kao one koja odbacuje dosadašnje „diskreditirane ideologije“, te nadodaje kako: „(principijelni realizam) nastupa s iskrenim priznavanjem činjeničnog stanja“ (*Remarks by President Trump...*, 2018). „Iskrenost“ kao principijelnost i „priznavanje činjenica“ kao realistički pristup zbilji plitka je konstatacija koja ništa bitno ne otkriva. Niti dokument *National Security Strategy* (Nacionalna sigurnosna strategija, NSS), objavljen godinu dana

6 Paul Stares, viši suradnik u američkom Vijeću za međunarodne odnose (*Council for Foreign Relations*) tvrdi da je sam naziv strategije proturječan, jer realizam tradicionalno gleda na međunarodnu politiku kao područje slobodno od bilo kakvih principa. To se proturječje odražava i na samu vanjskopolitičku praksu. Primjerice, Trumpovo povlačenje iz dogovora oko iranskog nuklearnog programa je principijelno, ali ne i realističko u smislu stvarnih američkih interesa. S druge strane, pristupanje pregovorima oko obuzdavanja sjevernokorejskog nuklearnog programa je realističko bez principa, jer je tim činom dat legitimitet odmetnutom totalitarnom režimu Kim Jong Una (vidi intervju sa Stareom u: Heldeyang 2018).

ranije i u kojem su sadržajno izložena programska načela doktrine *America First*, ne otkriva mnogo.⁷

Ipak, jedan paragraf u NSS-u privlači pozornost; onaj u kojem se obrazlaže motiv upotrebe pojma „realizma“: „(Strategija) je realistička zato što priznaje središnju ulogu moći u međunarodnoj politici, potvrđuje da su snažne i suverene države najbolja nada za miroljubivi svijet, te jasno definira nacionalni interes“ (Trump 2017, 55).

Ovaj kratki navod indikativan je i dostatan za razumijevanje cjelokupne doktrinarne podloge Trumpove vanjske politike. Tri spomenuta pojma: moć, suverena država i nacionalni interes, razotkrivaju specifično intelektualno uporište u neorealizmu. Stanovište NSS-a izravno se nadovezuje na tri ključne neorealističke pretpostavke: moć shvaćena u materijalnom smislu (u prvom redu vojna moć); suverena država kao temeljna jedinica međunarodnog sustava; te nacionalni interes shvaćen funkcionalno (samopomoć, *selfhelp*), u vidu povećanja materijalne moći radi opstanka u anarhičnom sustavu (Jović 2013; posebno Novičić 2013; također, Vukadinović 2005). Dok zdvajaju nad značenjem „principijelnog realizma“, Trumpovi kritičari sasvim pogrešno zaključuju da Trump ovim izrazom prikriva svoj vanjskopolitički oportunistički i sirovost svoje „transakcijske“ vanjske politike.⁸ Oni tvrde da je zvučni naziv „principijelni realizam“ zloraba tradicije realizma kako bi jedna „od danas do sutra“ vanjska politika, lišena svakog moralnog ograničenja i vizije, dobila na „intelektualnoj težini“ (Kirkery 2018; Grgić 2018). Međutim, ti kritičari previdaju da tako konstruirana predodžba o zbilji svijeta – nesigurnog svijeta, u kojemu su sva sredstva u borbi za goli opstanak dopuštena – jest temeljna neorealistička paradigma. Zoltan Feher uočio je niz podudarnosti između glavnih predizbornih obećanja *America First* platforme i koncepcija suvremenih neorealista, kao što su John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Robert Art, Barry Posen i Christopher Layne. Prvo, Trump je izričito zahtijevao pravičniju raspodjelu financijske odgovornosti i ulaganja u NATO savez, što je u skladu s hegemonijom prinude koju zastupaju svi neorealisti. Drugo, Trump je najavljivao vojno povlačenje iz Europe i Azije, što se podudara s Layneovom koncepcijom „offshore balansiranja“ (*offshore balancing*).⁹

7 Strategija vrvi uobičajenim sigurnosnim diskursom, obrazlažući četiri stupa nacionalnog interesa: 1) zaštita domovine; 2) promicanje američkog prosperiteta; 3) snagom održavan mir; te 4) širenje američkog utjecaja.

8 Transakcijsku vanjsku politiku karakterizira menadžerska tehnika djelovanja i nedostatak političke vizije. Načelo kojim se vodi je izvlačenje apsolutne dobiti nauštrb kako saveznika tako i neprijatelja (Nye 2014). Doktrina *America First* u praksi se svodi na *cost-benefit* izračun: tko je voljan platiti, taj će dobiti zaštitu i pomoć SAD (Stokes 2018).

9 Koncept „offshore balansiranje“ prvi je razvio Layne (1997) kao stratešku alternativu liberalnoj hegemoniji SAD. Ovaj koncept zagovara nemiješanje SAD-a u određene regionalne sukobe, nego „udaljeno“ podržavanje klijenata (npr. Izrael, Saudijska Arabija, Egipat itd.) u

Treće, Trump je zastupao stajalište da daljnje proširenje NATO-a na istok Europe treba obustaviti kako bi se normalizirali odnosi s Rusijom, što je u skladu s Mearsheimerovim ranijim gledištima o američkoj pretjeranoj rastegnutosti (*overstretch*) na više bojišta.¹⁰ Četvrto, najavio je nepopustljivi rat protiv islamskog fundamentalizma i terorizma, sukladno Artovu konceptu „selektivnog angažiranja“ (*selective engagement*).¹¹ Feher stoga zaključuje da Trumpova vanjskopolitička doktrina nije „niti nova, niti bizarna, niti radikalna“; ona je jednostavno – neorealistička (Feher 2017).

Većina je neorealista u prvi mah prepoznala realistički potencijal doktrine *America First*. Mearsheimer je pisao kako nova administracija ima povijesnu priliku odbacivanja „bankrotirane strategije liberalne hegemonije“, te predlaže službeno usvajanje strategije „offshore balansiranja“ (Mearsheimer 2017). Slična su i Waltova gledišta (Walt 2017). Od svih neorealista koji su u početku poduprli doktrinu *America First*, do danas će dosljedan u podršci ostati jedino Randall Schweller. U članku *Foreign Affairs*-a, pod naslovom „Tri pohvale Trumpovoj vanjskoj politici“, Schweller tvrdi kako je Trump u dvije godine mandata uspješno ostvario većinu zacrtanih vanjskopolitičkih ciljeva: na trgovinskom planu, njegov ekonomski nacionalizam uzdrmao je legitimitet multilateralnih slobodnotrgovinskih ugovora koji su išli na štetu SAD, te je objavio trgovinski rat Kini; na sigurnosnom planu, vojno je slomio Islamsku državu; i na političkom planu, obuzdao je takozvani *free-riding*, odnosno da SAD snosi glavni teret troškova u euroatlantskom savezništvu. Međutim, ono po čemu je Schwellerov članak zanimljiv nije njegova empirijska analiza na temelju koje pozitivno ocjenjuje Trumpovu vanjsku politiku, nego kriterij njegove prosudbe. Dvije stvari čine neorealistički kriterij ekskluzivnim: prvo, posjedovanje kognitivne sposobnosti razumijevanja same zbilje; te drugo, mudro oblikovanje odluka u skladu sa strukturnim ograničenjima koje nameće međunarodni sustav. Po Schwelleru, Trump je realist *par excellence* jer je on prvi shvatio da SAD više nije jedina globalna supersila posthladnoratovskog svijeta: „Trump nije stvorio ovakvu zbilju, on ju je jednostavno prepoznao“ (Schweller 2018b, 142). Američki „unipolarni moment“ definitivno je završio globalnom recesijom 2008, ustupivši mjesto multipolarnosti kao novoj zbilji koju karakterizira visoka kompetitivnost država posvećenih

uravnoteživanju snaga s neprijateljem. Takvim pristupom, osim što neizravno utječe na sukob, SAD će rasti međunarodni ugled kao posredniku.

10 Posebno obratiti pažnju na Mearsheimerov članak o ukrajinskoj krizi i osudi američkog imperijalnog hubrisa, koji je pridonio rasplamsavanju sukoba u Ukrajini (Mearsheimer 2014).

11 Strategija „selektivnog angažiranja“ odnosi se na strogo definirane ciljeve vanjske politike, i primjenu sile isključivo protiv označenih („selektiranih“) prijetnji koje predstavljaju stupanj najviše ugroze (Art 1998/99).

vlastitim interesima, sigurnosti i ekonomskom blagostanju. Čak i ako se na određenim područjima takva vanjska politika pokaže neuspješnom, ona je hvale vrijedna samom činjenicom što si postavlja zadatke i ciljeve u skladu sa zakonima zbilje, a ne po idealističkim uvjerenjima ideološki zaslijepljenih liberala.

Schweller je usamljeni glas. Nitko nije toliko gorljivo osporavao Trumpov navodni realizam koliko sami realisti. Robert Jervis je ustvrdio kako će Trumpova doktrina vrlo vjerojatno ostati na razini predizborne retorike.¹² Primijenivši Waltzove „tri razine (ili predodžbe) analize“ i birokraciju kao intervenirajuću varijablu, autor je ukazao na niz izravnih institucionalnih i međunarodnih ograničenja, koja će jednostavno onemogućiti Trumpovo najavljeno predizborno obećanje o radikalnom raskidu s dotadašnjim vanjskopolitičkim smjernicama (Jervis 2018, 4–5). Ukoliko Trump zaista ostvari svoja obećanja, tim je više realizam njegove doktrine upitan. Naime, ako struktura uvjetuje ponašanje država, a međuovisni sustav liberalnog međunarodnog poretka svakako predstavlja zbiljsko stanje stvari; onda, koliko god da je opravdan Trumpov skepticizam oko određenih politika (npr. neravnomjerni teret troškova u NATO-u, štetnost pojedinih slobodnotrgovinskih ugovora, odnos prema Rusiji itd.), radikalna promjena vanjske politike ne bi bila u skladu s imperativima sustava, odnosno ne bi bila realistička. Međutim, Jervis sumnja u takav ishod, jer povijest je pokazala da američki predsjednici, neovisno o suprotstavljenim političkim platformama, uvijek bivaju strukturno ograničeni, stoga valja prije očekivati kontinuitet na koji eventualna promjena vanjskopolitičke metode i taktike neće mnogo utjecati. Pritom, Jervis tvrdi da Trumpova doktrina kao takva „teško da je uskladiva s realizmom; iako se ne može reći koja to alternativna teorija, ako takva uopće postoji, može opravdati principijelni realizam“? (Ibid. 5)

Peter Feaver i Hal Brands također su ustvrdili da doktrina *America First* nije realistička, budući da se ne temelji na tradicionalnim načelima sigurnosne strategije i političkog pragmatizma, nego u dosad neviđenom izolacionističkom povlačenju i tribalizmu.¹³ U stvari, meta njihove oštre kritike u članku „Spašavanje realizma od takozvanih realista“ nije Trump, nego neorealisti koji su ga u prvi mah prigrlili: Mearsheimer, Walt, Lyne itd. Ti su, kako ih autori nazivaju, „akademski realisti“ na groteskni način izvitoperili jednu veliku teorijsku tradiciju, koja njihovom „zaslugom“

12 Za reakciju i odgovor na Jervisov esej, vidi: Schweller (2018a: 22–39).

13 Sličnog je stava i konzervativni publicist Daniel Larison. On tvrdi da Trumpova fiksacija na povećanje vojne moći i prijezir koji pokazuje prema diplomaciji potvrđuje da s tradicionalnim diplomatskim pragmatizmom kojim se realizam diči on nema veze. Čak i po pitanju „prepoznavanja zbilje“, Trump uopće ne posjeduje nikakvu analitičku sposobnost svojstvenu realistima, već djeluje po iracionalnim i refleksivnim impulsima (Larison 2018).

postaje sinonimom za prizemni oblik nacionalističkog radikalizma. Takav „realizam“ je u bitnoj suprotnosti sa uhodanim obrascima ponašanja u skladu s realističkim shvaćanjem američke hegemonije. Naime, *America First* doktrina smjera uništenju međunarodnih institucionalnih aranžmana koji su se izgrađivali desetljećima i uspješno jamčili stabilnost i prosperitet SAD i Zapada. Izdaja je to onog izvornog realističkog pragmatizma u tradiciji Geoga Kennana i Henryja Kissingera, a koji je prepoznao „da će moć SAD biti najdjelotvornija ako se upregne s neodoljivim koncepcijama američke moralne svrhe i primijeni kroz trajnu suradnju s nacijama koje sa SAD dijele neke zajedničke temeljne vrijednosti“ (Brands i Feaver 2017).

Optimizam u pogledu realističkog potencijala doktrine *America First* od samog je početka bio akademski mjehur na tržištu ideja, koji se rasprnuo prvim potezima Trumpove administracije.¹⁴ Danas je većina neorealista na čelu s Mearsheimerom i Waltom u najmanju ruku razočarana (Walt 2018; Posen 2018). Međutim, to nipošto ne znači da su u pravu oni kritičari koji su tvrdili da „principijelni realizam“ nije ništa drugo do obični simbolički slogan bez teorijskog uporišta. „Principijelni realizam“ zaista ima utemeljenje u neorealizmu i to je, paradoksalno, glavni izvor sporenja. Naime, cjelokupni se prijemor svodi na dvojbu je li Trumpovo aktivno podrievanje liberalnog međunarodnog poretka, pa samim time i američke liberalne hegemonije, realističko u smislu prepoznavanja zbilje i djelovanja u skladu s strukturnim ograničenjima sustava? Ovaj prijemor je više politički nego akademski, čemu u prilog govori i činjenica da je polemika oko Trumpove doktrine izrazito jakog ideološkog naboja.¹⁵ Međutim, kako bi se razjasnila ova dvojba, potrebno je izdići se izvan dualističkog okvira realističko-liberalne dihotomije.

14 Primjerice, Trump ne samo da je odobrio povećanje broja vojnika u Afganistanu, nego je i odustao od *time-line based strategy*, kojom se trebao utvrditi konkretni rok povlačenja američkih snaga iz te zemlje; umjesto da je uravnotežio snage s Rusima na Bliskom istoku, bombardirao je Siriju; definitivno je zanemario strategiju offshore balansiranja kada se svrstao kao saveznik Izraela po pitanju „dvostranog rješenja“ s Palestincima; pojačao je sankcije Rusiji itd. (Stokes 2018; Walt 2018).

15 Jervis otvoreno iskazuje osobni animozitet prema Trumpu i njegovoj politici. Schweller ponosno ističe da je republikanac i da je Trump bio njegov izbor. Obojica koriste jedinstvenu neorealističku strukturalnu metodu u svojim analizama. U oštrom odgovoru Brandsu i Feaveru, Andrew Bachević je razotkrio njihove veze s neokonzervativnim elitama, kao pozadinu njihovog ideološki motiviranog napada na Mearsheimera, Walta i druge. Njihovo pozivanje na realizam iz vremena Hladnog rata pokazuje njihovo nepoznavanje zbilje, odnosno da se od tog vremena struktura izmjenila dva puta: najprije u „unipolarnom momentu“ američke liberalne hegemonije, te potom u suvremenoj multipolarnosti, a odraz koje je Trump (Bachević 2017).

3. NEOREALIZAM KAO IDEOLOŠKI IDEALIZAM

Uvjet identitetskog određenja realizma, kao teorije zbilje, zahtjeva konstituiranje njegove suprotnosti: liberalizma, kao jednog od ideoloških varijanti političkog idealizma. Ova podjela seže u same korijene nastanka akademske discipline međunarodnih odnosa, čija službena predaja bilježi navodnu pobjedu realista nad liberalnim idealistima u takozvanoj „prvoj velikoj raspravi“ tridesetih ili četrdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća. U stvari, ta je „rasprava“ popularizirani mit osmišljen po uzoru na razornu kritiku liberalnih „utopista“ u studiji Edwarda Carr *Dvadesetogodišnja kriza* iz 1939 (Carr 2001).¹⁶ Carr udara temelje danas konvencionalnom binarnom diskursu kada kaže: „Radikal je nužno utopist, a konzervativac realist (...) politička ljevica smišlja načela političkog djelovanja i razvija ideale koje državnici trebaju slijediti, ali joj nedostaje praktičnog iskustva koje proizlazi iz bliskog kontakta s zbiljom“ (Carr 2001, 18–19). Na ovoj pretpostavci niknuti će desno-lijeva tautologija američkih doktrina vanjske politike.¹⁷ Međutim, što Carr podrazumijeva pod „konzervativizmom“ kada govori o realizmu, te zbog čega liberalnoj ljevici ekskluzivno pripisuje utopizam, odnosno idealizam? Za razumijevanje ove podjele potrebno je razlučiti tri razine realističke, odnosno idealističke misli (Griffith 1992, 1. poglavlje). Prva razina odnosi se na razlikovanje u teoriji znanja, koje se kategorijalno dijeli na realistički i idealistički pristup razumijevanju zbilje; druga razina je deskriptivna, te se odnosi na razlikovanje teorijskih perspektiva političkog realizma i političkog idealizma kao skupu stiliziranih pretpostavki i načela; te konačno, treća razina je preskriptivna, i odnosi se na razlikovanje vanjskopolitičkih programskih strategija i praktičnih pristupa kojima odgovara uobičajena podjela na realizam i liberalizam.

Na epistemološkoj razini, Robert Berki (1981) je ukazao kako realizam i idealizam predstavljaju suprotstavljena misaona svojstva. Realistička misao pretpostavlja zbilju kao trajni dijalektični odnos nužnosti (strukturnog determinizma) i slobode (slobodne volje u djelovanju, koje nadilazi struk-

16 Carr-ov napad na „utopiste“ odnosi se na kritiku nekoliko nepovezanih ličnosti iz političkog i akademskog svijeta: npr. američkog predsjednika Wilsona, pacifista Normana Angella, intelektualnog *spiritus movensa* Lige naroda Alfreda Zimmerna itd. Većina „utopista“ koje Carr kritizira u stvari su utilitaristi i ekonomski liberali devetnaestog stoljeća, a što je i slučaj u Morgenthauovoj kritici u *Čovjek znanosti protiv politike moći* (Morgenthau 1947). Ipak, u naknadnoj konstrukciji realističko-liberalnog dualizma, svi navedeni „utopisti“ biti će svrstani pod jedinstvenu tradiciju – koja, očito, u takvom obliku nikada nije postojala – „liberalni idealizam“.

17 Primjerice, Mearsheimer na temelju ove nekritički i u pojednostavljenom obliku izložene podjele u uvodnom dijelu svoje studije *Tragedija velikih sila* izvodi svoju koncepciju „ofenzivnog realizma“ (Mearsheimer 2001, 1. poglavlje).

turna ograničenja). U ovom relativnom odnosu, teorija se razvija iz „iskustva svakodnevnog praktičnog života“ (Berki 1981, 2); kako bi povratno djelovala na društvo i njegovu organizaciju. Idealizam, s druge strane, negira ovaj dijalektični odnos, tvrdeći da je zbilja ontološka: ili nužnost ili sloboda. Posljedično tomu, idealistička „imaginacija“ apstrahira nužnost ili slobodu do razine konceptijske dogme, koja u praktičnoj primjeni vodi ili u totalno potčinjavanje društva ili u revoluciju. U modernoj tehno-znanstvenoj epohi, idealizam nastoji utemeljiti svoju „imaginaciju“ u znanosti (prvenstveno u prirodnim znanostima), kako bi si priskrbila neprikosnoveni znanstveni autoritet u polaganju prava na univerzalnu „istinu“. Realizam osporava ovu idealističku samouvjerenost, tvrdeći da znanje, budući da proizlazi iz iskustva, nužno je uvjetovano subjektivnim predodžbama (Neascu 2009, 8–11; Petersen 1999). Zagovaranje univerzalne „istine“ u ovom slučaju ne može biti ništa drugo do racionalizirani interes partikularnog društva ili grupe; dakle, ideologija (Jütersonke 2010, 151–160; Molloy 2004; Behr and Heath 2009; Rösch 2013).

Realizam u biti ne osporava liberalnu tradiciju slobode i jednakih prava, nego prvenstveno racionalističku političku znanost. U srcu racionalističkog pristupa liberalnog idealizma vlada uvjerenje da se valjana politička praksa postiže konstruiranjem univerzalne znanstvene metode, pomoću koje će se otkriti objektivni zakoni društvene zbilje. Politička primijenjenost „znanstveno“ otkrivenih koncepcija vodi u društveni inženjering, a to je ono čemu se Carr i cjelokupni intelektualni pokret „klasičnog“ realizma protive. To je pravi smisao onog „konzervativnog“ u Carrovom realizmu (Cox 2000; Molloy 2003; Babik 2013).¹⁸ Također, time se podrazumijeva da idealizam nije ekskluzivno svojstvo liberalizma i ljevice, nego je potencijalno svojstven bilo kojoj političkoj teoriji koja bi svoja načela, koncepte i pretpostavke postavila na pijedestal „znanstveno“ utvrđene univerzalne „istine“.¹⁹ Riječ je o epistemološkom sukobu relativnog i apsolutnog; refleksivnog i racionalističkog; praktičnog iskustva i apstraktnog koncepta; anti-ideologije i ideologije. A upravo ova dihotomija u bitnom smislu razdvaja „klasični“ realizam od neorealizma. Potonji sebe smatra nasljednikom „klasične“ realističke tradicije, ali to samoprogllašeno naslijeđe tek je na razini deskripcije, u prihvaćanju nekih općih načela i pretpostavki o moći,

18 To je i središnje značenje Morgenthauove kritike u studiji *Čovjek znanosti protiv politike moći* (1947), koja napada čvrstu vjeru liberalnog racionalizma da znanošću može riješiti kompleksne društvene probleme (konkretno rat) kroz primjenu metoda prirodnih znanosti, a koja je u konačnici nesposobna razumjeti i suočiti se s erupcijom iracionalnih snaga dvadesetog stoljeća: masovnoj politici, industrijaliziranom ratu, totalitarizmu, genocidu itd. (Bell 2009; Lazović 2013).

19 Iako nikada nisu bili predmetom sustavne kritike, realizam u ovu kategoriju smješta i marksizam i radikalni nacionalizam, u obliku ondašnjih fašističkih pokreta (Morgenthau 1970, poglavlje 23; te 2006, poglavlje 7).

državi i međunarodnom sustavu. No, neorealizam u bitnom epistemološkom smislu utemeljenje nalazi u političkom idealizmu.²⁰

Osnivač ovog teorijskog pravca Waltz tvrdi da se valjana teorija ne smije zanimati za „sve što se događa u međunarodnoj politici“, već joj je potreban „vitalni eksplanatorni konstrukt“ (Waltz 1990, 32). U duhu liberalnog racionalizma, on kaže da teorija mora biti apstrahirana od empirijske zbilje (dakle, od svakog iskustva) i oblikovana kao kognitivna predodžba specifične društvene aktivnosti (međunarodne politike) u svrhu predviđanja, te nadalje „kontroliranja“ zbilje (Waltz 2008, 1. poglavlje). Pretendirajući na neprikosnoveni znanstveni autoritet temeljem otkrivanja univerzalnih zakona međunarodne politike, neorealizam prirodu apstraktnih koncepcija o moći, državi i međunarodnom sustavu poistovjećuje s prirodom međunarodne politike. Mearsheimer tako kaže da je neorealizam teorija „materijalnih struktura koje uvjetuju ponašanje država“, iz čega proizlazi da je praksa valjana ako je u skladu s mehaničkim zakonima sustava (Mearsheimer 1994, 41). Dakle, epistemološke razlike između novog realizma i liberalizma nema, (čemu u prilog svjedoči i „unutarparadigmatska rasprava“),²¹ dok se razlikuju tek u deskripciji: umjesto slobode, neorealizam zagovara nužnost u vidu strukturnog determinizma.

Kako je u prethodnom dijelu istaknuto, strategija „principijelnog realizma“ polazi od načelnih pretpostavki da je borba za moć bitna karakteristika međunarodne politike, te da je za miroljubiv svijet nužno potrebna vojno i ekonomski jaka suverena država. Iako u deskriptivnom smislu to jesu načelno pretpostavke realističke tradicije, Waltz im je u procesu pojmovne racionalizacije izmijenio smisao, primjenjujući ono što Morgenthau kritizira kao racionalistički „redukcionizam“ (Morgenthau 1970, 241–248).²²

20 Kao što je ranije napomenuto, „liberalni idealizam“ kao jedinstvena tradicija u međunarodnim odnosima nije nikada postojao, nego se ovaj naziv načelno odnosi na racionalističku političku znanost kao skup pretpostavki, mikroekonomskih modela i empirijskih metoda preuzetih iz klasičnog liberalizma.

21 Riječ je o takzvanoj „trećoj velikoj raspravi“ neorealizma i neoliberalizma osamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća, koju je Ole Waever prozvao „neo-neo sintezom“ (Waever 1996). Prihvativši sve temeljne pretpostavke neorealizma: državu kao jedinstvenog racionalnog aktera, moć, anarhični sustav, „nova“ varijanta liberalizma, čiji su glavni predstavnici Robert Keohane i Joseph S. Nye, svela se na neorealističku granu koja razmatra suradnju među državama i njihovu apsolutnu dobit, umjesto nepovjerenja i posljedične relativne dobiti.

22 Ovdje navedena Morgenthauova kritika datira iz sredine šezdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća i odnosi se na rane američke teorije međunarodnih odnosa koje prethode neorealizmu: npr. bihejvioralne teorije, simulacija, teorija igre itd. Međutim, bitni smisao kritike savršeno je primjenjiv i na neorealizam.

Redukcionizam pretpostavlja dedukcijsko svođenje zbilje na pojednostavljene teorijske sheme, podložne kvantitativnom mjerenju.²³ Posljedično tomu, kako kaže Morgenthau, teorija gubi iz vida važne čimbenike koji uvjetuju međunarodnu politiku, kao što su moralne dvojbe, rizici u donošenju političkih odluka i intelektualna zdvajanja nad stanovitom međunarodnom problematikom (Ibid. 243). Tako će Waltz jedan od najkompleksnijih fenomena međunarodne politike – moć – svesti na elementarne materijalne snage države; konkretno, na vojnu moć. Jer, po Waltzu, znanstvena je analiza međunarodne politike valjana kada se „moć procjenjuje uspoređivanjem (materijalnih, op.a.) sposobnosti određenog broja jedinica“ (Waltz 2008, 110). Ovaj pristup bitno odudara od „klasičnog“ realističkog poimanja moći, kao epistemološkog „putokaza“ za razumijevanje moralnih i sociopolitičkih implikacija društvene iracionalnosti, psihološki uvjetovane inherentnom „težnjom k moći“ (Williams 2007, 118–127; Tjalve 2008, 97–136; Rösch 2013).

Neposredna je implikacija ove intelektualne zablude neorealizma konstruiranje društvene predodžbe koja će psihološku kategoriju političke moći razumjeti isključivo u terminima sile. Kada se na temelju takve predodžbe oblikuje interes, političko se u vanjskopolitičkom odlučivanju nužno mora povući pred vojnim. Rezultat toga je militarizacija politike, za koju Morgenthau kaže da „ne razumije paradoksalnu činjenicu da povećanje materijalne moći nužno ne znači povećanje sveukupne nacionalne moći“, te dodaje kako će konačni rezultat one politike, koja sve kapacitete podredi povećanju materijalne moći, državu suočiti s činjenicom „da nema prijatelje, samo vazale i neprijatelje“ (Morgenthau 2006, 174).²⁴ Materijalistička predodžba o moći kao sili u bitnom smislu oblikuje Trumpov pogled na svijet, eksplicitno izložen u njegovoj knjizi *Great Again*:

Moj pristup vanjskoj politici izgrađen je na snažnim temeljima: djeluj na temelju svoje snage. To znači da moramo zadržati status naše vojske kao

23 U slučaju neorealizma konkretno je riječ o mikroekonomskom modelu na kojemu je sazdana treća predodžba međunarodnog sustava, koji je analogan tržištu, države kompanijama, a ravnoteža snaga mehanizmu „nevidljive ruke“ Adama Smitha. Dobrobit općeg mehaničkog uravnoteživanja jest opstanak aktera na međunarodnoj sceni. A da li će određena država opstati ovisi o, kako Waltz kaže: „njenom vlastitom naporu (...) Međunarodna politika predstavlja područje u kojemu je sve dozvoljeno. Ona je strukturno slična tržišnoj ekonomiji onoliko koliko je načelu samopomoći dozvoljeno da djeluje u tržišnoj ekonomiji (Waltz 2008, 103).

24 Morgenthauovo poimanje moći istovjetno je poimanju H. Arendt, koja strogo razlikuje moć i silu. Dok moć počiva na društvenom pluralitetu javno-političkog prostora, sila počiva na materijalnim sredstvima i kao takvoj društvena joj brojnost nije potrebna. Arendt kaže: „Gdje se sila, koja je zapravo fenomen pojedinca ili malobrojnih, povezuje s moći, koja je moguća samo među mnogima, nastaje nečuveno povišenje potencijala sile koje sa svoje strane, doduše, potaknuto moći organiziranog prostora, međutim, potom kao i svaki potencijal sile narasta i razvija se nauštrb moći“ (Arendt 2013, 56).

daleko najmoćnije na svijetu. Moramo iskazati našu volju da uporabimo našu ekonomsku snagu kako bismo nagradili one zemlje koje s nama surađuju i kaznili one koje to ne čine (...) Također moramo stupiti u savezništva s našim partnerima s kojima imamo zajedničke koristi (...) Moramo potrošiti koliko je god potrebno novaca da u cijelosti financiramo svoju vojsku (Trump 2015, 30).

Poglavlje iz kojega je navod preuzet nosi naslov „Borba za mir“, što je veoma indikativno i daleko od bilo kakve ironije. Naime, Trump je zaista čvrstog uvjerenja da su politička stabilnost i red u međunarodnoj sferi mogući jedino na temelju vojne premoći države. Takvu vrstu idealizma Morgenthau je svojedobno označio kao viziju takozvane „makijavelističke utopije“, za koju je karakteristično „zanemarivanje dubokog jaza između kvalitete političke inteligencije i kvalitete političke prakse“ (Morgenthau 1945, 145).²⁵ Već u ožujku 2017, samo dva mjeseca otkako je postao predsjednik, Trump je predložio povećanje proračuna za Ministarstvo obrane na 639.000.000.000 dolara, što je oko 54.000.000.000 dolara više u odnosu na prethodne godine. Veoma je znakovito da je prenamjena novca trebala ići na štetu godišnjeg proračuna predviđenog za *State Department* (28%), inozemnu pomoć, te UN-ove programe; dakle, na štetu diplomacije.

Doduše, militarizacija američke vanjske politike proces je koji traje još od administracije Georga W. Busha i njegovog pokretanja „rata protiv terorizma“ 2001, a koji se nastavio i pod predsjedništvom Baraka Obame. Međutim, militarizacija vrhunac doživljava upravo pod Trumpom, koji je dao potpuno odriješite ruke Pentagonu da po vlastitoj prosudbi donosi odluke. Kada je u proljeće 2017. Trump izjavio da prepušta svu odgovornost generalima jer im vjeruje više nego političarima (Scarborough 2017) bio je to konačni krah političkog pred vojnim. Politički interes tako postaje vojni interes, a vojnoj je sferi relativna priroda političkog strana. Vojna sfera razmišlja logikom efikasnosti provedbe konkretne strategije, koja u svojoj bezobzirnosti prema mogućoj „kolateralnoj šteti“ može uključivati i prekomjernu upotrebu sile (npr. bacanje „majke svih bombi“ na uporište Islamske države u Afganistanu).

Svođenje moći na silu zaokružuje se u imaginaciji države kao jedinstvenog djelatnog aktera u sustavu, zbog čega „principijelni realizam“ i stavlja naglasak na suverenu državu kao jamstvo mira. Hartmut Behr i Amelia Heath (2009) pokazali su da je Waltz svoju ideološku pristrasnost u konceptualizaciji pojma države razvio još u svojoj doktorskoj disertaciji

25 Utopijski karakter Machiavellijeve političke filozofije Morgenthau prepoznaje u posljednjem dijelu *Vladara*, gdje Machiavelli smišlja pravila političkog djelovanja kao sredstvo do cilja ujedinjenja Italije. Po Morgenthauu, „utopijsko je uvjerenje“ da moć jedne od tih gradova država, „mudrom političkom upotrebom“, može dovesti do ujedinjenja i mira (Morgenthau 1945, 145).

sredinom pedesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća, naknadno objavljenoj pod naslovom *Čovjek, država i rat*. U toj studiji Waltz iskrivljuje političku misao Rousseaua i Hobbesa kako bi oblikovao predodžbu o državi kao akteru „sposobnom jedinstveno djelovati“ u anarhičnom sustavu. Međutim, pretpostavka je problematična jer izaziva dvojbu oko kriterija određenja „jedinštenog djelovanja“: postiže li se jedinstvena vanjska politika konsenzusom svojstvenim republikanskim uređenjima, ili ju netransparentno oblikuje koncentrirana moć u središtu autoritarne vlasti? Waltz se opredjeljuje za potonje, zagovarajući svako potiskivanje kritične opozicije kroz državno sponzoriran odgoj u „domoljublju“. Pozivajući se na Rousseauovu *Političku ekonomiju*, Waltz kaže:

U takvoj državi sukob je eliminiran, a jedinstvo ostvareno, jer s negativnog stajališta jednakost sprječava razvoj onih parcijalnih interesa koji mogu biti pogubni za jedinstvo države; s pozitivnog stajališta, usađivanje javnog osjećaja u glavu razvija u građaninu duh odanosti i blagostanja za sve. Volja države je općenita volja; ne postoji problem nejedinstva i sukoba. U proučavanju međunarodne politike pogodno je misliti o državama kao o djelatnim cjelinama (...) To je važno mjesto za svaku teoriju međunarodnih odnosa, a posebno za treću predodžbu (Waltz 1998, 148–49).

Nadalje, Waltz od Hobbesa doslovce preuzima racionalistički konstrukt „prirodnog stanja“ kao zbiljskog uvjeta međunarodne politike.²⁶ Belicistička predodžba anarhije, koja odražava hobsovski *bellum omnium contra omnes*, nužna je za opravdanje koncepcije države kao jedinstvene „djelatne jedinice“. Budući da iznad država ne postoji jedno suvereno središte moći, metafora anarhije pretpostavlja treću predodžbu oslobođenu bilo kakve političke ili pravne regulacije, trajno sklone nepovjerenju i sukobima kao dokazu slobodnog djelovanja država. Waltz kaže: „Jedinstvo jedne nacije hrani se ne samo izvornim faktorima, nego i antagonizmima koji se često javljaju u međunarodnim odnosima“ (Ibid. 151).²⁷ Označivši neorealizam kao američku hladnoratovsku znanost o strategiji, Behr i Heath zaključuju: „Počevši s pojmom anarhije i gotovo dedukcijski, putem ideja o samopomoći i nacionalnog interesa, Waltz izlaže ne samo pojmove nego i *zahtjev* (kurziv autorov) za nacionalnu i međunarodnu politiku moći, koja podra-

26 Waltz očito zanemaruje da je Hobbes svjestan međunarodne dimenzije i da mu je za međudržavnu regulaciju odnosa ključna unutardržavna legitimnost suverena kao funkcija ograničavanja njegovog djelovanja prema van (Behr and Heath 2009, 342–343).

27 Po Waltzu, anarhija ima jedinstvenu logiku, a to je „sigurnosna dilema“. Takva predodžba pretpostavlja državu ne samo kao zatvorenu cjelinu u materijalnom smislu, nego i s onim što Alexander Wendt (2009) naziva „privatnim znanjem“ o sebi i svijetu, a koji nije dijeljen s drugim državama u sustavu. Drugim riječima, oslikava se jedan primitivan sustav odnosa slabe komunikacije i nikakvog međusobnog razumijevanja, što izaziva trajno nepovjerenje i veliku mogućnost učestalih sukoba. Logiku anarhije Waltz je izveo iz Rousseauove parabole o lovu na jelena u *Raspravi o porijeklu nejednakosti* (Waltz 1998, 141–142).

zumijeva povećanje moći/sigurnosti u vanjskoj i političku homogenizaciju u unutrašnjoj politici“ (Behr and Heath 2009, 339).

Elementi autoritarnosti vidljivi su iz Trumpovog menadžerskog stila vladanja državom kao kompanijom; riječ je o administraciji koja je podijelila najviše otkaza u povijesti i koja koristi sva sredstva kako bi potčinila ili nadigrala zakonodavnu vlast (npr. proglašenje izvanrednog stanja u veljači 2019. kao izgovor za ispunjenje predizbornog obećanja izgradnje zida s Meksikom). Koncept međunarodnog sustava kao anarhije svoj vjerni odraz nalazi u Trumpovoj predodžbi svijeta kao „igri nultog zbroja“ i posljedično tomu u transakcijskoj vanjskoj politici. Savjetnik za nacionalnu sigurnost H. R. McMaster možda je na najbolji način dočarao logiku anarhije u Trumpovoj predodžbi kada je rekao da „svijet nije globalna zajednica“. Naprotiv, svijet je područje borbe za moć državnih, nedržavnih i ekonomskih aktera, i takvu „elementarnu prirodu“ međunarodne politike Trumpova administracija „ne treba negirati, nego prigrliti“ (Gvosdev 2017).

Protoliberalni idealizam Trumpove doktrine neorealizam može jedino osporavati pozivanjem na znanstveni i objektivni karakter teorije, toliko tipičan za ideologije. Argument bi glasio da neorealizam nije ideologija iz razloga što od tri predodžbe ili razine analize samo prve dvije: čovjek i država (a koje ova teorija odbacuje), mogu biti nositelji stonovitih doktrina i ideja. Treća razina, odnosno međunarodni sustav, ima vlastitu logiku (logiku anarhije), na koju ne može utjecati nikakva ideologija. S tim u skladu, Schweller upućuje „tri pohvale“ Trumpovoj vanjskoj politici. Trumpovo djelovanje na međunarodnoj sceni nije uvjetovano njegovim nacionalističkim pogledom na svijet, već svoje uspjehe duguje sposobnosti inženjera koji prepoznaje konkretni problem te ga tehnički rješava. Primjer koji kod Schwellera to najbolje ilustrira Trumpova je prijetnja da će razvrgnuti NATO. Činjenica jest da se ova vojna organizacija u posljednjih tridesetak godina preobrazila iz međudržavnog saveza kolektivne sigurnosti u interesnu organizaciju liberalnih elita.²⁸ Ali, upravo je zbog toga Trumpov zahtjev za preustrojem ili razvrgavanjem NATO-a bitno *političko* pitanje, koje zahtjeva iznimnu političku inteligenciju i diplomatski pragmatizam umjesto puke prinude ili prijetnje. Međutim, to ne sprječava Schwellera da zaključi: „U konačnici, nije Trump glavni krivac za pohabane veze u NATO-u, nego međunarodna struktura“, jer, jednostavno, s krajem Hladnog rata „Europi više

28 Dokaz tome je da je prethodnih godina Islamska država preuzela odgovornost za terorističke napade u čak pet država članica NATO-a: Belgiju, Tursku, Englesku, Francusku i Njemačku, i da se niti jedna od tih država nije pozvala na članak 5. NATO-ove Povelje, koja jamči kolektivnu akciju u slučaju napada na jednu od članica. Ali kada su konkretni ideološko-ekonomski interesi označili libijskog predsjednika Moamera Gaddafija kao prijetnju, NATO se nije libio uplesti u libijski građanski rat i vojnom intervencijom srušiti Gaddafija.

nije trebala tolika zaštita supersile, pa stoga niti Washington nije mogao imati utjecaj kao nekad“ (Schweller 2018b, 141).

Ovakvo je objašnjenje u najmanju ruku konformističko prema vladajućoj doktrini, gdje „znanost“ oslobađa analizu od bilo kakve kritičke prosudbe. Međutim, kako je istaknuo Michael Williams, racionalističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa (s neorealizmom kao vrhunskim primjerom) u konačnici će morati same sebi priznati da su i one povijesni društveni konstrukti. Naime, prvobitni motiv njihova konstituiranja jest snalaženje u kompleksnom i nestabilnom svijetu, koje se postiže primjenom racionalne i odgovorne političke analize i prakse. U središtu njihovog zanimanja „nije činjenica“ na kojoj će podići vrijednosno neutralnu znanost o međunarodnim odnosima, nego predanost razumskom djelovanju kao *vrijednosti* po sebi“ (Williams 2007, 146). Stoga, ironija je da neorealizam, bježeći od ideologije, u stvari trči k njoj. Jer, ako je po neorealistima država strukturno uvjetovana anarhičnim sustavom, njihovo je *vrijednosno* opredjeljenje da zagovaraju djelovanje po kriteriju posve agresivne militarističke doktrine jednog autoritarnog režima.

Liberali su u tom kontekstu označeni kao neprijatelji istine i neposredna politička opasnost, budući da ne prepoznaju zbilju transpovijesnih zakona međunarodnog sustava. Iz perspektive Mannheimovog partikularnog pojma ideologije, daje se zaključiti da je neorealizam poslužio političkim elitama kako bi tijekom Hladnog rata znanstveno potvrdile racionalnost svojih političkih odluka i osporile „pogrešno mišljenje“ i „lažnu svijest“ svojih političkih suparnika. Konačni je rezultat svođenje realizma na konzervativnu desnicu i liberalizma na progresivnu ljevicu. Neorealizam, koji prisvaja monopol na univerzalnu „istinu“, posljedično postaje lokalna.²⁹ Desno-lijeva tautologija će, s promjenom društvenih uvjeta i okolnosti u posthladnoratovskom dobu, teoriju suočiti sa stanovitim anomalijama u analizama. Tako je republikansku administraciju G. W. Busha već spomenuti Peter Feaver označio kao realističku, iako je Bush bio vjerojatno jedan od najžešćih liberalnih križara u širenju demokracije poslije Wilsona (Walt 2009). Predsjednik Obama, demokrat, je apriori bio

29 Iako se neorealizam podučava na sveučilištima diljem svijeta kao „opća teorija međunarodne politike“, te se u velikom broju primjenjuje u doktorskim disertacijama, kao i znanstvenim i stručnim studijama ili analizama, ipak je uočljivo kako se kategorija „realist“ ili „liberal“ isključivo pridaje američkim predsjednicima (gotovo uvijek ovisno o političkom spektru). Na druge države s različitim povijesnim iskustvima kategorije „realista“ i „liberala“ su neprimjenjive. Uzmimo primjer Hrvatske, čije je povijesno iskustvo posljednjih godina oblikovalo dvije suprotstavljene vanjskopolitičke pozicije: jednu koja zagovara jačanje odnosa s državama u regiji (politika bivšeg predsjednika Josipovića); i drugu, koja zagovara veći angažman u Srednjoj Europi i Višegradskoj skupini (politika predsjednice Grabar-Kitarović). Po navedenim kriterijima, koja je od tih pozicija realistička a koja liberalna sasvim je bespredmetno razmatrati.

označen liberalom iako je njegova vanjska politika, što mu čak i Schweller priznaje (2018a), bila realistička. Trump po toj logici nužno mora biti realist, iako je on po svim kriterijima protuliberalni idealist. Primjena jedne zastarjele kategorijalne podjele glavnim je uzrokom spomenute polemike u neorealističkom krugu oko određenja Trumpove doktrine. Što se tiče Trumpovog prisvajanja epiteta realizma, ono je samo dokaz do koje je mjere ovaj teorijski binarni konstrukt ukorijenjen u intelektualnoj svijesti, zarobljenoj u dominantnom diskursu onoga što Williams naziva „tiranijom lažnog polariteta“ (2007).

4. PROTULIBERALNI IDEALIZAM I PROTULIBERALNA HEGEMONIJA

U posljednjem dijelu ovog rada razmotriti ćemo pojam protuliberalni idealizam i njegove praktične učinke u kontekstu liberalnog međunarodnog poretka i američke hegemonije. Treba naglasiti da Trumpov fenomen zaista predstavlja specifični izazov za teorije međunarodnih odnosa, budući da s ovakvom doktrinom suvremena američka politika nije imala iskustva. Bilo da je riječ o realističkoj sklonosti vojnoj moći i nacionalnom interesu ili promicanju liberalnih načela i vrijednosti, jedna je stvar od 1945. bila neupitna: svijest o univerzalnom poslanju liberalnog SAD u svijetu. Trump je prvi predsjednik u novijoj povijesti koji je upravo tu neospornu vrijednost američkog društva, politike i hegemonije doveo u pitanje.

Uopće, fenomen uspona populističke desnice na Zapadu nameće potrebu promjene, odnosno uvođenja nove paradigme u teorijama međunarodnih odnosa. Tom su se pitanju posvetili Michael Williams i Jean-François Drolet u radu „Radikalni konzervativizam i globalni poredak“ (Williams and Drolet 2018). Autori ukazuju kako ideološki projekt Nove desnice, koji se šezdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća razvija na intelektualnim ishodištima Carla Schmitta, Oswalda Spenglera, Juliusa Evole itd., nije bio ozbiljno shvaćan, te stoga niti razmatran kao teorijska perspektiva. Njegovim se probojem na Zapadu u posljednjem desetljeću dosadašnji binarni diskurs o suprotnosti realista i liberala zamijenio novom suprotnošću između „suverenista“ i „globalista“. I dok se globalistima još uvijek označavaju one iste liberalne elite, suverenisti nisu tradicionalni konzervativci kojima se konvencionalno pripisivao realizam. Nova desnica poima državu kao jedinstvenog aktera, ali ne na materijalnom (vojnom) principu, nego na etničkom organizizmu. U stvari, konzervativna je desnica zbog svoje sklonosti kapitalizmu jednako odgovorna, kao i liberalizam, za društvenu nejednakost i ekonomske migracije. Konzervativci su prešutno odobravali politiku liberalnih elita, koje su u ime apstraktne „humanosti“ dozvolile priliv stranaca kao jeftine radne snage, izmijenivši etničku, kulturnu i duhovnu sliku nacije.

Ipak, čini se da protuliberalni idealizam Trumpa ima svoje mjesto u kategorijalnom aparatu „klasičnog“ realizma. Mogući odgovor nudi Carrov nasljednik Martin Wight. Naime, „klasičari“ su razmatrali modalitete društvene moći unutar oprečnih kategorija zbilje i utopije (Carr), *statusa quo* i *imperijalističkih* država (Morgenthau), ili „legitimnog“ i „revolucionarnog“ poretka (Kissinger). No, Wight ide korak dalje u produbljanju i proširivanju konceptijskih tipova realizma i idealizma. On nudi „triptih“ sastavljen od „realističke“, „racionalističke“ i „revolucionarne“ predodžbe međunarodne politike (Wight 1991, 7–15).³⁰ Za ovu je raspravu posebno zanimljiva treća „revolucionarna“ predodžba, kao oblik utopijske, odnosno idealističke misli. Wight ju izvodi iz povijesnog iskustva tri epohalne revolucije: protestantske Reformacije, Francuske revolucije i Oktobarske revolucije. Međutim, za razliku od realističke i racionalističke tradicije, revolucionarna tradicija u sebi sadržava svoju unutarnju kontradikciju. Drugo protu-progresivno lice idealizma je kontrarevolucionarna reakcija, koja se povijesno javlja u vidu katoličke Proturreformacije, Legitimizma i antikomunizma utjelovljenog u J. F. Dullesu (Bull 1976, 105).

Reakcija je ne samo srodna, već ona izravno proizlazi iz konzervativizma. Od tuda i sklonost brkanju nacionalističkih ideologija s konzervativnim realizmom. Ipak, između konzervativne i reakcionarne ideje postoji bitna razlika. Kissinger je u *Obnovljenom svijetu* pokazao da je konzervativna/realistička pozicija u bitnom smislu defenzivna, odnosno konzervativizam nastoji isključivo obraniti legitimnost društvenog poretka pod naletom progresivnih snaga. On određuje idealni tip konzervativca kao realističkog državnika koji protiv svoje volje biva uvučen u sukob i kojega jedino pokreće etika odgovornosti prema društvu kojemu prijete rasap u revolucionarnom vrenju. S druge strane, idealni tip revolucionara u sukobu određen je jakom individualnom voljom za radikalnom promjenom, koju pokreće etika društvene lojalnosti prema revolucionarnoj, odnosno idealističkoj doktrini. Konzervativcu je sam pojam borbe odbojan, a osjećaj trijumfa stran; on je svjestan da poredak treba promjenu, ali putem reforme a ne revolucije.³¹ I upravo zbog takvog defenzivnog karaktera konzervativca, Kissinger primjećuje da „nije slučajno što u revolucionarnom sukobu konzervativnom pozicijom dominira reakcionarno – što znači kontrarevolucionarno – krilo, dakle grupa koja se bori (revolucionarnim op.a.) terminima volje i etikom lojalnosti“ (Kissinger 1976, 240). Dakle, bitno razliko-

30 Wightova tradicija „racionalizma“ nema veze sa liberalnim racionalizmom o kojem je do sada bila riječ: *cost-benefit* analize, racionalni izbor, mikroekonomski modeli itd. Racionalizam se ovdje odnosi na zajednička pravila, norme i vrijednosti anarhičnog međunarodnog društva, te na običajne prakse i institucije međudržavnih odnosa.

31 Kissingerovo razlikovanje konzervativca i revolucionara, kao i opis sukoba pod izravnim je utjecajem Karla Mannheima i njegove *Ideologije i utopije* (Mannheim 2007, 249–257).

vanje konzervativizma i reakcije ne svodi se samo na princip djelovanja nego i na konačni cilj – konzervativac s odbojnošću i nevoljko stupa u borbu kako bi sačuvao red kao takav; reakcionar s zadovoljstvom stupa u borbu kako bi restaurirao stari poredak. Za razliku od konzervativizma, reakcionarna misao ima političku viziju: to je romantičarska vizija prošlosti, koja je jednako utopijska kao i vizije budućnosti bilo „trajnog mira“ kod liberala ili „radničkog raja“ kod marksista.

Trumpova doktrina u osnovi je reakcionarna. Ona se javlja kao kontra-revolucija na revolucionarni liberalni međunarodni poredak kojeg pokreće galopirajuća globalizacija, s namjerom da revitalizira neki novi oblik vestfalskog uređenja suverenih nacija država, gotovo identičan neorealističkoj zastarjeloj hladnoratovskoj koncepciji anarhičnog sustava. Reakcija *America First* ponajviše se očituje u aktivističkom djelovanju Trumpovog ideologa Stevea Bannona. Turnejama po Europi on nastoji ujediniti desne suverenističke snage kako bi se nastavilo ono što on naziva „nacionalnom populističkom revolucijom“ na Zapadu.³² Međutim, povijesno iskustvo pokazuje da, zbog svog utopijskog karaktera, reakcija nikada ne ostvaruje svoj konačni cilj restauracije starog poretka. Pišući o totalitarnim reakcijama na liberalizam u prvoj polovici dvadesetog stoljeća, Jose Ortega y Gasset kaže kako su kontrarevolucije osuđene na propast jer je liberalni čovjek već ostvario epohalnu pobjedu nad ne-liberalom. Reakcija predstavlja tek puku negaciju, jer umjesto da se bavi onim nakon liberalizma, ona se bavi stanjem od prije.³³ Reakcija tako „nestaje u poništavajućoj praznini i ostavlja 'zastarjelo' kao pozitivan sadržaj“ (Gasset 2003, 116). Pokušaj vraćanja na staro čista je utopija koja može silom nastojati ostvariti svoj cilj i biti poražena, ali koja u većini slučajeva primorava državnika da se prilagodi strukturnim ograničenjima dane društvene zbilje. I ta činjenica dovodi do bolne spoznaje da „principijelni realizam“ u praksi izdaje sve za što se neorealisti zalažu: Trump, naime, nastavlja održavati američku hegemoniju.

Još jedan od razočaranih neorealista, Barry Posen (2018), uočio je kako je Trump tek skinuo benevolentnu masku svog prethodnika Obame, te nastavio intenzivnijim putem održavanja globalne američke hegemonije. Bez promicanja demokracije, ljudskih prava i sklapanja novih multilateralnih trgovinskih ugovora, Trumpova hegemonijska politika zanemaruje

32 Po Bannonu, početak revolucije je 2016. godina, koju obilježava Trumpova izborna pobjeda, i pobjeda breksitera na referendumu o izlasku Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva iz Europske unije (Baume and Borrelli, 2019).

33 Po tom je pitanju znamenit Trumpov ekonomski nacionalizam, koji zagovara protekcionizam kako bi se podigla zaposlenost u onim industrijama koje su odavno prevladane. Primjerice, obećanje obnove rudarske industrije u doba sve većih zahtjeva i pritisaka za uvođenje održivog razvoja i industrije, koja počiva na obnovljivim izvorima energije, predstavlja jedan čudni spoj političkog idealizma i romantičarske nostalgije.

sve za što su se zalagali neorealisti: povlačenje (*retrenchment*), offshore balansiranje, selektivni angažman, održavanje veza sa tradicionalnim saveznicima na pragmatičnim osnovama, ravnoteža snaga itd. Što je, dakle, današnja „protoliberalna hegemonija“, koja se izdvaja iz dosadašnjeg benevolentnog liberalnog, odnosno prinudnog realističkog poimanja? Potrebno je naglasiti da „klasični“ realizam pretpostavlja da će međunarodni poredak biti legitiman isključivo ukoliko postoji minimalni konsenzus oko zajedničkih pravila svih aktera u sustavu. Kad je riječ o „principijelnom realizmu“ u praktičnoj primjeni, to je mješavina kontinuiteta i sporadičnog podriivanja, koje barem za sada ne ugrožava legitimnost liberalnog međunarodnog poretka.

Sukladno Jervisovoj prognozi, Trumpovo je djelovanje uglavnom u kontinuitetu održavanja dosadašnjih vanjskopolitičkih smjernica. Usprkos političkoj kampanji koja se vodi protiv Trumpove administracije oko navodnog dosluha s Rusima, Trump je u stvari pojačao sankcije Rusiji. SAD je i dalje vojno prisutan u Afganistanu, Iraku i Siriji. Što se tiče prijetnji oko razvrgavanja NATO-a zbog nepravične raspodjele tereta troškova, cilj je postignut u formalnim okvirima pregovora unutar saveza. Slična je stvar i sa Trumpovom agresivnom kampanjom protiv Sjevernoameričkog sporazuma o slobodnoj trgovini (NAFTA), koji je također pregovorima s Kanadom i Meksikom izmijenjena u jesen 2018. Konačno, Trump ne radi potpuni odmak od moralnih temelja američke vanjske politike. Nekoliko je puta naznačio svoju potporu demokraciji i ljudskim pravima kao oblik političkog pritiska na Kubu, Iran, Siriju i Venezuelu (Abrams 2019, 134–136).

S druge strane, u pojedinim slučajevima Trump unilateralnim potezima podriiva liberalni međunarodni poredak, ali samo u onim sferama međunarodne politike u kojima se takvim postupcima ne mogu izazvati tektonski poremećaji u sustavu. Uglavnom su to demonstracije sile, kao što je povlačenje SAD iz Pariškog klimatskog ugovora ili objava trgovinskog rata Kini. Dugoročne posljedice takve politike najviše će doprinijeti, kako kaže Doug Stokes, „nepopravljivoj šteti prestižu SAD“, te mu posljedično suziti manevarski prostora za vanjskopolitičku strategiju u međunarodnoj politici (Stokes 2018, 150). Slučaj gdje se izravno podriiva pravni legitimitet međunarodnog poretka je povlačenje SAD iz iranskog nuklearnog dogovora. Ovaj čin ne predstavlja pravo jedne države da se zbog svog interesa povuče iz takvog aranžmana, nego grubo kršenje međunarodnog prava. Dogovor je 2015, nakon desetogodišnjih diplomatskih napora, potvrđen Rezolucijom 2231 Vijeca sigurnosti UN-a, što ga čini pravno obvezujućim.

5. ZAKLJUČAK

Svrha ovog rada nije ocjenjivanje dosadašnje Trumpove vanjske politike, nego dominantnog diskursa u teoriji međunarodnih odnosa, koji je upravo na fenomenu Trumpa razotkrio svoju neupotrebljivost. Teorijska podjela na realizam i liberalizam ne samo da nije od pomoći, već i navodi na krivi put, što je i nagnalo mnoge u neorealističkom krugu da na početku Trumpovog mandata njegovu vanjskopolitičku doktrinu proglaše realističkom. Prevladavajući binarni diskurs u stvari je bitni odmak od prvobitne svrhe nastanka modernog realizma („klasičnog“), koji svoj identitet gradi u suprotnosti prema političkom idealizmu. Primjenom kategorijalne podjele na realizam i idealizam, pokazalo se da Trumpova doktrina, upravo zato jer ima intelektualno uporište u neorealizmu, nije realistička. Naime, neorealizam racionalizacijom koncepcija moći, države i anarhičnog sustava, koje postavlja kao univerzalne zakone međunarodne politike, posljedično postaje državo-centrična teorija fiksirana na vojnu moć i kao takva podložna ideološkom prisvajanju. Dogmatičnost prevladanih neorealističkih koncepcija iz vremena Hladnog rata Trump je jednostavno pretočio u svoj vanjskopolitički program, budući da te koncepcije odgovaraju njegovoj nacionalističkoj predodžbi svijeta. Ako je Trumpova vanjska politika usmjerena na održavanje, kako kaže Posen, protuliberalne hegemonije; onda najprikladniji pojam koji objašnjava samu doktrinu jest protuliberalni idealizam koji svoje utemeljenje nalazi u kategorijalnom aparatu još uvijek aktualnog „klasičnog“ realizma.

Ideološki uvjetovan, „principijelni realizam“ u svom reakcionarnom idealizmu zahtjeva radikalnu promjenu sustava liberalnog međunarodnog poretka. Međutim, očiti vanjskopolitički kontinuitet održavanja američke hegemonije u posljednje dvije godine Trumpovog mandata ukazuje da radikalni raskid s dosadašnjom praksom nije moguć jer – nije u skladu sa zbiljom. To i jest bio jedan od glavnih predmeta sporenja među neorealisticima. Naime, neorealizam je bio i ostao hladnoratovska strateška znanost, koja se u prvi mah prepoznala u *America First* doktrini, iako je ta doktrina odraz okolnosti na koje neorealizam, skučen unutar gabarita ustaljenog realističko-liberalnog „lažnog polariteta“, nema odgovora. U doba globalizacije i nametanja novih paradigmi (među ostalim, one koje nameće populistička desnica kao podjelu na politički „suverenizam“ i „globalizam“), neorealizam je naprosto osuđen da na tržištu ideja u dogledno vrijeme ostane u sjeni.

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SUMMARY

THE TRUMP DOCTRINE AND THE REALIST TRADITION

The article's initial motive is the recent controversy among contemporary realists, who questioned the supposed realism of US president Donald Trump's foreign policy doctrine. The author argues that the polemic is a consequential outgrowth of outdated, tautological, and yet still actual binary discourse, that divides international theory and foreign policy practice on Realism and Liberalism. Referring to the established critique of Neorealism, the article argues that Neorealism does not in epistemic terms belong to the tradition of Realism, to which it is a self-proclaimed successor. On the contrary, with its notions of power, state and international system it is established in political idealism: the tradition of thought that is conventionally attributed to Liberalism, and to which "classical" Realism was fundamentally opposed. By analyzing evident congruence between principles of Neorealism and Trump's America First doctrine, the article concludes that Trump is not a realist, but illiberal idealist. His idealistic nationalist world-view, when translated into foreign policy objectives, is in stark contrast to the professed principles of Realism. Furthermore, the concept of illiberal idealism offers an analytical framework for further analysis of present US foreign policy in the context of its hegemonic position in the Liberal International Order.

KEY WORDS: Trump, Realism, Neorealism, Liberalism, Idealism.

MODERN-DAY CRUSADERS IN EUROPE. TRADITION, FAMILY AND PROPERTY: ANALYSIS OF A TRANSNATIONAL, ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE, CATHOLIC-INSPIRED INFLUENCE NETWORK

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ABSTRACT

Three recent events affecting human rights in sexuality and reproduction (a proposed ban on abortion in Poland, blocking support for *She Decides* in Croatia and halting a civil union law in Estonia) were spearheaded by organizations which appear to be the national antennae of the transnational, socially conservative network called Tradition, Family and Property (TFP). TFP refers to a set of interrelated conservative, Catholic-inspired organizations which share a common world view inspired by the TFP founder, Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira. Originating in Brazil in 1960 and eventually spreading throughout the world, TFP has long been an insurrection movement within Catholicism, with a distinct way of working by fusing social conservatism with economic hyper-liberalism and a legacy of complicity with far-right movements. Having withered away from Latin America, TFP is now an active European network with positions against sexual and reproductive rights (SRR) among its priorities. TFP's influence on SRR takes three main routes: social mobilization; norm entrepreneur and entering decision-making spaces. TFP has found new horizons in Eastern Europe and ambitions to influence the European Union and the United Nations. The reactionary narrative of TFP espousing religious orthodoxy and sanctifying economic inequality could become attractive to some by offering religious legitimization for illiberalism and authoritarianism.

KEY WORDS: reproductive rights, ultra-conservatism, religious movements

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INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 2016, thousands of Polish women took to the streets in what became known as the 'Black Marches' to protest a draft law which would seek to implement a total ban on abortion, removing the few allowable cases where it was legally available under Poland's already restrictive law and even providing for the imprisonment of women who have an abortion (BBC 2016). In March 2017, the then Foreign Affairs Minister of Croatia, decided to take a position against the *She Decides* global fundraising initiative (Shedecides.com) on sexual and reproductive rights (SRR) and, further, to instruct Croatian diplomats to convince other European Union (EU) Member States to take a similarly hostile position (Despot, 2017). Earlier, in 2013, a petition gathering nearly 40,000 signatures in Estonia against same-sex unions forced the parliament to temporarily halt its deliberations on its civil partnership legislation (White 2013b).

While the three political events share a similar socially conservative objective, they appear otherwise unrelated, as they appear at different times, in different national contexts and on different issues. Closer inspection of the main protagonists involved in each, however, reveals some hitherto unknown connections. In Poland, the organization most prominently involved in promoting the abortion ban was the *Fondacija Instytut na rzecz Kultury Prawnej Ordo Juris* (Foundation Institute for Legal Culture 'Ordo Juris'). *Ordo Juris* drafted the legislation under consideration and both presented and defended it before parliament and to the public. In Croatia, individuals affiliated with the organization *Vigilare* gained privileged access to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to encourage him to adopt a more traditionalist perspective in Croatia's diplomacy. In Estonia, the initiator and promoter of the petition which reached over 500,000 of Estonia's 1.2 million citizens was the organization *Sihtasutus Perekonna ja Traditsiooni Kaitseks* (SPTK – Foundation for the Protection of Family and Tradition). All three organizations, *Ordo Juris*, *Vigilare* and SPTK, appear to be the national antennae of the transnational, socially conservative, Catholic-inspired lay organization called Tradition, Family and Property (TFP).

TFP refers to a set of interrelated conservative, Catholic-inspired lay organizations which share a world view inspired by the TFP founder, the 20th century Brazilian landowner and politician, Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira. TFP-related organizations go by the name TFP in their own country or by another name, often related to a socially conservative cultural cause. They number over 40 separate organizations across over dozens of countries and several continents. This article attempts to understand the extent of the TFP network in Europe and how it works to influence sexual and reproductive rights (SRR).

NEIL DATTA

MODERN-DAY CRUSADERS IN EUROPE. TRADITION, FAMILY AND PROPERTY:
ANALYSIS OF A TRANSNATIONAL, ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE,
CATHOLIC-INSPIRED INFLUENCE NETWORK

1. TFP ORIGINS AND IDEOLOGY

If the Revolution is disorder, the Counter-Revolution is the restoration of order. And by order we mean the peace of Christ in the Reign of Christ, that is, Christian civilization, austere and hierarchical, fundamentally sacral, anti-egalitarian, and anti-liberal.¹

Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira,
Revolução e Contra-Revolução, in Catolicismo,
April 1959

Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira (1908–1995) was a wealthy, conservative, Catholic landowner in Brazil who served in Brazil's parliament and then went on to found TFP in 1960. A first characteristic of the movement is that TFP has a dual nature: spiritual and temporal. On the one hand, it can be seen as a similar conservative, religious movement to channel the motivation of lay Catholics as Opus Dei in Spain, Communion and Liberation in Italy and the Legion of Christ in Mexico, and, like these movements, TFP spread across the world from its native Brazil. On the other hand, TFP is also a politically active social movement focusing on the areas which Corrêa de Oliveira identified as the two main enemies of the Church in the 1960s: from within the Church, the enemy was liberation theology and other 'modernist' tendencies (which undermined the traditions of the Church) (Corrêa de Oliveira 1974), and from outside the Church, it was Communism, which advocated for agrarian reform (posing a threat to large landowners) (Corrêa de Oliveira 1985).

The doctrine of TFP is best described by its very name. By 'tradition', TFP opposes socially progressive evolutions in Catholic teachings – for example, some of the reforms of Vatican II – and advocates for the Church to remain true to its traditions in terms of social teachings and religious rites. While TFP opposes modernist tendencies in the Church and falls within the traditionalist faction of Catholic movements, it is not in open schism with Rome, as some other groups are, such as the Society for Saint Pious X (SSPX).² By tradition, TFP also supports the historical primacy of the Church over the secular State. By 'family', TFP defends a traditionalist approach to marriage – namely, heterosexual, monogamous, patriarchal

1 Corrêa de Oliveira, Plínio. 1959 and 1977. "Revolução e Contra-Revolução". *Catolicismo*, April 1959 (parts I and II) and January 1977 (part III): chapter III, part 1.

2 The SSPX, also referred to as 'Lefebvrists' after their founder, is a traditionalist Catholic movement which rejects the reforms of Vatican II. The clergy associated with the SSPX were excommunicated in the 1980s and as such are considered 'out of communion' with Rome. They are regarded as hard-line, far-right and anti-Semitic (Splcenter.org).

and geared towards procreation. As such, it opposes the legalization of divorce, contraception and abortion as well as same-sex relations. While this is standard fare for conservative, religious movements, TFP's position on property is unique. In defending private property ownership, TFP specifically means inherited wealth and privileges; it opposes the notion of socio-economic equality, which it considers dangerously Communist. As such, unlike many other conservative Christian groups, TFP can be described as not believing in the modern welfare State nor in the redistribution of wealth.

Corrêa de Oliveira was a prolific author and expounded on his world vision in his many works.³ Two works stand out: *Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (Corrêa de Oliveira 1959) and *The Nobility and Analogous Traditional Elites* (Corrêa de Oliveira 1993). In *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, Corrêa de Oliveira explains how the current ills of the world are the result of three past revolutions – namely, the Protestant revolution of the 16th century, which challenged the primacy of the Catholic Church; the French Revolution of the 18th century, which ushered in the dangerous ideas of 'equality' and 'liberty' and undermined the privileges of the nobility; and the Communist revolutions of the 20th century, which endangered respect for private property itself and challenged the existence of God.

In *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, Corrêa de Oliveira explains how TFP will lead the counter-revolution, resulting in an apocalyptic battle of good versus evil which he calls the *bagarre* (the battle) to restore an ideal society based on how he imagined the world prior to these revolutions – namely, a society modelled on medieval Europe. Harking back to an idealized medieval past explains TFP's extensive use of medieval imagery – for example, the heraldic 'lion rampant' as its logo and the use of red capes and gold lion brooches as official dress for its members, who are themselves styled as 'warrior monks', and large red flag-staffs and banners emblazoned with the TFP gold lion.⁴

Nostalgic fascination with an imagined medieval Europe goes beyond inspiration for colourful imagery and branding, but forms the basis of TFP's vision of an ideal social hierarchy. In *The Nobility and Analogous Traditional Elites*, TFP advocates for a return of the former aristocracy and analogous traditional elites (for example, large property owners in Latin America) to their historic and rightful positions of power. Indeed, invoking religious legitimacy for this position, *according to the pontifical texts discussed hereafter, the nobility is an elite from every point of view. It is*

3 For Corrêa de Oliveira's many works, see: <http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/livros.asp>.

4 For an explanation of TFP's lion rampant visual, see: http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/DIS_SD_leao_TFP.htm#.WkTxooxFxRo.

the highest elite, not the sole elite. It is a species within the genus 'elites'.⁵ Such aristocrats would emerge after the *bagarre* to lead the world and thus save Western civilization by restoring authentic Christianity, all the while supported by the TFP warrior monks, while the rest of the population is reduced to a state of docile serfdom.

2. THEORETICAL MODELS FOR TFP

... it is difficult to understand how such a disjointed mixture of political reaction, religious intransigence and obscurantism could have flowered to the point that it enabled the TFP to reach out to the world, or at least to part of the Christian world of Western Europe, the United States and most of the countries of Latin America.⁶

TFP's polymorph nature as both a religious and politically engaged social movement as well as a trans-national network spanning six decades requires a unique theoretical approach anchored in at least two models. The first concerns TFP's religious personality as elaborated by Barker (2010), Compagnon (2008), Introvigne (2009), Mayer (1982), Matta (2008) and Zanotto (2017). The second field elucidate TFP development as a civil society movement as described by Power (2008), Ruderer (2012), Peñas Defago, et. al. (2018), Yamin, et. al. (2018), as well as Kuhar and Paternotte (2017).

Eileen Barker's work "The cult as a social problem" offers a theoretical framework for discussing new religious movements (NRM), often labelled as cults, and helps in understanding how TFP may be classified as NRM as a "religious or spiritual organisation with a predominantly first-generation membership." Barker also identified some of the common questions which NRM's must address including leadership, recruitment and ability to adapt. NRM's often confront suspicion, at times justified and at times not, from society at large and from the hierarchy of the religion from which they derive which helps situate TFP's standing within the wider Catholic world. Further, Matta (2008) explains in detail the case of the TFP in two Latin American countries and their specificity within the world of Catholic movements while Zanotto (2007) describes TFP as a 'complete organisation' adequately filling the many varied needs of its adherents.

However, Compagnon's work on Catholic movements in the 20th century show how TFP is heir to an older tradition, that of Catholic fundamenta-

5 Ibid.

6 Latin America Report. 1985. "TFP Composition, Political Orientation, Training Discussed". Joint Publication Research Service, Arlington, VA.

lism. The concept of Catholic fundamentalism itself only becomes relevant when the mainstream of the Catholic world evolves to a new stage, leaving those who resisted in a minority position. TFP would thus be a NRM based on preserving Catholicism at a stage before its 20th century evolution. As such, Mayer's work on the religious social movements helps situate TFP as an insurrection movement within Catholicism, specifically against the perceived progressivism of Vatican II and liberation theology. However, TFP is not the only traditionalist Catholic movement with pre-conciliar positions and Introvigne's analysis from a religious economy perspective on how different religious movements position themselves internally and with the externally explains TFP's evolution over time and its near schism with the Catholic hierarchy.

In addition to being a religious movement, TFP has equally been a politically active, trans-national social movement. Margaret Power (2010) explains the important role TFP played in the global fight against abortion and Communism from the 1960s to the 1980s. Stephan Ruderer (2012) analysed TFP's role as a standard bearer for Catholic fundamentalism translating into a synergistic relationship with the authoritarian regimes of Pinochet's Chile and Videla's Argentina (Ruderer 2012). Finally, Peñas Defago's, et. al (2018) conceptualization of the modernisation of conservative social movements in the early 21st century combined with Paternotte and Kuhar's (2017) analysis of anti-gender movements shed light on TFP affiliates' influence on SRR today.

On this basis, this article seeks to understand two phenomena: first, the development of TFP in Europe; and second, TFP's ability to organize and impact issues which are among its priorities, specifically SRR. This article does not explore the religious beliefs and practices within the TFP network.

3. SPREAD, GROWTH AND DIVISION OF TFP

Based on such powerful ideals and a charismatic leader, the TFP network grew to comprise over 40 organizations spread across several continents. The TFP network became what it is today over the course of four distinct phases: the first being from the foundation in 1960 to the early 1990s; the second precipitated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the third precipitated by the founder's death in 1995 and finally the fourth from the conclusion of the legal challenges to the present.⁷

7 For an overview of this development, see: <http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/gesta.asp>.

3.1. THE FIRST PHASE: FOUNDATION AND EXPANSION

In 1968, the TFPs then existing in South America... organized national petition drives addressed to Paul VI, requesting measures against leftist infiltration into the Catholic clergy and laity of South America. Altogether, 2,060,368 people in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay signed the petition during a 58-day period. (Corrêa de Oliveira 1959, 97)

From its origins in Brazil in 1960, TFP then spreads first to other Latin American countries by founding local non-governmental organisations where the climate created by authoritarian military regimes provided fertile ground (Ruderer 2012). The founder and a close circle of confidants drawn from the other initial founders tightly controlled this expansion and the founder himself personally chose the names of the organizations in each country (Matta 2008). In the early 1970s, TFP appeared in France (Tfp-france.org) where it settled in a château in the region of Lorraine⁸ from where it spread to other European countries.⁹ At the same time, outposts appeared in Canada, South Africa, the USA and Australia.¹⁰

In this period TFP's primary targets were Communism and Liberation theology, the two forces joining to promote agrarian reforms which threatened the interests of its land owning founding members. Margaret Power (2010) and Gonzalez Ruiz (2006) describe TFP's role in socially conservative movements in Latin America where TFP developed their signature public campaigns which combine displays of religious expression with political actions. An early attempt to root out liberal tendencies inside the Church took place in Chile, with the TFP affiliate Fiducia publishing a scathing criticism of the Chilean Catholic Church in 1976¹¹ where it accused the Chilean Bishops of having acted in complicity with the leftist/Marxist Frei and Allende governments to carry out socialist reforms.

Similar pressure was exerted in Europe, for example in 1981 in France with an open letter about the ills of the Socialist government of François

8 Fédération Pro-Europa Christiana – Creutzwald (Fpec-creutzwald.org).

9 Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Schutz von Tradition, Familie und Privateigentum e.V. (Tfp-deutschland.de); L'Associazione Tradizione Famiglia Proprietà (Atfp.it); Acção Família (Acca-ofamilia.eu); Irish Society for Christian Civilisation (Isfcc.org); and Österreichische Gesellschaft zum Schutz von Tradition, Familie und Privateigentum (Tfp.at).

10 Canadian Society for the Defence of Christian Civilization (Canadianeedsourlady.org); The American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (Tfp.org), South Africans for a Christian Civilization ceased functioning in the early 2000s; and Australian Tradition, Family and Property (Tfp.org.au).

11 Fiducia, 1976. *La Iglesia del Silencio en Chile – La TFP proclama la verdad entera*. http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/GestaES_0408_1976.htm#_WIN_mExFjJU.

Mitterand entitled *What Does Self-Managing Socialism Mean for Communism: A Barrier? Or a Bridgehead?* (Corrêa de Oliveira 1981). The letter was published in leading newspapers around the world, while TFP asserts it was able to mail it to 300,000 people in France.¹² Building on this success, the Spanish TFP-Covadonga released *España, anestesiada sin percibirlo, amordazada sin quererlo, extraviada sin saberlo – La obra del PSOE* (TFP Covadonga 1988) in 1988 on how the Socialist government of Félipé Gonzalez had betrayed Spain.

In this first phase, TFP had become an influential, international, anti-Communist movement as well as a successful traditionalist insurrection within Catholicism. However, it also started encountering the first instances of the two main challenges which would haunt it for decades: hostility from the Catholic hierarchy and legal difficulties arising from TFP's alleged practices.

3.2. THE SECOND PHASE: RE-FOCUS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

A number of external factors provoked the TFP network to shift focus, thus entering a second phase in its existence. These include the fall of the Berlin Wall (signalling the demise of its greatest foe, Communism), the Vatican's formal condemnation of liberation theology and the presence of a sufficiently conservative Pope. As Barker describes, a characteristic of NRM's is that "they are likely to change far more quickly and fundamentally than older, more traditional religions" and this is evidenced as TFP leaders worked to create new types of organizations focusing on social issues of the day, namely abortion and the related human rights on sexuality and reproduction. The anti-abortion organizations *Droit de Naître* in France and *Generazione Voglio Vivere* in Italy would appear in the early 1990s. This addition to the TFP template proved successful and spread to Germany, Austria and Poland.¹³ Another experiment was that of *Luci sull'Est* in Italy, which focused on bringing the TFP message to previously formally atheist Eastern Europe. A successful early example which still generates pride in the TFP network is the mass petition supporting Lithuanian independence in 1990 which gathered the support of over 5 million people, earning it a place in the *Guinness Book of World Records* (Corrêa de Oliveira 1991).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Aktion Kinder in Gefahr (KIG) (Aktion-kig.de); SOS Leben (Dvck-sosleben.de) and Prawo do Narodzin (Prawodonarozdin.pl).

3.3. THE THIRD PHASE: LEGAL CHALLENGES

At the movement's height, Corrêa de Oliveira passed away in 1995, marking the beginning of the third and most troubled phase in the movement's history which only ended in 2004. As often happens in movements built around the founder's charisma and where large-scale finances are at stake, internal strife broke out between different TFP factions. The factions emerged around three main differences: 1) the use of the TFP brand; 2) the future direction of TFP as a political campaigning organization; and 3) the religious teachings of the organization. This led to legal action with a series of decisions from the Brazilian courts in 1997 and 2004 (ISTOE 2013; Bezzera 2013).

The trial resulted in a victory (ISTOE 2013; Bezzera 2013) for the faction which wished to mend fences with the Church and downplay the organization's political engagement. External factors, including the presence of a conservative Pope, allowed the winners, led by a former lieutenant of Corrêa de Oliveira,¹⁴ to pursue a different path – that of rapprochement with the Vatican – by having the organization recognized as an International Association of Pontifical Right in 2001, known as the Heralds of the Gospel (Heraldsusa.org). The Heralds of the Gospel is thus the spiritual wing of the TFP movement, sharing many of the devotional traits of TFP as well as some of the visual branding in ceremonial clothing, but shedding the social and political activism which had characterized TFP's temporal dimension. Most importantly, TFP transitioned from a near schismatic insurrection to a fully integrated Catholic movement.

While the Heralds retained the rights to the TFP brand in Latin America and Iberia, it does not actively use it, leading to the TFP organisations in those regions to gradually disappear. The losing side in Brazil founded the Association of the Founders (Fundadores.org.br) and an online library dedicated to the founder's writings (Pliniocorreadeoliveira.info). However, the TFP organisations in Europe remained unaffected by the Brazilian verdict and continued their development, some growing to positions of influence in Eastern Europe, while the disappearance of TFP created space for a new socially conservative organisation to emerge in Spain.

3.4. THE FOURTH PHASE: RE-BIRTH IN EUROPE

A fourth phase emerged in the early 21st century with a less centralized leadership, allowing for innovation. Most importantly, the centre of the movement would shift from Brazil to Europe, first to France and later to

14 Msgr. João Scognamiglio Clá Dias was a close confidant of the TFP founder. ISTOE. 2013.

Poland. From its French headquarters, TFP bought a building in Brussels in 2008 and opened a representation to the European Union under the name Fédération Pro-Europa Christiana (FPEC) (Fpec-bxl.be) and in 2011, its own academy at its Lorraine headquarters, the Institut Européen de Sciences Sociales (IESS) (Sciencessociales.fr). The TFP network developed rather quickly, with a flourishing infrastructure appearing in Austria¹⁵ and Germany¹⁶ and Italy.¹⁷

The most recent TFP innovation has been to expand into litigation and policy development with the creation of *Ordo Iuris* in Poland in 2001. *Ordo Iuris* is the first experiment in developing legal and policy expertise which has been active in 'law-fare'¹⁸ processes before the Polish courts and European Institutions.¹⁹ The Polish TFP organisations seem to have taken the leadership within the movement as they have expanded the franchise to Croatia²⁰, Estonia²¹, The Netherlands²², Slovakia²³ and Switzerland.²⁴ This new generation of TFP organisation takes to a higher level what had been signature TFP methodologies (see section 5) corresponding to the professionalization of conservative actors (Peñas Defago, et. al. 2018). These new TFP organisations have become key actors, at times

15 Österreichische Gesellschaft zum Schutz von Tradition, Familie und Privateigentum (Tfp.at)

16 Der Adel (Der-adel.info); Deutschland braucht Mariens Hilfe (Mariens-hilfe.de); and Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Schutz von Tradition, Familie und Privateigentum e.V. (Tfp-deutschland.de); Deutsche Vereinigung für eine christliche Kultur (Dvck.de) and <https://kultur-und-medien-online.blogspot.com/2011/03/deutsche-vereinigung-fur-eine.html>.

17 Associazione Tradizione, Famiglia, Proprietà (Atfp.it); Centro Studi Storici sulla Contro-Rivoluzione (CESCOR, Cescor.org); Corrispondenza Romana (Corrispondenzaromana.it); La Famiglia Domani (Famigliadomani.it); and the Lepanto Foundation (Fondazionelepanto.org).

18 "Lawfare" includes legal mobilization and litigation at national and international level (Yamin, Datta and Andion, 2018).

19 For examples of 'lawfare', see: <http://www.ordoiuris.pl/interwencje-prawne>, as of 10 March 2019.

20 Centar za obnovu culture (Cok.hr); Vigilare (Vigilare.org); and TradFest (Tradfest.org).

21 Sihtasutus Perekonna ja Moraalseaduse Kaitseks (Association for the Defence of Family and Morality (Saptk.ee)); Elukultuuri Instituut (The Institute for Life Sciences); <https://elukultuur.wordpress.com>; Objektiiv.ee (SAPTK's news and opinion portal) and Abort.ee, as of 10 March 2019.

22 Stichting Civitas Christiana ('Cultuur onder Vuur' (Cultuurondervuur.nu)); Stirezo (Stichting Recht Zonder Onderscheid) Pro-Life (Stirezo.nl); and Gezin in Gevaar (Gezinin-gevaar.nl).

23 Nadácia Slovakia Christiana (Slovakiachristiana.sk); Fatima Slovensko (Fatimapres-lovensko.sk)

24 Helvetia Christiana (Helvetia-christiana.ch)

leaders, in the anti-gender campaigns in Europe which Kuhar and Pater-
 notte (2017) describe.

3.5. THE CASE OF SPAIN

An interesting case is that of Spain. For nearly three decades, a successful TFP organization thrived in Spain, the TFP-Sociedad Cultural Covadonga.²⁵ TFP-Covadonga was a victim of the court case in Brazil and disappeared around 1999. However, in 2003 a new organization called Hazte Oír appeared which seems to fit many of the characteristics often associated with TFP (see section 5), including: grass-roots mobilization combined with fundraising, multiplicity of branding, youth outreach, the same US contacts, intense contact with other TFP organizations and, finally, exercising traditionalist pressure on the Catholic Church. It diverges from TFP characteristics primarily in its branding, and, while Catholic inspired, Hazte Oír is by no means a religious movement, and there are no references to Corrêa de Oliveira. Hazte Oír (literally, 'make yourself heard') plays a watchdog role on Spanish political life and launched a social mobilization platform "CitizenGO" which would appear to be a 21st century digital version of the direct mailing techniques TFP pioneered in the 1970s (see section 8). Hazte Oír may be the reincarnation of TFP-Covadonga under a new set of circumstances where there are limits as to how openly it may display its affiliations in Spain²⁶ (see section 6). Whether Hazte Oír is formally part of the TFP family or not, it shares many of the characteristics of TFP organizations and occupies the same niche.

3.6. TFP REACH

Taken together, TFP organizations exhibit diversity in size, reach and funding. The TFP umbrella organization, the FPEC, declares an average annual turnover of approximately €2 million to French authorities,²⁷ originating from the membership fees across Europe. These member organizations in turn generate this revenue through their fundraising initiatives.

25 For TFP's presence in Spain, see: http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/GestaES_0211Espana.htm#.WVIL7oVOKUK.

26 Agente Provocador. 2017. "Los «caballeros medievales» de Covadonga son peores que Hazte Oír." *Agente Provocador*, 8 March. <http://www.agenteprovocador.es/publicaciones/hazte-oir-poda-ser-peor>.

27 FPEC's 2012 and 2017 annual accounts: Association Pro Europa Christiana. 2012. *Rapport au Commissaire des Comptes sur les comptes annuels, exercice clos le 30 juin 2012* and FPEC's 2017 annual accounts: Association Pro Europa Christiana. 2017. *Rapport au Commissaire des Comptes sur les comptes annuels, exercice clos le 30 juin 2017*. Creutzwald: FPEC.

FPEC also owns several real estate properties in France and in Brussels.²⁸ However, other TFP affiliates are more modest; some may not even be registered officially and are only informal associations of individuals with a light web presence.²⁹ TFP individual members are not likely to number more than a few hundred individuals per country and have traditionally been all-male.³⁰ However, their small size in personal affiliation is compensated for by their public outreach, which can reach several hundreds of thousands of people, depending on the country.

From these small number of adherents, TFP leverages influence in two ways: first, by attracting 'elites' with a specific background. The place of honour reserved for aristocrats attracted a number of noble families to become supporters – for example, the TFP representative to the EU is Paul, Duke of Oldenburg³¹ (a grandson of the last German Emperor), or the late Luigi, Marquis of Naples, who is described as “a personal friend of Prof. Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira’s” (Nobility.org 2015). Specifically, TFP favours a return to power of the former Brazilian imperial family, the family of Orléans-Bragança, who feature prominently at TFP events.³² Indeed, TFP is the clerico-aristocratic network *par excellence* which Kemper describes³³ in the landscape of anti-gender actors. Second, the mainstay of the TFP leadership in Europe to this day are Latin American men and returnee *émigrés* who took Corrêa de Oliveira’s message from its native Brazil and spread it across the Europe.³⁴

28 These properties are *La Villa Clairière* in Creutzwald, the *Le Jaglu* château in Château-neuf-en-Thymerais and a townhouse on rue Taciturne in Brussels.

29 TFP Malta <https://www.facebook.com/pg/ProMaltaChristiana/about/> retrieved 17 March 2019

30 Introvigne (2009) and Assemblée nationale. 1995. *Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête sur les sectes, Rapporteur M. Jacques Guyard, 20 décembre 1995*. Paris: Assemblée Nationale which categorized the French TFP organizations among those with between 50 and 500 members.

31 FPEC (Fpec-bxl.be) and European Parliament Transparency Register entry on FPEC as of 19 March 2017: <http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=65395896737-91>

32 See the programmes of Summer Academies and Chivalry Camps listed above.

33 Kemper, Andreas. 2015. “Christlicher Fundamentalismus und neoliberal-nationalkonservative Ideologie am Beispiel der 'Alternative für Deutschland'”. In “Unheilige Allianz Das Geflecht von christlichen Fundamentalisten und politisch Rechten am Beispiel des Widerstands gegen den Bildungsplan in Baden-Württemberg Ideologie am Beispiel der 'Alternative für Deutschland'”, edited by Lucie Billmann, Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung.

34 Among the Latin American men are Caius Vidigal Xavier da Silva, Nelson Fraginelli and José Ureta. Examples of returnee *émigrés* include Matthias von Gersdoff (born in Chile and founding the German TFP), Carlos Eduardo Schaffer (born in Brazil and founding the Austrian TFP) and Leonardo Prybysz (born in Brazil and founding the Polish TFP).

4. SHARED TFP TRAITS

Gizele Zanotto (2007) characterises TFP as a 'chameleon' being able to take on different shapes and colours to suit its changing surroundings. However, the TFP chameleon comes only in a limited range of shapes which are recognizable as: 1) TFP organizations; 2) cultural organizations;³⁵ 3) anti-abortion organizations;³⁶ 4) organizations dedicated to Mary or Fatima;³⁷ and 5) legal organizations named *Ordo Iuris*.³⁸ The fact that they are part of the TFP network is evidenced by their mutually referencing each other as part of the same network; that the same individuals involved in TFP organizations are also involved in these other organizations; and their use of TFP branding. Despite their brand multiplicity, key traits of TFP affiliates include: shared leadership; iconography and branding; youth outreach; fundraising techniques; transnational links outside the TFP family; a specific focus for religious veneration; and links with far-right movements.

TFP organizations share the same leadership which tend to be led by a small cadre of men, usually of Latin American origin as well as European aristocrats. These men exchange roles in different TFP-related organizations, for example, one individual will be president of organization X, board member of organization Y and a staff member of organization Z. This is done within countries and transnationally. In short, the leadership of the many TFP-associated organizations around the world is held by a small and interchangeable cadre of men.³⁹

Another common feature is TFP's unique iconography, drawing on a medieval crusader motif. Aside from the 'lion rampant' visual for some TFP organizations' logos, others which do not bear the TFP name do make use

35 Fédération Pro-Europa Christiana (Federation-pro-europa-christiana.org); and for France: *Avenir de la Culture* (Avenirdelaculture.org); and for Germany: *Deutsche Vereinigung für eine christliche Kultur* (Dvck.de).

36 See for France *Droit de Naître* (Droitdenaitre.org); for Italy *Generazione Voglio Vivere* (Generazionevogliovivere.it); for Poland *Prawo do Narodzin* (prawodonarodzin.pl)

37 South Africa Needs Our Lady (Sanol.co.za); and America needs Fatima (Americaneeds-fatima.org).

38 See for Poland *Ordo Iuris* – Instytut na Rzecz Kultury Prawnej (Ordoiuris.pl)

39 For example, Nelson Fraginelli is involved in the TFP organizations in Brazil, France, Italy and the USA; Paul, Duke of Oldenburg, heads the TFP office in Brussels and is on the boards of the TFP organizations in Canada and Estonia. Also on the board of the Estonian TFP is Sławomir Olejniczak, who is on the Polish and Croatian TFP's boards. Valdis Grinsteins serves on the Estonian and US TFP's boards. The Canadian TFP board assembles individuals from TFP organizations from across the world, such as Georges Martin from the French TFP affiliate, Jose Antonio Ureta from the Chilean TFP member, who also helped establish the South African TFP, and Carlos Eduardo Schaffer, who was also active in TFP Brazil and a founder of the Austrian TFP.

of the logo – for example, *Vigilare* in Croatia and *Ordo Iuris* in Poland.⁴⁰ In addition, the Crusader motif is regularly used by TFP affiliates,⁴¹ and the founder himself is styled as a crusader.⁴² Related to this is the use of historical personalities or important Christian victories in the names of TFP organizations.⁴³ A number of TFP events are in fact celebrations of medieval imagery, such as *TradFest*, “a festival of tradition and conservative ideas”, which takes place in Croatia since 2016.⁴⁴

The medieval imagery infuses TFP work in another area: that of youth outreach. Several TFP organizations run summer schools for young people, mainly adolescent boys and young men. TFP affiliates call the youth camps Summer Academies in Austria, Germany and Poland and Chivalry Camps in Ireland and the USA.⁴⁵ TFP characteristics are on display at these youth camps – for example, the medieval imagery, complete with “parades of manly chivalry”, the involvement of aristocrats and readings from the works of the founder and TFP religious ceremonies.⁴⁶ This has most recently coalesced into creating TFP Student Action Europe in 2017 which mobilizes these same young men into street protests.⁴⁷ While the youth activities target adolescent boys and young men, the TFP network expanded to post-secondary education by opening the Institute d’Etudes sur les Sciences Sociales (IESS). The IESS faculty and board are composed of the same personalities who make up the leadership of TFP organizations, as well as their wives.⁴⁸ The courses the IESS offers are aimed at

40 *Vigilare* displays the TFP lion on Facebook (<https://www.facebook.com/Vigilare>) but not its website (Vigilare.org), and *Ordo Iuris* displays the TFP lion’s head (Ordoiuris.pl).

41 *Krucjata Młodych* (Youth Crusade) in Poland (Krucjata.org.pl).

42 de Mattei, Roberto. 1996. *El Cruzado del Siglo XX*. Asociación Tradición y Acción por un Perú Mayor.

43 For example, Piotr Skarga, from which the Polish TFP organization takes its name, was a famous 16th century Polish Jesuit who was active in the Counter-Reformation by being critical of religious tolerance and advocating for monarchical powers.

44 *Tradfest* (Tradfest.org).

45 For Summer Academies in Europe, see <http://tfp.at/2007/07/31/lernen-um-den-stuermen-der-geschichte-zu-trotzen-sommerakademie-2007> and <http://tfp-france.org/28501/universite-dete-2017-des-tfp-en-europe>, for the Summer University of TFP in Niepołomice, Poland see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gPf6eKfmZs> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-lQpL5h99s>; and for Chivalry Camps in Ireland, see <https://www.isfcc.org/summer-camps> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBDlUjA5Lcl&feature=autoshare>; and <https://www.tfps-studentaction.org/get-involved/call-to-chivalry-camps/tfp-chivalry-camp-in-the-shadow-of-the-sequoias> in the USA, as of 10 March 2019.

46 See the programmes of Summer Academies and Chivalry Camps listed above.

47 <https://tfpstudentactioneurope.org/> as of 11 March 2019.

48 <http://www.sciencessociales.fr>, where Edyta Olejniczak, the spouse of Sławomir Olejniczak (Polish and Croatian TFP), as well as Catherine Rochet-Goyard, the spouse of Jean Goyard (French TFP), Maria Del Pilar, Duchess of Oldenburg, the spouse of Paul, Duke

'leading a profound reflection on European culture with an emphasis on its Christian roots and thus responding to Pope Jean Paul II's call for an evangelization of culture'.⁴⁹

Despite its elite origins and governance, TFP organizations specialize in grass-roots mobilization. TFP organizations excel at mass mailings, public campaigns and protests (see section 8.1). A number have even developed their own media ranging from magazines/reviews to news agencies and even television channels.⁵⁰ This grass-roots outreach helps them in another area: fundraising. TFP's fundraising toolkit includes requesting funds for campaigns; often several campaigns take place at the same time. Carlos Eduardo Schaffer, who was involved in several TFP organizations, is credited with having *developed the system of direct mail and fundraising for the organization through personal visits ... [and] is now developing a system of fundraising through mass e-mails in combination with a call center.*⁵¹ The TFP model of direct mail fundraising was described by a French inter-ministerial body in 2006 (MIVILUDES 2006) as comprising four distinct phases: 1) prospecting potential donors; 2) direct mailing to their homes; 3) sharing a database of contacts with other organizations within the TFP network; and 4) home visits to request regular, monthly contributions. This 2006 report notes that the fundraising campaigns are often an end in themselves, as no funds collected will be spent to address the issue identified, except to fundraise for the campaign itself (Ibid).

Another characteristic which TFP affiliates share is their transnational partnership with an actor in the USA, the Leadership Institute (LI).⁵² The LI describes itself as teaching *conservatives of all ages how to succeed in politics, government, and the media.*⁵³ Gordon Blackwell, an influential voice of the US Christian Right and founder of the LI, praises TFP, stating ... *Intensely Catholic, their members receive Communion every day. Although a secular group, in some ways they could be likened to a medieval religious order. They stand opposed to much that has occurred in modern times, which they consider to have commenced at the end of the Middle Ages, a not unreasonable view. They intend to save Western civilization or to die*

of Oldenburg (FPEC), Mme Heleen Bos-Boerefyn, the spouse of Hugo Bos (Dutch TFP) are listed as faculty and board members, as of 10 March 2019.

49 From <http://www.sciencesociales.fr/institut/cours>.

50 Correspondance européenne (Correspondanceeuropeenne.eu); Corrispondenza Romana (Corrispondenzaromana.it); Polonia Cristiană (Pch24.pl); of the Estonian SATPK (Objektiiv.ee) and Radici Cristiane (Radicicristiane.it) (access 10. 3. 2019).

51 See biography as of 10 March 2019: <https://leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm?FacultyID=679589#sthash.hLTONqj.dpuf>.

52 Leadershipinstitute.org.

53 <https://www.leadershipinstitute.org/aboutus>.

trying. Since my visit to Brazil, I have taken opportunities to meet national TFP leaders in my travels to half a dozen countries on four continents (Blackwell 2010). TFP organizations and LI collaborate on a range of training events in Europe, with workshops focusing on fundraising, lobbying and advocacy.⁵⁴ A deeper relationship exists whereby the leadership of TFP organizations (the same cadre of men mentioned above) are also visiting professors for the LI.⁵⁵

TFP is also a religious movement and as such focuses on certain aspects of the Catholic religion – specifically, the veneration of the Virgin Mary and secrets of Fatima⁵⁶ which play prominent roles in TFP public and private ceremonies. Dedicated websites to Fatima operated by TFP exist in nearly all countries where TFP has a presence.⁵⁷ TFP combines its religious devotion with its fundraising outreach by selling the books written by the founder⁵⁸ and religious items, such as a 'miraculous medal' featuring a Catholic motif.⁵⁹

A final characteristic of the TFP movement is its proximity to elements of the far-right, specifically of the older fascist traditions in Europe and Latin America. TFP affiliates in France are close to fascist political parties (Compagnon, 2008), with the Italian TFP members described as being "parts of a galaxy of traditionalist and Far-Right movements".⁶⁰ Conversely, TFP activities attract persons involved in far-right parties, for example

54 Leadership Institute training programmes for Madrid (2009) and London (2010, 2011).

55 TFP personalities referred to as having a function at LI:

Carlos Eduardo Schaffer: <https://leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm?FacultyID=679589>;

José Ureta: <http://www.leadershipinstitute.org/Training/contact.cfm?FacultyID=144665>;

Silvio Dalla Valle: <https://www.leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm?FacultyID=144662>;

Sławomir Olejniczak: <http://www.leadershipinstitute.org/Training/contact.cfm?FacultyID=139901>; and Matthias von Gersdorff: <https://www.leadershipinstitute.org/training/contact.cfm?FacultyID=144668>, as of 10 March 2019.

56 Bertone, Tarcisio, SDB, Archbishop Emeritus of Vercelli, Secretary of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 2000. "Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: The Message of Fatima." La Santa Sede website: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000626_message-fatima_en.html.

57 Examples include in Austria (Fatimaonline.at); Canada (Canadaneedsourlady.org); Germany (Mariens-hilfe.de and Fatima-familie.de); Peru (Fatima.org.pe); Poland (Przymierzezmaryja.pl); South Africa (Sanol.co.za); and the USA (Americaneedsfatima.org). (Access 10.1.2019).

58 To purchase the works of TFP, see: <http://store.tfp.org/> and <http://www.ksiegarnia.polo-niachristiana.pl/>, as of 10 March 2019.

59 <http://www.die-wundertaetige-medaille.de>; and <http://medaglia-miracolosa.it> (access 10. 3. 2019).

60 Garbagnoli, Sara. 2017. "Italy as a lighthouse; Anti-gender protests between the 'anthropological question' and national identity." In *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe*, edited by

the rising star of the Belgian Vlams Belang who participated in the TFP summer academy in Poland (Cochez 2019). In some cases, the relations between TFP leaders and fascism are personal (Piątek 2017c). In Spain, the TFP-Covadonga was historically close to the Franco regime,⁶¹ and in Latin America, national TFP affiliates maintained close links with the various military dictatorships from the 1970s onwards (Ruderer 2012). The relationship was mutually reinforcing, with TFP providing a moral 'truth' for the exercise of power by such forces. Ruderer (2012) explains *all these are concepts that dictatorships used to legitimize violence, were found in the texts of the TFP already in the 60s* (translated from Spanish N.D.).⁶²

5. RELATIONS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

TFP's relationship with the Catholic Church needs to be situated within the context of the emergence of various streams of 20th century Catholic thinking and movements. Compagnon (2008) recalls how there were three broad movements within the Catholic world starting in the late 1950s. The first was the liberation theology which advocated for a Catholicism better adapted to the developing world by addressing inequalities. The second Christian democracy, which sought to bring the social doctrine of the Church into politics, resulting in a number of Christian Democratic parties across Europe and Latin America. The third current was that of Catholic fundamentalism, of which the Brazilian TFP was among the first representatives. (Compagnon 2008)

TFP was founded at a time when the Church was undergoing great turmoil with various competing currents pulling in different directions. The founder is reported to have attended the Second Vatican Council but left early, as he was unhappy with the liberal, progressive wind sweeping the delegates.⁶³ For Corrêa de Oliveira, there were two great enemies he must confront: Communism was the primary external enemy, while liberation theology was the main enemy within. As such, TFP is what Mayer (1982) in his political-economy approach to religious movements, would refer to as an insurrection within Catholicism, at times bordering on a schism. As Mayer explained, such insurrection movements understand their relative autonomy/vulnerability towards the official hierarchy and which explains why TFP entities are not constituted as Catholic entities;

Roman Kuhar and David Paternotte, Chapter 9. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield International.

61 Agente Provocador. 2017.

62 Ibid.

63 See biography at http://www.traditioninaction.org/Collection/Bios/E001_Bio_SDP.html.

rather, they are legally constituted as civil organizations according to the laws of the countries where they are based (Matta, 2008).

A serious degradation of relations occurred in the 1980s when National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (NCBB) accused TFP of straying away from the teachings of the Church. In 1985, the NCBB wrote a letter decrying TFP's alleged apostasy – namely, *Its esoteric character, the religious fanaticism, the cult given to the personality of its leader and his mother, the abusive use of the name of Mary Most Holy, according to news items circulated, cannot in any way merit the approval of the Church.*⁶⁴ As a result, *Corrêa de Oliveira's TFP was explicitly disavowed by the bishops.* (Introvigne 2009) Because of this, some even questioned TFP's authenticity as a Catholic movement, instead dubbing it 'pseudo-Catholic'.⁶⁵ Critics also came from within. Orlando Fedeli, one of the founding members of TFP, described the movement as having degenerated into a 'burlesque gnosis' (Fedeli 2010). At one point, *Oliveira had gone down, with these criticisms, a path openly schismatic, of separation from the Church.* (Cariello 2008)

Since the death of the founder and the courts in Brazil issued their verdict, relations between the TFP family and the Catholic Church have improved. The religious wing of TFP is now its own International Association of Pontifical Right known as the Heralds of the Gospel. As the religious aspects of TFP went with the Heralds, the more eccentric devotional ceremonies of the past no longer posed an obstacle. This resulted in greater but not complete acceptance of TFP organizations within the wider world of Catholic laity until recently. (Introvigne 2009) At the same time, under Pope Benedict, the Church was sufficiently conservative so as to no longer warrant an internal insurrection.

However, the arrival of Pope Frances, often seen as a liberal and moderniser, has awoken the need for conservative pressure. Thus, TFP attempted to exert pressure to prevent reforms with its *Declaration of Fidelity to the Church's Unchangeable Teachings on Marriage and to her Uninterrupted Discipline*,⁶⁶ signed by many TFP members as well as the aristocrats the network attracts in advance of the Extraordinary Synod on the Family in 2015.⁶⁷ Similarly, in 2017, a group including Roberto De Mattei of the Italian TFP signed *A Filial Correction Concerning the Propagation of Heresies*, also

64 TFP. 2007. "The American TFP's 2007 comments regarding a note on the Brazilian TFP approved by the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil on April 19, 1985." TFP website. <http://www.tfp.org/ref/ncbb.pdf>.

65 Assemblée nationale. 1995. *Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête sur les sectes, Rapporteur M. Jacques Guyard, 20 décembre 1995.* Paris: Assemblée nationale.

66 <http://filialappeal.org>.

67 http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20151026_relazione-finale-xiv-assemblea_en.html.

known as a *Dubia* (the 25-page letter was delivered to the Pope),⁶⁸ to Pope Francis's *Amoris Laetitia*⁶⁹ (a post-synodal apostolic exhortation addressing the pastoral care of families). TFP's positioning within the Church is thus delicate from the start: TFP is loyal to the Vatican but exerts conservative pressure on it and is allied to some of the more conservative elements in the Church hierarchy, particularly at times when the leadership is seen as progressive.

Massimo Introvigne (2009)⁷⁰ analyses TFP and the Heralds of the Gospel from the perspective of religious economy. Recalling religious economic theory, where a market for religion exists and there may be competition both inter-brand (different religions) and intra-brand (different movements within a same religion) for religious consumers, Introvigne explains how TFP catered to the 'strict' or 'ultra-strict' Catholic religious market from the movement's founding until the founder's passing. TFP and, later, the Heralds of the Gospel would appear to have shifted towards the 'strict' (for TFP) to 'moderate conservative' (for the Heralds of the Gospel) markets for a number of reasons, among them intra-brand competition with the SSPX and because the potential markets for the 'strict' to 'moderate conservative' religious consumers are far larger than the 'ultra-strict' market. Introvigne also explains why organizations emanating from the TFP movement display their proximity to the movement differently: "The fact that the Heralds of the Gospel, whose leadership is largely composed of former prominent TFP members, downplay their relationship with Corrêa de Oliveira allows a number of Brazilian bishops to support them without either revisiting the history of the NCBB." (Introvigne 2009, 7). The ambiguity in how openly TFP organizations associate with the TFP brand is thus a defining feature of the network.

68 <http://www.ncregister.com/blog/edward-pentin/group-of-clergy-and-laity-issue-filial-correction-of-pope-francis>.

69 https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20160319_amoris-laetitia_en.pdf.

70 Massimo Introvigne is involved in several TFP-related organizations, including the Italian Alleanza Cattolica (<https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/massimo-introvigne>), and founder of the Centre Studi Storici sulla Contro-Rivoluzione (CESCOR: Cescor.org) dedicated to the writings of Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira. Introvigne is also the founder of the Centre for the Study of New Religions (CESNUR), which is regarded as a 'cult apologist' (<http://www.apologeticsindex.org/cio.html>).

6. TFP CULT ACCUSATIONS AND LEGAL TROUBLES

From the afterlife, Plinio Correa de Oliveira, while sitting next to the Virgin Mary in the sky, is also regulating climate change and working in favor of Pope Francis' imminent death.
(Fsspx.news 2017)

No understanding of the TFP network is complete without also becoming familiar with its history of legal troubles and accusations it faced. The accusations against TFP fall into three categories: 1) indoctrination of children; 2) political extremism and 3) cult allegations.

6.1. INDOCTRINATION OF CHILDREN

TFP organizations' focus on youth has taken various forms, including summer camps as well as permanent educational institutions. Early in its history, in 1977, TFP organizations established a school in France. Following several complaints, the French Catholic Church investigated the complaints (La Dépêche. 2003) which resulted in closing the school in 1979 when authorities concluded that the school served as a centre for recruitment and indoctrination. Indeed, the tribunal which judged the case stated *the management of the establishment, almost all Brazilian nationals, exerted psychological pressure on the young people inciting them to... become adepts of a certain foreign organisation...* (Leroy 1980). In return, the French TFP organizations launched a vigorous defence of their movement in 1980 (TFP-France 1980).

A few years later, in Venezuela, family members of young people involved in the local TFP organization filed a complaint with authorities, claiming that the organization created a *conflict between parents and children, with the subsequent removal of the child or children (minors or adults) from their respective homes... that the aforementioned family conflicts have their cause or are induced through mental control techniques... whose ideology is related to the Brazilian Society of Defense of the Tradition, Family and Property* (Venezuela Ministerio Público 1984). These allegations resulted in a police raid on the offices of Resistencia in October 1984 as well as a parliamentary investigation, generating wide media coverage.⁷¹ The result was the expulsion of the organization when the Ministry for the Interior and Justice considered that TFP's activities were contrary to the Constitution (Calcano de Temeltas 1999) and "once it was proven that the

⁷¹ TFP archives for their account of the events in Venezuela: http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/GestaES_0205Venezuela.htm#.Wkf7mkxFxRo.

organization offended family values by instilling discriminatory values, turning youths into fanatics” (Cesnur.org. 2001)

6.2. POLITICAL EXTREMISM

During the investigation in Venezuela a number of concerns arose regarding TFP related to the use of violence. Among the most serious concerns were that TFP devotees were allegedly involved in a plot to assassinate the Pope in 1984 while on a Pontifical visit to Venezuela which reportedly contributed to the expulsion of the TFP order from the country (Navarro 2004). However, in April 1984, the Chilean TFP member organization itself reports having been the victim of an attempted bombing of its headquarters in Santiago.⁷² Without delving into the credibility of these allegations, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada did list TFP as a ‘religious para-military group’ in 1998 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 1998), while TFP is classified as ‘TFP and other violent groups’ in the work of Gonzalez Ruiz on the far-right Mexican youth movement MURO (see next paragraphs for more on MURO).⁷³

More recently, starting in 2011 and persisting today, the Spanish organization *Hazte Oir* has been the subject of a range of different accusations that it is the Spanish front of a far-right, ultra-Catholic, para-military, secret society from Mexico called El Yunque (‘the Anvil’) (El Plural. 2017; Mata 2015). Victoria Uroz Martínez, the wife of one of the alleged leaders of El Yunque in Spain, in an extensive interview in January 2015, describes her experiences of El Yunque and states that El Yunque uses TFP as a base to reach other countries.⁷⁴ To understand the links between the TFP network and El Yunque, it is necessary to delve into the history of far-right movements in Latin America. Irene Ortiz (2008) explains how a violent, far-right youth group in Mexico, the Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orientación (MURO), which emerged in the 1960s was a key contributing ingredient in what became El Yunque (Ortiz 2008). Separately, Gonzalez Ruiz (2006) explains how the Brazilian TFP maintained links with Mexican far-right groups, including MURO, in the 1970s. The allegations that *Hazte Oir* is linked with El Yunque reached mainstream media and prompted the head of *Hazte Oir* to file a lawsuit for defama-

72 Catholicismo. 1984. “Atentado contra sede da TFP chilena.” *Catholicismo* 34(400), April, page 12. http://www.pliniocorreadeoliveira.info/GES_19840314_Chileatentadoasede.htm.

73 Gonzalez Ruiz, Édgar. undated. *MURO (Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orientación) Memorias y Testimonios 1961–2002*. Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla.

74 Jimenez Jacinto, Juan Francisco. 2015. “Entrevista a Victoria Uroz.” *Forum Libertas*, 9 January.

tion. In 2014, Hazte Oir lost the lawsuit, with the judge affirming that the allegations were “essentially true” (Jimenez/Juan 2015), resulting in some Spanish Catholic Bishops prohibiting Hazte Oir use of their facilities in 2015 (Bastante 2015).

Finally, TFP is also the subject of fanciful conspiracy theories, chief among them from US fringe politician from the 1980s and 1990s, Lyndon LaRouche,⁷⁵ who accused the TFP of being the nexus of a vast network of aristocrats who were plotting to take over the world and assassinate his wife.⁷⁶

6.3. CULT ALLEGATIONS

There have been persistent allegations directed at TFP that it is a ‘cult’ centring around two main concerns; on the one hand, there is suspicion from public authorities regarding possible harm to TFP members and the public at large and, on the other, accusations from ecclesiastical authorities about TFP’s alleged doctrinal deviations.

Authorities in France were among the most proactive in investigating the former. In 1995 and 1999, the French National Assembly (Assemblée nationale. 1995) listed French TFP members among its list of cult-like movements, as did a public body in charge of monitoring cult activities in 2006.⁷⁷ The 2006 report to the Prime Minister’s office by the ‘Inter-ministerial mission for vigilance and fight against cult-like movements’ describes the TFP affiliates as *dedicated to fundraising for unspecified objectives*⁷⁸ and having characteristics which are considered warning bells for cult-like behaviour, such as: increasing demands on persons involved in the campaigns; opacity of the hierarchy and structure; a high degree of hierarchy and the involvement of only a few key persons in the management; and distortion between the stated aims of a campaign and the eventual use of funds.⁷⁹

From ecclesiastical authorities, in addition to the formal accusations of the NBCC of 1985 (see section 6), new accusations emerged in June 2017 of cult-like worship of Dr. Plinio and his mother, Lucilia. The leader

75 For more about Lyndon LaRouche, see Severo (2019).

76 EIR. 1985. “For an international mobilization to stop the TFP brainwashing cult.” *EIR* 12(5), 5 February.

77 MIVILUDE (2006) and Tribunal Correctionnel de Chartres. 2001. “Tradition, Famille et Propriété, Avenir de la culture, Groupe inscrit sur la liste des sectes du rapport parlementaire de 1995, Procès ‘Européenne de medias’ (GEIE) contre ‘L’Echo républicain de Chartres.’” *Echo communication*, Audience of 17 September 2001.

78 MIVILUDES. 2006. page 93.

79 Ibid., page 3.

of the Heralds of the Gospel (see section 4.3) was placed under investigation by the Holy See's Congregation for Institutes of Consecrated Life in June 2017, when a series of videos featured him conducting religious ceremonies dedicated to Dr. Plinio and his mother and claiming that "*climate change, and the increase of heat. It is Plinio who does everything.*"⁸⁰ They are also under investigation for asserting that the current Pope is under the control of the devil and that he would soon die, as well as for using non-Vatican-approved methods of exorcism. (Palmer 2017)

At a more personal level, blogs abound of ex-TFP and Heralds of the Gospel followers claiming to have escaped from the grips of what, according to them, is a cult-like movement.⁸¹ However, in 2008 the French government clarified that TFP *has never been the subject of judicial proceedings and cannot be described as sectarian aberrations constituting acts liable to be penalized*,⁸² while the Vatican investigation into the Heralds of the Gospel was still ongoing in 2019.

7. TFP'S INFLUENCE ON SRR IN EUROPE TODAY

Even though TFP has not often been recognised in Europe, it plays a leading role among the anti-gender landscape of movements and organisations (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017) and the anti-SRR advocacy networks such as Agenda Europe (Datta 2018). TFP's influence on SRR takes three main routes: social mobilization; norm entrepreneur; and infiltrating decision-making spaces.

7.1. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

TFP social mobilization campaigns always have multiple targets: aiming at the general public, the political classes and the Catholic Church to maintain a socially conservative line, as well as other Catholics to rally them to TFP ideals and, when possible, also serve a fundraising objective. A recent example is a rosary reading and prayer event to mark the centenary of the miracle of Fatima and expiation of the sins of abortion, same-sex marriage and euthanasia in Belgium in front of the Palace of Justice in Brussels in October 2016.⁸³ In the Netherlands, the main protagonists in defending the 'Zwarte Piet' tradition (a helper for Saint Nicolas who is painted in

80 Ibid.

81 For example, see: <https://tfpheraldos.blogspot.be/>; <http://trescarabelasaladeriva.blogspot.be>; and http://www.angelusonline.org/index.php?section=articles&subsection=show_article&article_id=773.

82 Assemblée nationale. 2008. *Journal Officiel*, 10 June, Question N°: 24712, page 4832.

83 <https://www.fpec-bxl.be/images-vidéos/> and https://youtu.be/_Zrmkc18VBo.

black-face and assists delivering candy to children on Saint-Nicolas day in Belgium and The Netherlands) in 2017 and 2018 was the Dutch TFP members Cultuur onder Vuur.⁸⁴ In Lithuania, the TFP Member, Krikščioniškos Kultūros Institutas has led the charge against holding Baltic Pride in Vilnius in 2019 (Repeckaite 2019). The creation in 2017 of TFP Student Action Europe with street protests in Estonia, Ireland and the Netherlands suggest that the network is taking the example of the US-based TFP Student Action to the streets and campuses of Europe.⁸⁵

7.2. NORM ENTREPRENEUR

From a protest movement, TFP has evolved into a norm entrepreneur through three approaches: agenda setting, policy expertise and finally engaging in 'law-fare'. First, TFP affiliates convene events to allow for socially conservative agenda-setting. These attract high-level participation – for example in Croatia with 'Tradfest'. 'TradFest' takes place annually in Zagreb since 2016 and brings together the conservative representatives of the Church, such as Cardinal Raymond Leo Burke,⁸⁶ with leading politicians such as Davor Ivo Stier, the Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia; Aleksander Stepkowski, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Poland (also President of Ordo Iuris Poland); and US Member of Congress Chris Smith,⁸⁷ as well as TFP representatives such as from Poland and Croatia.⁸⁸ Similar events take place at the TFP EU headquarters in Brussels where *practically all the conservative currents active in European institutions participate in our events; both the elite of the very cosmopolitan society of Brussels today, and the high Belgian nobility.*⁸⁹ These events in turn serve a related purpose *to favor the formation of conservative coalition networks in several areas: right to life, family, religious values etc*⁹⁰ as per TFP's accredited representative to the EU Institutions.

As second tool in TFP's norm-setting repertoire is that of developing policy and legislative campaigns. Echoing the TFP of the 1970's and 80's,

84 <https://cultuurondevuur.nu/tag/zwarte-piet/>

85 <https://tfpstudentactioneurope.org/>

86 For more on Cardinal Burke's conservative positioning within the Vatican (Feder and Hall 2014).

87 Congressman Chris Smith is a leading anti-SRR voice in the US Congress. See his record: http://www.ontheissues.org/NJ/Christopher_Smith_Abortion.htm.

88 <http://www.tradfest.org/en/tradfest-2016-en> and <http://www.tradfest.org/en/tradfest-2017-en/>.

89 Interview with Paul, Duke of Oldenburg, 10 May 2012: <http://www.nobility.org/2012/05/10/interview-oldenburg>.

90 Ibid.

the campaigns are aimed at the public defamation of progressive, left-wing governments (see examples of France and Spain in section 4.1). Hazte Oir updated the TFP-Covadonga work with a similar publication in 2010 entitled *Proyecto Zapatero: Cronica de un asalto a la sociedad*.⁹¹ In *Proyecto Zapatero*, Hazte Oir explains how secularism, relativism and gender ideology comprise the key ingredients of a grand social engineering experiment by the Socialist Party resulting in undermining the Spanish State. The Hazte Oir President then went on a book tour to promote *Proyecto Zapatero* and was hosted by the TFP headquarters for its Brussels launch⁹² and by the TFP successor organization in Chile.⁹³

The more advanced organisations have evolved to acquire the legal expertise to develop specific policy asks such as proposals to restrict abortion in Poland and Spain. The draft legislation in Poland was prepared and defended by *Ordo Iuris*⁹⁴ and inspired by Hazte Oir's 'Aborto Cero' campaign in the case of Spain. However, after mass demonstrations in each country, both bills were subsequently withdrawn by their respective governments (BBC 2014, Domonoske 2016).

Most recently, TFP members have embarked upon weakening protections for gender-based violence by campaigning against the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on gender-based violence.⁹⁵ *Ordo Iuris* has also drafted an alternative to the Istanbul Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Family,⁹⁶ which it launched in the European Parliament in October 2018 and is supported by TFP affiliates from Eastern Europe. Separately, in Madrid, Hazte Oir launched its bus against "Feminazis" in March 2019, calling for a review of Spain's gender based violence law.⁹⁷ *Ordo Iuris* is also an active participant in the informal anti-SRR advocacy network which emerged in 2013 entitled Agenda Europe, even hosting the Agenda Europe summit in Warsaw in 2016 (Datta, 2018). Agenda Europe Summits would allow other similarly conservative minded organisations

91 Arsuaga Rato, Ignacio, and Miguel Vidal Santos. 2010. "Proyecto Zapatero: Cronica de un asalto a la sociedad." HazteOir website.

92 <http://www.hazteoir.org/evento/390> Arsuaga Rato, Ignacio, and Miguel Vidal Santos. 2010. "Proyecto Zapatero: Cronica de un asalto a la sociedad." HazteOir website.74-muevete-chile-invita-ignacio-arsuaga-hablar-ho-y-proyecto-zapatero.

93 Ibid.

94 See dossier *Równa ochrona prawna dla każdego dziecka zarówno przed, jak i po urodzeniu*: http://www.ordoiuris.pl/sites/default/files/pliki/OI%20zobroszura%20Stop%20a%20borczi_final_rozkladowki.pdf.

95 <https://ordoiuris.pl/pliki/dokumenty/opinia-Łotwa.pdf>.

96 <http://en.ordoiuris.pl/family-and-marriage/convention-rights-family-international-guarantee-defence-families>

97 El Pais. 2019. Spanish ultraconservative group launches bus campaign against "feminazis" 1 March.

and individuals outside the TFP network to learn from TFP's policy innovations and domesticate them to their context.⁹⁸

A most sophisticated level of engagement is that of initiating 'lawfare' (Yamin, et. al. 2018), namely using legal strategies such as litigation and engaging with human rights bodies at national, European and international level. Thus, in February 2017, Ordo Iuris obtained Consultative Status with the United Nations (UN ECOSOC. 2017) and by May 2017 had registered an office in the EU district of Brussels.⁹⁹ The newly created Ordo Iuris-Croatia had already secured a place on the working group with the Croatian government tasked with implementing the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on gender-based violence in 2017 (Despot 2017). In Poland, Ordo Iuris has been active before the Polish courts and expanded internationally by successfully supporting the case of a Norwegian national obtaining asylum in Poland to escape the influence of the Child Protection Services.¹⁰⁰

7.3. INFILTRATING DECISION-MAKING SPACES

Infiltrating decision-making spaces is another objective of TFP-affiliates with historical precedents in Latin America¹⁰¹ and contemporary examples in Europe. For example, Roberto de Mattei, who considers himself *a disciple of Professor Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira... and to whom he dedicated a biography*,¹⁰² was appointed International Affairs Counsel in the government of Silvio Berlusconi from 2002 to 2006. Another example is Massimo Introvigne, who leads one of the TFP groups in Italy, is a student of the TFP founder¹⁰³ and was appointed in 2011 as Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, also Focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions.¹⁰⁴ Using the credibility of this position, Introvigne asserted that *[t]he most dangerous areas [of intole-*

98 For example, Ordo Iuris mentions having presented its Convention on the Rights of the Family at the 2018 Agenda Europe Summit in Vienna, see <http://en.ordoiuris.pl/family-and-marriage/convention-rights-family-international-guarantee-defence-families>

99 See the Ordo Iuris Brussels office: <http://www.ordoiuris.pl/en/node/98>.

100 <http://en.ordoiuris.pl/family-and-marriage/asylum-silje-garmo-officially-confirmed>.

101 Gonzalez Ruiz (2006) who explains how, in the 1970s, a TFP member from Argentina served as his country's ambassador to Brazil and the United Nations and how another Peruvian TFP member rose to the position of Vice-Chancellor and First Vice-President under President Fujimori.

102 <http://www.robortodemattei.it/en>.

103 <http://www.massimointrovigne.com>.

104 9 Colonne. 2011. "OSCE, Massimo Introvigne nuovo rappresentante lotta al razzismo". 9 Colonne, 10 January.

rance and discrimination] are those which limit the conscientious objection of Christians who do not want to cooperate in abortion, the sale of abortifacient pills, or the celebration of same-sex marriage. (White 2013a).

Having barely established themselves in Croatia, the TFP organizations have already progressed significantly, with a member of the TFP organization serving as foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister until 2016.¹⁰⁵ More recently, in the Polish government of Prime Minister Szydłowa in 2015, Aleksander Stepkowski, President of Ordo Iuris Poland, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁶ Stepkowski held this function from 2015 to 2016, during which time he paved the way for the draft abortion ban to make its way through the wheels of government. In February 2019 Stepkowski was confirmed as a judge on the Polish Supreme Court (Jałoszewski 2019).

Separately, an additional manner to reach influential positions is to court like-minded political parties or, when necessary, to create them. Thus, the far-right parties of Lithuania (Pro Patria)¹⁰⁷ and Belarus (Беларускі Народны Фронт / Belarus Peoples' Front)¹⁰⁸ have open links with TFP, while the new VOX party of Spain shares an overlapping leadership with Hazte Oir (Bastante 2018) and the a candidate for the 2019 federal elections of the Belgian Vlams Belang has participated in TFP Summer academies in Poland (see section 4).

7.4. TFP'S CHEQUERED PAST IS CATCHING UP

Finally, TFP's past seems to be catching up with it. The recent success and notoriety that some in the TFP franchise have achieved, particularly Vigilare and Ordo Iuris, have attracted the attention of investigative journalists. In Poland, *Wyborcza* published several accounts in 2017 of Ordo Iuris, outlining how it is related to "a Brazilian cult" (Piątek 2017). This generated a media spotlight on the organization and the influence it wielded on the ruling PiS party (Gruca 2017). Meanwhile, in Croatia, in May 2017, investigative journalists published articles describing the Croatian TFP organizations' previously unknown links with TFP (Despot 2017). On further investigation, journalists uncovered how the individuals involved

105 The advisor, Stjepo Bartulica, is a member of the TFP organization Centar za obnovu kulture (Penić 2016).

106 http://msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/aleksander_stepkowski_podsekretarzem_stanu_w_msz.

107 <http://www.propatria.lt/2018/12/dovilas-petkus-ko-mes-dar-nesupratome.html> retrieved 16 March 2019.

108 <http://narodny.org/> retrieved 16 March 2019 and Szoszyn, Ruslan. 2016. "Polak-katolik" w białoruskim parlamencie? Rzeczpospolita. 6 September.

in Vigilare are part of a wider anti-Semitic, 'alt-right' community (Benačić 2017). This revelation led to a loss of credibility for a prominent member of Vigilare, forcing him to halt all public engagement by deleting his social media accounts and resigning as a regular commentator on Croatian television (Šimićević 2017). Even the religious wing of TFP, the Heralds of the Gospel, which had mended its relationship with the Vatican, is in turmoil, as revelations appeared in June 2017 of inappropriate religious practices and threats to the life of Pope, thus provoking an internal investigation for apostasy by Vatican bodies (Tornielli 2017).

8. CONCLUSION

Then the great leaders of human masses rose up and began to drag behind them the multitudes terrorized into a state of delirium, and to promise simple solutions through the most diverse legislative reforms.

Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira

Section on Dictatorships, *In Defense of Catholic Action*,
1943 (Corrêa de Oliveira 1943)

There are several conclusions to draw from an understanding of TFP. The first is that TFP's chameleon nature has successfully shielded it from public scrutiny in Europe for a long time. This is changing as more investigative journalists, activists and researchers attempt to understand the organisations behind a number of anti-SRR policy initiatives in Europe. As these investigations take place, it becomes apparent that story TFP did not end with the death of the founder and the creation of the Heralds of the Gospel.

The second conclusion is that the story of TFP is now a European story. After a lull in the early 21st century, the TFP network has emerged from slumber, modernized and expanded to new territories. Indeed, the movement has transformed itself and has found new horizons in Europe, with recent progress in Poland, Croatia and Estonia. It has also updated its infrastructure by setting up an office to lobby the EU, an institute of higher learning in France, as well as a team of lawyers based in Poland. In its original Brazil TFP is *but a shadow of what it once was... with valuable assets such as land and some real estate, as well as a structured mailing services that distributes medals and collects donations, the entity has lost relevance and is no longer a reference in Brazil's conservative agenda* (ISTOE 2013). In some parts of Europe TFP affiliated organisations are now the centre of gravity in pushing positions which go against SRR.

TFP's position within the Catholic world also merits attention. When the Church hierarchy was sufficiently conservative, its role as an insurrection

movement tempered. Now, under the progressive reign of Pope Frances, TFP's traditionalist oriented critiques are resurfacing and they are finding allies with like-minded factions within the Church. This suggest that there is also competition with other, more mainstream Vatican-oriented, socially conservative movements for agenda setting against SRR.

The TFP network possesses a recognizable toolkit to achieve its objectives. The chief among them is public mobilization involving religious campaigns through mass communications. Another component is that of setting the political debate by developing legislative packages and of demonizing progressive governments. This legislative experience has culminated in the creation of permanent legal expertise which is engaging is in 'lawfare' at national as well as international level. A standard in the TFP repertoire is leadership infiltration, with several TFP-affiliated individuals gaining access to influential political positions.

The current populist, reactionary and nationalist trend in Europe, often intertwined in religious discourse, offers fertile ground and familiar territory for TFP franchises to take their crusade further, cultivate new allies and, thus, have greater impact. More ominous is the depth of infiltration by *Ordo Iuris* into the workings of the Polish State, with the current hard-right, ethno-nationalist government's embrace chillingly reminiscent of TFP's glory days with Latin American fascist regimes. Finally, TFP's reactionary narrative espousing religious orthodoxy and sanctifying economic inequality by invoking a heroic and noble imaginary past could become attractive to some by offering religious legitimization for illiberalism and authoritarianism, as it did in Latin America in the 1960s to 1990s. Alternatively, understanding TFP's origins and history through time and across continents and the movement's *contempt for women and the poor, the extolling of wealth as part of its ideology* (Gruca 2007) could prove to be the TFP crusader's Achilles heel.

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NEIL DATTA

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SAŽETAK

SUVREMENI KRIŽARI U EUROPI.

TRADICIJA, OBITELJ I VLASNIŠTVO: ANALIZA TRANSNACIONALNIH,
ULTRAKONZERVATIVNIH, KATOLICIZMOM
INSPIRIRANIH MREŽA UTJECAJA

Tri nedavna događaja koja se tiču seksualnih i reproduktivnih prava (predložena zabrana pobačaja u Poljskoj, blokiranje potpore inicijativi *She Decides* u Hrvatskoj i zaustavljanje Zakona o civilnom partnerstvu u Estoniji) potaknule su organizacije koje se doimaju poput nacionalne antene transnacionalne, socijalno konzervativne mreže Tradicija, obitelj i vlasništvo (Tradition, Family and Property – TFP). TFP je oznaka za skup međupovezanih konzervativnih i katolicizmom nadahnutih organizacija koje dijele svjetonazor blizak osnivaču TFP-a Plinia Corrêe de Oliveira. Nastao u Brazilu 1960-ih, a zatim proširen svijetom, TFP je već dugo pobunjenički pokret unutar katolicizma, a kojeg odlikuje specifičan način djelovanja kroz spajanje socijalnog konzervativizma, ekonomskog hiperliberalizma i naslijeđe bliskosti s krajnje desnim pokretima. Oslabljen u Latinskoj Americi, TFP je sada aktivna europska mreža s dominantnim stavovima protiv seksualnih i reproduktivnih prava (SRR). Utjecaj TFP-a na seksualna i reproduktivna prava zbiva se putem društvene mobilizacije, normativnog poduzetništva i ulaska u prostore donošenja odluka. TFP-u su se u Istočnoj Europi otvorili novi horizonti i ambicije za utjecaj na Europ-sku uniju i Ujedinjene narode. Reakcionarni narativ TFP-a, koji promiče pravovjernost i posvećuje ekonomske nejednakosti, mogao bi postati privlačan kao religijska legitimacija iliberalizma i autoritarizma.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: reproduktivna prava, ultrakonzervativizam, religijski pokreti.



PRIKAZI



MARIJANA GRBEŠA, BERTO ŠALAJ

DOBAR, LOŠ ILI ZAO? POPULIZAM U HRVATSKOJ

TIMPress, Zagreb, 2018, str. 307.

Dobar, loš ili zao? *Populizam u Hrvatskoj* prva je ozbiljna studija populizma na hrvatskom jeziku. Autori se ne bave samo populizmom u Hrvatskoj, kako bi se moglo pomisliti iz naslova studije, nego nude kritički pregled teorijskih i metodoloških pristupa proučavanju populizma u suvremenoj politološkoj literaturi u svijetu. Premda je knjiga strukturirana na osam poglavlja, zapravo se može podijeliti na dvije tematske cjeline: opće teorijsko i metodološko razmatranje populizma, te autorsko pozicioniranje unutar njega (pogl. 1–6), i empirijska analiza populizma u Hrvatskoj (pogl. 7).

Opisujući povijest populizma, autori ističu kako je to vrlo star politički fenomen koji se korijeni u kasnoj Rimskoj Republici gdje je označavao političku frakciju u Senatu, *populares*, koja je zastupala interese naroda, nasuprot senatskoj frakciji *optimates*, koja je zastupala interese elite. No, u moderni politički život širom ulazi potkraj 19. stoljeća u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama – to je „domovina“ suvremenog populizma (str. 86) – kao naziv za političko djelovanje Narodne stranke (*People's Party*). Predmetom politoloških rasprava postaje gotovo stoljeće kasnije, ponajprije u studijama Margaret Canovan, Matthewa Goodwina i Michaela Kazina. Poslije Drugoga svjetskog rata širi se i u druge dijelove svijeta, poglavito u Latinsku Ameriku koju zahvaćaju čak tri velika vala populizma, vezana najčešće za političke prakse predsjednikâ južnoameričkih država: Juana Peróna u Argentini i Getúlija Vargasa u Brazilu u prvome klasičnom poslijeratnom valu, Alberta Fujimorija u Peruu i Carlosa Menema u Argentini u drugome „neoliberalnom“ valu, te Huga Chaveza u Venezueli, Eva Moralesa u Boliviji, Rafaela Corree u Ekvadoru i Daniela Ortege u Nikaragvi u trećem valu.

Kako je populizam doživio svojevrsnu eksploziju od sedamdesetih godina 20. stoljeća u Zapadnoj Europi, da bi se kasnije proširio na Srednju i Istočnu Europu, autori su ponudili najiscrpniju i najdiferenciraniju analizu tog fenomena upravo na našem kontinentu. Analiza obuhvaća i 26 tabličnih prikaza glavnih populističkih aktera, njihovih recentnih izbornih rezultata, političkog statusa u matičnim zemljama i Europskoj

uniji. Iz tipologije je očito kako u suvremenoj Europi prevladava desni populizam (Austrija, Belgija, Danska, Finska, Francuska, Grčka, Italija, Mađarska, Nizozemska, Njemačka, Poljska, Švicarska, Velika Britanija), rjeđi je lijevi populizam (Grčka, Nizozemska, Njemačka, Španjolska), a najrjeđi centristički populizam koji obuhvaća aktere koji su obično označeni kao sporni granični slučajevi (Češka, Slovenija, Španjolska). Posebna su kategorija zemlje u kojima postoji desni i lijevi, desni i centristički ili lijevi i centristički populizam (Grčka, Italija, Nizozemska, Njemačka, Španjolska). Posljedica bujanja toga fenomena, ponajprije u Europi, bio je i nastanak mnoštva znanstvenih radova u kojima su se istaknuli politolozi – Cas Mudde, Michael Freeden, Daniele Allbertazzi, Duncan McDonnell, Paul Taggart, Yves Meny, Yves Surel, Robert Jansen, Kurt Weyland i dr. – bavili njime stvorivši teorijske i metodološke temelje za empirijske analize pojedinih slučajeva ili, obratno, poopćavajući uvide stečene analizama pojedinih empirijskih slučajeva u teorijske koncepte.

Autori smatraju da uzroke širenja i jačanja populizma treba tražiti „u kombinaciji strukturnih činitelja i djelovanja određenih aktera“ (str. 139). Među strukturnim uvjetima razlikuju kontekstualne i latentne činitelje. U kontekstualne čimbenike ubrajaju socijalno-ekonomske (ekonomske krize) i socijalno-kulturne dimenzije (prevladavajuće političke stavove građana), politički sustav (strukturu i djelotvornost podsustava političkog sustava, napose izbornoga i stranačkog) i medije. Među latentnim čimbenicima izdvajaju napetost između liberalizma i demokracije, napetost između demokratskih ideala i demokratske prakse, te opet medije. Da bi svi ti čimbenici „proizveli“ populizam, moraju postojati politički akteri – pojedini političari, nerijetko karizmatične ličnosti, političke stranke i društveni pokreti – koji artikuliraju i promiču populistične opcije i prakse. Taj odnos autori sažimlju na sljedeći način: „... Populizam je latentno prisutan u strukturi i praksi suvremenih liberalno-demokratskih političkih poređaka, a oživljava i jača u situacijama velikih društvenih, ekonomskih i političkih kriza, posebice u slučajevima pojave vještih populističkih vođa, te postojanja medijskog sustava u kojemu dominira populističko novinarstvo i/ili postojanja medija sklonih davati veliki prostor populističkim idejama i akterima“ (str. 157).

U znanstvenoj literaturi autori razaznaju pet pristupa populizmu: (a) kao tipu stranačke organizacije, (b) kao strategiji političke mobilizacije, (c) kao političkom diskursu, (d) kao stilu političke komunikacije i (e) kao političkoj ideologiji. U suvremenim raspravama prevladavaju dva posljednja pristupa. Jedna skupina autora smatra da se populizam može svesti na stil političke komunikacije, nadideološki politički govor ili političku retoriku, koji su svojstveni svim političkim i društvenim akterima (pojedincima, političkim strankama, društvenim pokretima, medijima,

interesnim skupinama i dr.). Svima je zajedničko pozivanje na narod i identificiranje s narodom ili „običnim građanima“ u ime čijih interesa nastupaju. Druga skupina autora tvrdi da je populizam više od stila političke komunikacije i političke retorike te da se može, kako je to učinio Cas Mudde, jedan od najutjecajnijih analitičara populizma, definirati kao „ideologija koja dijeli društvo na dvije antagonistične skupine, poštenu narod i korumpiranu elitu, i koja tvrdi da bi politika trebala biti izraz opće volje naroda“ (str. 38). Oba su suprotstavljena entiteta homogena: sve su socijalne, etničke, vjerske, rasne, profesionalne i druge razlike u narodu nebitne u odnosu prema njegovoj zajedničkoj antagonizirajućoj poziciji prema otuđenima, nesposobnima, korumpiranima, manipulativnima političkim elitama, koje su pak „sve iste“, neovisno o političkima i ideološkim razlikama među njima. Demokracija mora biti vladavina suverenog naroda, a ne političkih elita. Vrlo je utjecajno mišljenje, koje je izvorno oblikovao Michael Freedon, da je populizam „slaba“ (*thin*) ideologija koju karakterizira prepoznatljiva, ali ograničena morfologija, te koja ni ne pokušava odgovoriti na sva pitanja na koja odgovaraju „jake“ ideologije. Neki autori takav pristup populizmu nazivaju ideacijskim kako bi istaknuli da je riječ o skupu ideja koji „politiku razumijeva kao manjevaljsku borbu naroda i elita“ (str. 43).

Svoj teorijski pristup autori nazivaju inkluzivnim zato što uključuje i shvaćanje populizma kao „slabe“ političke ideologije, i shvaćanje populizma kao stila političke komunikacije. Vlastitim doprinosom proučavanju smatraju konceptualiziranje populizma kao svojevrsne metaideologije – nadređenoga rodnog pojma koji obuhvaća pojedine političke ideologije koje neka zajednička svojstva povezuju, a neka ih posebna svojstva razdvajaju. Na taj su način populizam kao metaideologiju postavili ne istu ravan na kojoj se nalaze monizam i pluralizam. Kao što metaideologijski monizam obuhvaća fašizam, komunizam i vjerski fundamentalizam, a pluralizam liberalizam, konzervativizam, kršćansku i socijalnu demokraciju, tako populizam uključuje lijevi, desni i centristički pravac. Konstitutivne dimenzije populizma kao političke ideologije čine, ukratko, pozitivno vrednovanje naroda i negativno vrednovanje elita. Te su dvije dimenzije nerazdvojna ideološka svojstva populizma i ne može ga konstituirati samo jedna od njih. Protuelitizam je svojstven i nekima drugim ideologijama koje „ne diviniziraju“ narod, primjerice „antipolitičkoj tehnokraciji“ (str. 52), dok je „diviniziranje“ naroda svojstveno političkim mišljenjima i ideologijama koje nisu nužno protuelitističke općenito, odnosno ograničene su na kritiku samo konkurentске političke elite, kao u nekima pluralističnim ideologijama.

Budući da su u prvom dijelu artikularali svoju teorijsku poziciju, u drugom dijelu svoj pojam populizma operacionaliziraju i primjenjuju u

empirijskim istraživanjima u Hrvatskoj. Drugu tematsku cjelinu stoga čine prikazi istraživačkog dizajna i rezultata provedenih istraživanja. Autori su se u dosadašnjem radu ograničili na empirijska istraživanja ponude populizma (*supply-side of populism*), to jest prisutnosti i intenzivnosti populizma među političarima, političkim strankama i nekima političkim grupacijama, dok je istraživanje potražnje za populizmom (*demand-side of populism*) ostavljeno budućim radovima. U istraživanjima su koristili kvalitativne i kvantitativne metode analize sadržaja. Iz „Matrice za analizu sadržaja“, koja je tiskana u Dodatku na kraju knjige, vidljivo je kako su autori koncipirali analizu sadržaja i primijenili je u trima empirijskim istraživanjima u Hrvatskoj što su provedena od 2014. do 2017.

Prvo istraživanje obuhvatilo je analizu dvjestotinjak intervjuja što ih je šest poznatih političara što ih je javnost obično percipirala kao populiste i pet etabliranih glavnostrujaških političara koje javnost obično nije percipirala kao populiste dalo najvažnijima nacionalnim i regionalnim hrvatskim novinama između dvaju ciklusa lokalnih izbora 2009. i 2013. Pokazalo se da se njihovi stavovi prema narodu i političkim elitama znatno razlikuju. Indikativan je i nalaz da nijedan pretpostavljeni populist nije sebe smatrao dijelom političke elite, a da su se političkim profesionalcima smatrali svi etablirani političari. Drugo empirijsko istraživanje obuhvatilo je stil komunikacije četvero kandidata na predsjedničkim izborima 2014/2015. Populistički stil komuniciranja istražuje se na temelju prisutnosti triju dimenzija: (a) pridavanja eksplicitnoga pozitivnog značenja pojmu naroda (alternativno: hrvatskoga naroda, Hrvata, građana) kao homogenog kolektiviteta i pripisivanja negativnog značenja pojmu elita (alternativno: političari); (b) nastojanja kandidata da se prikažu kao zastupnici naroda korištenjem neformalnoga i privatnog jezika; (c) uporabe „praznog označitelja“ koji je tipičan za populistični diskurs, a koji je u ovome slučaju ispunjen pojmom „opasnih drugih“ (medija, financijskih elita, etničkih, vjerskih, seksualnih i drugih manjina, Europske unije). Pojam „prazni označitelj“ autori preuzimaju od Ernesta Laclaua koji tako naziva i „narod“ i „dominantan blok“ u populističkom diskursu, svodeći ih na simbolične figure koje se mogu ispuniti različitim sadržajima. Treće empirijsko istraživanje bavilo se populističnošću političkih stranaka u Hrvatskoj, a autori su se usredotočili na Most, razmjerno novu stranku, koju je većina dnevnih političkih komentatora smatrala populističnom.

Ni teorijske rasprave ni metodološki dizajni empirijskih istraživanja populizma nisu, kako ističu i sami autori, „završena priča“. Osim doprinosa teorijskome i empirijskom izučavanju populizma, studija *Dobar, loš ili zao?* otvara nova istraživačka pitanja i postavlja nove metodološke dvojbe u izučavanju populizma. Posebno se izazovnim čini teorijsko problematiziranje shvaćanja populizma kao političke metaideologije koja je smje-

štena na istu ravan s političkim monizmom i političkim pluralizmom. Kako politički monizam i politički pluralizam imaju neposredne posljedice za političko ustrojstvo i organizaciju društva, a koje se izražavaju u uspostavi dvaju bitno različitih tipova političkih poredaka, totalitarnoga i demokratskog, autori bi u budućim radovima trebali pokazati što su institucionalno-političke posljedice populizma. Drugim riječima, kakav politički poredak proizlazi iz populizma kao političke metaideologije? Objašnjenje prema kojemu populizam proizvodi „dualističko strukturiranje politike kao prostora antagoniziranja dobrog i poštenog naroda i loše i korumpirane političke elite“ (str. 49) ne odgovara na to pitanje, jer se takav prostor može otvoriti i unutar pluralističnoga političkog poretka. To je tim važnije što se autori nisu izričito odredili prema pitanju je li institucionalna-politička posljedica populizma izravna demokracija, koja je modelski suprotstavljena predstavničkoj demokraciji, premda empirijski obrasci predstavničke demokracije mogu imati ugrađene i neke elemente izravne demokracije, najčešće referendum. U tom bi sklopu bilo važno razmotriti i tradicionalne i nove koncepte „plebiscitarne demokracije“. No zadaća dobrog znanstvenog djela nije samo da zatvara stara nego i da otvara nova istraživačka pitanja te time upućuje na nove pravce istraživanja.

Važno je što se proučavanje populizma općenito i u Hrvatskoj posebno nije ograničilo na teorijska razmatranja nego je zasnovano i na empirijskim istraživanjima. Upravo su ona omogućila autorima da, među ostalim, dođu do javno neuvriježenih spoznaja o profilu pojedinih političara, primjerice Ive Josipovića, i političkih stranaka, primjerice Mosta. Inovativni su i neki pristupi teorijskom razmatranju populizma. Ističem uvrštavanje strukturne napetosti između liberalizma i demokracije u modelu suvremene liberalne demokracije među latentne uzroke nastanka, širenja i jačanja populizma, i to upravo u starima i konsolidiranim europskim demokracijama. Zaključno, riječ je o vrlo dobroj i poticajnoj studiji jednoga „fluidnoga“ političkog fenomena kojega je vrlo teško odrediti i analizirati.

Mirjana Kasapović

SINIŠA MALEŠEVIĆ

DRŽAVE-NACIJE I NACIONALIZMI. ORGANIZACIJA, IDEOLOGIJA I SOLIDARNOST

Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 247 str., 2017.

Siniša Malešević, redovni profesor Škole sociologije na Univerzitet-skom koledžu u Dublinu (School of Sociology, *University College Dublin*), jedan je od vodećih sociologa današnjice na polju proučavanja nacije, nacionalizma, etničke vezanosti i organizovanog nasilja u uporedno-istorijskoj perspektivi. Ako je na izbor pomenutih tema istraživanja najverovatnije uticalo podneblje s kojega je potekao, onda je njihovo duboko teorijsko i uporedno-istorijsko promišljanje olakšala izvesna odmaknutost od ovih prostora, kao i svest o značaju njihovog proučavanja s obzirom na činjenicu da su se raširenost i značaj nacionalne identifikacije u poslednje vreme značajno uvećali diljem sveta (15).

Njegova knjiga *Države-nacije i nacionalizmi* predstavlja originalan pokušaj teorijskog promišljanja i uporedno-istorijskog istraživanja nastanka i razvoja nacija. Autor ostaje veran modernističkom pristupu, kojega je zastupao i u ranijim studijama¹, ali nalazi organizacijske i ideološke korene nacije u prošlim oblicima društvene organizacije. Jasno se suprotstavljajući ne samo iskoncima (primordijalisti) i mnogovekovcima (perenijalisti), već i etnosimboličkom pristupu Antonija Smita (Anthony D. Smith), koji poreklo modernih nacija nalazi u kulturnim odlikama predmodernih etnija (koje postaju u modernom dobu etnička jezgra modernih nacija), a svestan da one nisu mogle nastati ni iz čega ili kao puki proizvod nastojanja državnih institucija i nacionalističkih intelektualaca, što neretko pojednostavljeno ističu modernisti, Malešević se, prihvatajući uverenje etnosimbolista i mnogovekovaca da treba izučavati dugotrajne procese, posvećuje *longue durée* istraživanju predmodernih političkih organizacija stanovništva, jer se, po njegovom mišljenju, upravo tu nalaze začeci organizacionih, ideoloških i osećajno-solidarnih osnova modernih nacija. Naime, reč je o tome da, prema Maleševićevom mišljenju,

1 (2006). *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism*. London: Palgrave; (2004). *The Sociology of Ethnicity*. London, LA, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington D.C: Sage.

nije bitan kulturni, već organizacioni, a posredno i ideološki kontinuitet za nastanak nacije. Upravo zbog toga, autor istražuje: 1. dugotrajnu kumulativnu birokratizaciju prisile; 2. centrifugalnu ideologizaciju; 3. način na koji ova dva procesa utiču na razvoj društvene mikrosolidarnosti i njeno širenje iz primarnih društvenih grupa na čitavu naciju (17, 78).

Malešević prati kumulativnu birokratizaciju prisile, izazvanu potrebom ratovanja, potčinjavanja i organizovanja velikih skupina stanovništva, kroz različite istorijske velike društvene organizacije: plemenske saveze, gradove-države, kraljevstva, prvobitna carstva (čemu je posvećeno drugo poglavlje „Solidarnost u skupinama prije države-nacije“, str. 31–67), i naposljetku, nacije-države (treće poglavlje „Rađanje i širenje nacionalizma“, str. 69–102). Razume se, ova kumulativna birokratizacija prisile mora se opravdati, jer nijedna prisila se ne trpi ako nije ideološki ubedljivo pravdana i duboko usvojena. Ono što je predmoderne političke zajednice sprečavalo da postanu nacije odnosilo se na njihovo duboko neegalitarno, odnosno hijerarhijsko ustrojstvo, iako su imale ideologije kojima su pravdale svoje postojanje i društvene hijerarhije (55). Pojam nacije bio je ograničen na vrlo male elitne društvene grupacije, koje su bile etnički raznolike. Primerice, podela Poljske dovela je do toga da je 1795. dve trećine ruskog naslednog plemstva bilo poljskog porekla, dok u XVIII veku mnogi ugarski plemići nisu govorili mađarskim jezikom (61–2). Ideološkom pravdanju služile su u predmodernom vremenu mitologija (ne-ljudsko poreklo roda, odnosno plemena, npr. totemizam), religija (božansko poreklo monarha) ili imperijalne doktrine (najčešće o civilizatorskim, odnosno *Kulturträger* misijama).² U modernom vremenu, međutim, nacionalizam, ideologija koja poništava dotadašnje „društvene hijerarhije i prirodna prava koja se zasnivaju na statusu“, stvara teritorijalno omeđenu državu koja se ne zasniva na ličnim kletveničkim odnosima vernosti i pravda državu-naciju kao političku zajednicu suverenog naroda, kojega čine građani jednake moralne vrednosti, ali i u velikoj meri kulturno istovrsni, što je izuzetak u celoj dotadašnjoj istoriji sedelačkih političkih zajednica (21, 38, 49, 79–80).

Ova kulturna istovrsnost postaje organizaciono i ideološko načelo nacionalnih država (80). Otuda se francuski revolucionari „nisu protivili samo plemstvu, svećenstvu i konzervativnom seljaštvu, nego su se osobito neprijateljski odnosili prema svakom vidljivom znaku kulturne različitosti“, pa je i jedan od vođa revolucije opat Gregoar (Abbé Grégoire) napisao „Izveštaj o nužnosti i sredstvima uništenja *patoisa* (manjinskih jezika) i

2 Naravno, Malešević, kao poštovalac dela Majkla Mena (Michael Mann), sasvim je svestan da ovo važi samo u idealno-tipskom smislu, jer današnje imperije pravdaju svoje imperijalno delanje demokratijom i slobodnim preduzetništvom (49), čemu se mogu dodati kosmopolitska nastojanja društvenih elita uz istovremenu primenu „humanitarnih diskursa ljudskih prava“ (203).

univerzaliziranja upotrebe francuskog jezika“ (85). Istorija SAD pokazuje, pak, da je ova nacija i buduća imperija sazdana na genocidu nad urođenicima i stalnom ekspanzivnom ratovanju (86–7).

Naposletku, na socijalno-psihičkom nivou, pojedinci moraju solidarnost koju osećaju u porodičnom ili uskom prijateljskom krugu preneti na širu političku zajednicu, a ideologija, ako je učinkovita, upravo to omogućava. U tom smislu je nacionalizam, uprkos njegove „tanke“ teorijske prirode, najmoćnija ideologija, jer on se centrifugalno širi iz centra ka obodima države-nacije, dok se solidarnost iz porodice posredstvom ustanova države i civilnog društva (obrazovne i naučne ustanove, vojska, sredstva masovnog opštenja, dobrotvorna društva itd.) širi po celoj naciji, pa nacionalizam neosetno ispunjava svakodnevicu svih pripadnika neke nacije (88–9). Uistinu, tek kada „nacija postane nerazlučivom od vlastite uže obitelji, lako je moguće da će se svaka naznaka pokušaja nacionalnog poniženja protumačiti kao napad na bliske članove obitelji“ (100).

Upravo se u tome ogleda banalizacija nacionalizma, kojom se autor opširnije bavi u petom poglavlju („Svemoć trivijalnosti“, str. 135–169), suprotstavljajući se podeli na banalni i užareni nacionalizam, jer „nacionalizam u javnosti održavaju upravo organizacijska ukorijenjenost i rutina, koje omogućuju i njegov prelazak na nasilje u kriznim vremenima“ (128). Naime, nacionalizam je uistinu uspostavljen kao vladajuća ideologija tek kada postane banalan, tj. osvedočavan u različitim svakodnevnim situacijama u kojima se nalaze pojedinci (27–8), jer „se snaga svake ideologije najbolje mjeri njezinom nevidljivosti u narodu“ (157), tj. kada se prihvata zdravo za gotovo. Kolika je njegova snaga najbolje govori činjenica da nacionalisti nacionalnu državu smatraju prirodnom, a višenacionalne veštačkim, pa autor mora jasno staviti do znanja da „države-nacije nisu ni po čemu prirodne, jer su ljudska bića u glavnini svoga postojanja na ovom planetu živjela u drugim društvenim organizacijama koje imaju malo toga zajedničkog“ s njom (71).

Razume se, kao jedan od vodećih istraživača kako nacionalizma tako i organizovanog nasilja, Malešević se morao posvetiti i istraživanju veza između te dve pojave (četvrto poglavlje „Nacionalističke ideologije i nasilje“, str. 103–133). Za razliku od njihovog banalnog uzročnog povezivanja, čemu je sklona i sociološka misao, autor izričito tvrdi da ove pojave mogu, ali i ne moraju da budu povezane, pa je, štaviše, nacionalizam „rijetko kad primarni uzrok nasilnih postupaka“ (27). No, ne može se potceniti značaj geopolitičkog konteksta za nastanak različitih nacija, jer one su, tvrdi Malešević, uvek „dio većeg regionalnog i globalnog sustava koji se sastoji od mnoštva država-nacija, a često i drugih političkih entiteta“, dok „presudnu ulogu“ u njihovom nastanku igraju ratovi i revolucije (73). U modernom dobu se, pak, većina „političkih postupanja artikulira i

opravdava u okvirima nacionalizma“, pa otuda i pogrešna sklonost da se nacionalizam smatra prevashodnim uzrokom nasilnih dešavanja (113). Nasuprot tome, kad se ljudi „odlučuju umrijeti ili ubiti, velike ideološke pripovijesti poput 'nacionalnih ciljeva', 'socijalizma', 'rasne čistoće' ili 'islamske *umme*' uglavnom padaju u drugi plan pred osjećajima privrženosti, odgovornosti i dužnosti prema mikroskupini“ (129).

Uz sve pomenuto, Malešević kritikuje pomodni govor i poplavu istraživanja o „nacionalnom identitetu“ (šesto poglavlje „S onu stranu nacionalnog identiteta“, str. 171–195), predlažući da se teorijska pažnja s identiteta prebaci na društvenu organizaciju, ideologiju i solidarnost (28, 172), uprkos činjenici da osam od deset Evropljanki i Evropljana svoj nacionalni identitet smatra važnim ili veoma važnim (171). Naime, autor tvrdi „da su za postojanje nacionalnog identiteta dokazi oskudni, kako prije tako i poslije moderniteta“ (174–5), te da verovanje u postojanje nečega to nešto ne čini stvarnim (183). Reč je o tome da „nijedna tvrdnja o identitetu nije lišena ideologije“, te da je potpuno neupitno prihvatanje postojanja nacionalnog identiteta pokazatelj njegove ideološke banalizacije, čemu naročito doprinose teoretičari i istraživači nacionalnog identiteta (184). Umesto da se istražuje ideologija nacionalizma, koja stvara i održava identitet kao samorazumljivu činjenicu, istražuje se nacionalni identitet, a istraživanjem identiteta ne dopire se do uzroka njegove „reprodukcije“ (191, 195).

Naposletku, poslednje poglavlje („Budućnost nacionalizma“, str. 197–214) posvećeno je analiziranju uticaja kapitalizma, globalizacije, novih tehnologija, verskog radikalizma, neoliberalizma i terorizma na državnacije i nacionalizam. Zaključak je da niti jedan od tih procesa niti ikakva ideologija i praksa mogu ugroziti pojave kojima je posvetio svoju studiju (29), jer „nacionalizam teško nestaje“ i biće živ „sve dok ustanove moderne države--nacije reproduciraju ideologiju nacionalizma u rutinskoj formi, primjerice u školstvu, masovnim medijima, državnim službama, vojsci, policiji, sudovima, području javnosti itd“ (127). Za to potvrdu nalazi i u istraživanjima koja pokazuju da je, uprkos načelnoj suprotstavljenosti islama nacionalizmu, većina muslimana privrženica svojim nacionalnim državama i da se u tome ne razlikuje previše od nemuslimana (208). Takođe, kapitalizam i nacionalizam su međusobno zavisne pojave, a konzumerizam često prati razvoj nacionalističkih projekata (201, 203). Zaista, u pravu je autor kada tvrdi da globalni sportski događaji, npr. olimpijske igre i svetska fudbalska prvenstva, žive od masovne proizvodnje i prodaje 'nacionalnih' proizvoda, pa globalizacija, ekonomska liberalizacija, kapitalizam i konzumerizam jačaju prodor nacionalističke ideologije na čitavoj planeti (204–5). Prema tome, za nacionalizam i nacionalnu državu nema zime ni u doglednoj budućnosti.

Iz svega rečenoga je jasno da se radi o jednoj zanimljivoj i originalnoj studiji iz koje će svako zainteresovan za pojave nacije i nacionalizma imati mnogo toga da nauči. No, svaka studija ima i svojih nedostataka. Sa stano-
višta etnosimbolista, koje autor neopravdano svrstava u neodirkemovce, iako se zapravo radi o neoveberovcima (Entoni Smit se uostalom tako i samopoimao), zanemarivanje etničke povezanosti u predmodernom dobu svakako predstavlja nedostatak. Iako je autor unekoliko nadomestio mane uobičajenog modernističkog posmatranja nacije, on zbog pomenutog nedostatka nije mogao da ih sasvim ukloni, pa iako je problemu pristupio iz uporedno-istorijske perspektive. Takođe, insistiranje na načelno nenasilnoj prirodi nacionalizma teško je održivo u svetlu pravdanja nasilja nacionalističkim argumentima kojem kako nacionalistički tako i pragmatični vođi pribegavaju u kriznim situacijama. Činjenica da ovo nasilje neretko nije prevashodno motivisano nacionalnim razlozima, već kriminalnim ili lukrativnim ili utilitarnim ili pragmatičnim ili potrebom odbrane svojih bližnjih, na čemu autor s pravom insistira, ne može osporiti čestu pojavu da se, bez obzira na stvarne motive koji su doveli do upotrebe nasilja, nacionalističkom ideologijom ona podstiče i pravda. O tome, nažalost, imamo i suviše svedočanstava iz međusobnih odnosa južnoslovenskih nacija.

No, pomenuti nedostaci predstavljaju tek kap u čistom i dubokom moru Maleševićevih socioloških uvida u pojave nacionalizma i nacije. Takvo more je u većoj meri namenjeno iskusnijim plivačima, ali i početnici mogu tu proplivati, pod uslovom da imaju dobre učitelje.

Jovo Bakić

JOHN RAWLS

TEORIJA PRAVDE.

Zagreb: Feniks knjiga, 2017, 456 str.

Izdavačka kuća Feniks knjiga izdala je 2017. godine prijevod kapitalnog djela Johna Rawlsa "A Theory of Justice", koje je u originalu objavljeno 1971, dok je revidirano izdanje objavljeno 1975. godine. Riječ je o prvom prijevodu najvažnijeg djela ovog autora na hrvatski jezik. Sudbina prijevoda Rawlsovih djela prati tendenciju u hrvatskom izdavaštvu da se prvo prevode manje važna djela određenog autora. Tako su u izdanju izdavačke kuće KruZak prethodno izašli „Politički liberalizam“ (2000) i „Pravo narodâ i 'Preispitivanje ideje javnog uma“ (2004).

Rawlsovo najvažnije djelo izašlo je pod naslovom „Teorija pravde“. Kako i sam autor piše u predgovoru, „[o]vo je opsežna knjiga, ne samo po broju stranica“. (str. xvi) U njoj Rawls iz raznih uglova iznosi, propituje, dokazuje i komentira svoju teoriju pravde kao nepristranosti, zbog koje je često smatran najvažnijim političkim filozofom 20. stoljeća.

U prvom dijelu knjige Rawls iznosi glavne postavke svoje teorije. Rawlsova teorija pravde proizlazi iz ugovorne tradicije kako su je zastupali Locke, Rousseau i Kant, te je teorijski postavljena nasuprot tradicionalno dominantnom utilitarizmu. Mnogi pojmovi pomoću kojih Rawls gradi svoju teoriju preuzeti su ili su izvedeni iz teorije društvenog ugovora – primjerice, prvotno stanje te izvorni sporazum. Sam Rawls kaže da u njegovoj teoriji „prvotno stanje jednakosti odgovara prirodnom stanju u tradicionalnoj teoriji društvenog ugovora“ (str. 10). Tako su načela pravde ona načela koja bi slobodne i racionalne osobe prihvatile u početnom stanju jednakosti. Početno je stanje hipotetično stanje, karakterizirano sljedećim važnim pojmom u Rawlsovoj teoriji – velom neznanja, koje označava da u početnom stanju nitko ne zna svoje mjesto u društvu, svoj klasni položaj ni društveni status, svoju sudbinu u raspodjeli prirodnih prednosti i sposobnosti, svoju inteligenciju i snagu, kao ni svoje shvaćanje dobra, svoje posebne psihološke sposobnosti, čak ni konkretne okolnosti svog vlastitog društva. Specifičnost Rawlsove teorije pravde je da se načela pravde „biraju iza vela neznanja“. (str. 10, str. 104) Upravo iz vela neznanja proizlazi pravda kao nepristranost – ona se bira u prvotnom stanju čija je glavna osobina nepristranost koju veo neznanja omogućuje.

U takvom prvotnom stanju biraju se prva načela koncepcije pravde koja dalje reguliraju društvene institucije. Naime, primarni je predmet pravde za Rawlsa osnovna struktura društva, odnosno „uređenje glavnih društvenih institucija u jednu shemu suradnje“ (str. 42). Tako je pravda prva, odnosno određujuća vrlina društvenih institucija koje su, zapravo, javni sustav pravila. Institucije su predmet drugog dijela knjige. U njemu se Rawls bavi načelima pravde za institucije – detaljnije definira i propituje pojam slobode, te se bavi udjelima u raspodjeli – te dužnostima i obvezama kao načelima za pojedince. U ovom dijelu Rawls donosi i zanimljivu usporedbu svoje teorije s Kantovom. Naposljetku, nakon detaljne razrade od samog početka knjige, donosi i konačnu definiciju dvaju načela pravde: 1. Svaka osoba treba imati pravo na najširi ukupni sustav jednakih osnovnih sloboda koji je kompatibilan sa sličnim sustavom slobode za sve; 2. Društvene i ekonomske nejednakosti trebaju biti uređene tako da budu oboje: a) od najveće koristi onima u najnepovoljnijem položaju, u skladu s načelom pravedne štednje, i b) da su u vezi sa službama i položajima koji su otvoreni svima pod uvjetima nepristrane jednakosti mogućnosti. Ovim načelima pridružena su i dva pravila prioriteta koja definiraju prioritet slobode, te prioritet pravde nad efikasnošću i blagostanjem (str. 231–232).

U trećem dijelu knjige, koji je naslovljen „Ciljevi“ (“Ends”), Rawls se bavi pojmom dobrote, točnije dobrotom kao racionalnošću, te moralnom psihologijom tematizirajući osjećaj za pravdu. Naposljetku, teoriju pravde povezuje s društvenim vrijednostima i dobrom zajednice, odnosno pravdom kao dobrom. Rawls teoriju pravde u ovoj knjizi razrađuje od najuže povezanih pojmova do širokog pogleda na pravdu kao nepristranost, tako da treći dio knjige sadržava najšire problematiziranje pravde.

Prijevod ovako važnog djela nesumnjivo je važan trenutak za stručnu javnost i znanstvenu zajednicu. No, nažalost, ovaj prijevod pati od brojnih nedostataka. U prvom redu, sam prijevod sadrži pregršt gramatičkih pogrešaka i tipfelera. Tako prevoditelj koristi nepostojeće oblike riječi, primjerice „idenje“, „korišćenje“, „podastrijeo“, „oprijeo se“, „akoli“, „nekmoli“, „uskorenje“, „poređaj“, „bijući“ (od gl. biti), „nepodesna“, „udjelba“, „ništično“, „sućanski“ itd. Prevoditelj ne vlada ni konstrukcijom upitnih rečenica, što se vidi u primjerima „je li to je ili nije slučaj“, „je li važnost pravde zahtijeva jednaku slobodu za sve“, „je li takva načela postoje“, „je li takvo tumačenje postoji“, „je li ograničava“ itd. Problematična je i upotreba instrumentalna: „bavit ću se s jednim“, „počinje s idejom“. Naposljetku, prijevod je pun pogrešaka u korištenju „č“ i „ć“: „zamječujući“, „krećući“, „promiću“, „uskračuje“, „ovlašćuju“, „prisječajući“, „stećenim“, „poistovječene“, „najpreće“. Osim toga, čitanje teksta otežava i veliki broj tipfelera, pogotovo kako se knjiga bliži kraju – na nekim stranicama pri kraju teksta ima i po 10-ak

tipfelera po stranici. Poseban su problem i pogreške u prijelomu, primjerice u sadržaju se treći dio knjige zove „Zaključci“, a u tekstu „Ciljevi“. Navedeni su samo neki od primjera koji pokazuju da knjiga ima ozbiljnih problema s lekturom i korekturom, zbog čega ostavlja dojam nedovršenosti.

Još je jedan problem s ovim prijevodom to što unosi zbrku u terminologiju na hrvatskom jeziku. Tako primjerice i u knjigama u izdanju KruZaka pojam “theory of justice” preveden je kao „teorija pravednosti“, dok je ova knjiga prevedena kao „Teorija pravde“. U KruZakovim prijevodima također “justice as fairness” prevedeno je kao „pravednost kao pravičnost“, dok se u „Teoriji pravde“ ta sintagma prevodi kao „pravda kao nepristranost“ (Rawls, 2000; Rawls, 2004). Terminologija koja uključuje prijevode „teorija pravednosti“ i „pravda kao pravičnost“ ustalila se i u brojnim radovima o Johnu Rawlsu objavljenima na hrvatskom jeziku, primjerice kod Matan (2008), Matulović (1996), Kurelić (2003), Vujčić (2003), Posavec (2003), Kulenović (2003), Matan (2004), Posavec (2004), Zelić (2007), Brčić (2010), Zelić i Baccarini (2011), Eraković (2013), Ivanović (2014), Berdica (2016) i dr. U nekim radovima sintagma “justice as fairness” prevedena je kao „pravda kao poštenje“, primjerice kod Cvijanović (2003; 2006) i Kurelić (1994), dok u nekim slučajevima autori riječ “fairness” ostavljaju neprevedenu, primjerice Križan (1994), Uzelac (1994), Rodin (2003), no radi se o rijetkim primjerima.

S obzirom na sve navedeno, ovaj prijevod pomalo priziva talijansku izreku „traduttore, traditore“¹. Iako bi prijevod ovako važnog djela trebalo pozdraviti, na kvalitetan prijevod Rawlsovog kapitalnog djela morat ćemo još pričekati.

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